
WHO WATCHES THE WATCHERS? INSTITUTIONAL INVESTORS, CORPORATE POWER AND ACCOUNTABILITY IN IT SECTOR

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Executive Summary

Modern corporate governance depends heavily on investors to shape how managers act. These big financial groups hold a lot of power over multinational companies. There is very little oversight over how they use that power. The information technology sector adds complexity because of its fast growth and global reach. This study looks at the rules that are meant to hold institutional investors accountable in tech firms. Scholars say that when one agent watches another agent it creates agency problems in corporate structures. That's why it's important to look at the gaps in how institutional investors are monitored.

Current issues in governance are closely tied to institutional investors. These financial groups have a role in shaping how managers behave. They own amounts of stock in big companies but their influence is still not well understood. One area where this plays out is in the use of information technology. This paper aims to study the controls that exist over institutional investors in the IT field. Agency theory explains that multiple layers of management lead to relationships between principals and agents. Because of this the legal side of how these investors had overseen needs careful attention.

Most laws and regulations for investors do not require them to take more responsibility for their actions. Corporate law usually focuses on protecting the value of stock. It does not pay attention to protecting workers or society. In the IT industry this gap in the law allows companies to make cost-saving moves that hurt employees. Laws need to respond to the growing concentration of power in the hands of a few institutional investors. The idea of "watchdogs" is also important here. Often changes in laws come about because large economic players push for them. That means lawmakers should be required to think about interests when making rules about corporate governance in IT.

The legal responsibility of investors should be rethought. Changes in the law are needed to make sure they are more accountable. Agency costs in the IT world are high. That means legal action is necessary. Rules should be set to protect institutional investors when they go against powerful economic actors. It's important to create laws that require institutional investors to be more transparent when they cast proxy votes. Finally researchers believe the legal system for governance should be built so that financial actors are held responsible, for creating global public goods.

Chapter One: Introduction

Evolution of Corporate Power and Institutional Dominance

Corporate power has changed a lot from business owners to big groups that manage money. Funds that collect money from people and companies now own a part of the stock market. This concentration of money gives these groups a lot of control over how companies make decisions. In the technology industry this control affects the rules for software around the world. How people are hired. Experts who study laws need to check if the current rules for companies are good enough to deal with this growing power. Knowing how these big groups act is important, for keeping the market fair and making sure companies behave properly.¹

The Shift from Dispersed Share Ownership to Centralized Financial Hegemony

The historical development of law began with a model of widely spread share ownership. In this setup thousands of investors each owned small parts of large industrial companies. These ordinary shareholders often did not have time, money or ways to work together to keep an eye on company leaders. Because of this a classic problem arose the agency problem. It meant that managers could act in their interests without strong resistance from the scattered owners.

Now the structure of corporate ownership has changed dramatically. Today big institutional investors like funds, pension funds, hedge funds and sovereign wealth funds control huge portions of public company shares. They manage the savings and investments of millions of people.

¹ Wani, T. A., Haldar, A., & Ganie, I. R. (2023). In what contexts institutional investors can be catalyst? The moderating role of corporate governance. *International Journal of Global Business and Competitiveness*, 18(1), 70-79.

Legal scholars once saw these institutions as the solution. They believed that because of their size and resources institutional investors would be monitors. With much at stake they were expected to watch over executives and ensure good behavior. The idea was that they could fix the issue of collective action where many small investors struggle to act together.

This shift created a new challenge. Now that a few large groups control most of the shares the question is no longer, about how shareholders can control managers. Instead the real issue is who watches over these institutional investors themselves. They are supposed to be watchdogs. Do they need oversight too? The balance of power has. The legal system must adapt.

The Information Technology Sector as a Crucible of Unchecked Corporate Might

Institutional dominance touches every part of today's economy. In the information technology sector this influence creates special problems. The IT sector works differently than industries like steel or cars. It grows fast. It depends on networks where more users make the system more valuable.² It builds wealth from things that can't be touched like software, data and connections. Executives feel forced to increase user numbers. To make algorithms work harder to sell ads. To use data in ways that boost revenue. Often these moves ignore ethics. They risk privacy. They erode trust. They undermine labor standards.

The rules meant for factories and oil refineries do not fit companies. In manufacturing power flows through plants. In tech power lives in code and data. While the operation is scattered across servers, the money and control stay in the hands of a few powerful investors. These institutional investors use their ownership stakes to push companies toward moves. They encourage strategies that bring short-term gains. Those are often shifted onto society. When a platform crashes when misinformation spreads, when workers get exploited these burdens fall on citizens.³

The Recursive Agency Problem and the Myth of Passive Stewardship

At the center of this thesis is a legal issue called the recursive agency problem in company structures. Traditional agency theory believes there is a straight relationship between the

² Dasgupta, A., Fos, V., & Sautner, Z. (2021). Institutional investors and corporate governance. *Foundations and Trends® in Accounting*, 12(4), 279-394.

³ Al-Shaer, H., & Zaman, M. (2019). CEO compensation and sustainability reporting assurance: Evidence from the UK. *Journal of Business Ethics*, 158(1), 233-252.

company owner and the manager. When big investors get involved another level of agency is created. In this case the big money manager acts as a representative for people who invest and for those who get pensions. Lawyers say that these big representatives often have problems with their interests and different goals. Of being active supervisors who look closely at how a company works many big money managers choose to take a passive approach.⁴ They use automated rules for voting that just agree with what the company leaders want. This passive way of handling things keeps company leaders from being held responsible and also keeps investors from dealing with the results of bad company decisions. The legal system today thinks that competition in the market and people speaking up as owners are enough to fix these problems.. Real market situations show that big investors often act like quiet partners to the managers who make too many mistakes. To understand this kind of involvement it is important to look at the rules of the law and how they give power to big actors without making them responsible, for the needs of the whole society.

Reimagining Corporate Accountability through Legal Evolution

Confronting the rooted power of institutional investors demands a serious rethinking of corporate law and how we regulate companies. For years legal rules have been built around the idea that shareholders come first. This means that boards and investors are legally required to focus entirely on financial returns. These rules push companies to ignore needs, environmental damage and ethical concerns. In the IT sector this approach leads to cost-cutting unstable work for platform workers and little care for user privacy. The idea that markets can self-regulate and keep financial power in check is a myth. Experts who study this issue are calling for ways to govern. This thesis aims to show how changes in the law can transform investors. Of being distant financial players they can become publicly responsible stewards. By requiring transparency holding investors accountable through strong proxy voting rules and making corporate law reflect democratic values we can finally answer the hard question: who watches the watchers? The following chapters will carefully build this argument. They mix analysis, with real-world data to lay out a practical and sustainable path forward for governing the IT sector.⁵

⁴ Thomas, A. S., Jayachandran, A., & Biju, A. V. N. (2024). Strategic mapping of the environmental social governance landscape in finance—A bibliometric exploration through concepts and themes. *Corporate Social Responsibility and Environmental Management*, 31(5), 4428-4453.

⁵ Capelle-Blancard, G., & Petit, A. (2019). Every little helps? ESG news and stock market reaction. *Journal of business ethics*, 157(2), 543-565.

The Problem of Supervisory Voids

The central paradox of governance is that there is no oversight over the institutions meant to keep watch. Institutional investors are supposed to monitor managers but very few systems exist to monitor the investors themselves. This lack of supervision opens the door to short-term thinking and manipulation of markets. In the IT sector massive cash reserves and intangible assets make these governance issues even worse. Regulatory agencies find it hard to enforce accountability, in investment networks that cross national borders. As a result legal frameworks must address the fact that powerful institutional shareholders often operate with consequence.⁶

Research Scope and Legal Significance

This thesis looks at the connection between big investors and how technology companies are run. The main question is how the law can make these big groups behave in a way. By looking at the rules and real data this research shows what power companies really have. The importance is in suggesting changes to the law that will help people who're not in charge. This way of looking at things is the start of a legal review.

Research Aims and Objectives

Research Aims

This research thesis pursues four core aims. First this research thesis maps influence in the tech sector tracking how complex ownership structures and investments translate into board level power. Second this research thesis critiques existing accountability frameworks exposing governance gaps in corporate statutes that fail to address passive management and fiduciary duties. Third this research thesis analyzes secondary survey data on governance metrics to bridge legal concepts with empirical voting patterns. Finally this research thesis proposes legislative solutions, for policymakers aiming to close accountability gaps curb short-termism and foster sustainable long-term economic stability and responsible corporate behavior.⁷

⁶ McCahery, J. A., Sautner, Z., & Starks, L. T. (2016). Behind the scenes: The corporate governance preferences of institutional investors. *The Journal of Finance*, 71(6), 2905-2932.

⁷ Dyck, A., Lins, K. V., Roth, L., & Wagner, H. F. (2019). Do institutional investors drive corporate social responsibility? International evidence. *Journal of financial economics*, 131(3), 693-714.

Research Objectives

To achieve these research aims the study objectives are:

1. To show how institutions influence the IT industry by looking at how complicated ownership setups and big investments lead to control at the board level.
2. To question the legal systems that hold people responsible by finding the places where the laws don't cover everything and checking the points where duties for big money managers start.
3. To look at survey data about how companies run to find out how people vote and show the differences between what the laws say and what actually happens in companies.
4. To suggest laws that can be enforced for people who make the rules. These laws would fix the problem of not holding investors responsible stop focusing much on quick results and help make the economy stable, over a long time.

Chapter Two: Literature Review

Laws in countries make this a formal duty for directors. Critics say this narrow goal leads to problems for workers and local communities. Some legal thinkers propose a model one that includes stakeholders beyond just owners. In this view boards must consider a group of people affected by the company. These include employees, customers and the public. Institutional investors often oppose this change. They want to keep their profits flowing without restrictions.

The IT industry brings challenges in governance. Innovation moves fast and much of the value is not physical like software or data. This pressure may lead to cutting corners on security. It can also weaken standards in artificial intelligence. Legal studies show that institutional activism, in technology usually centers on money, not ethics. Because of this rules and oversight need to adapt. The digital economy has risks that traditional systems may not handle well.⁸

⁸ Brandon, R. G., Glossner, S., Krueger, P., Matos, P., & Steffen, T. (2020). Responsible institutional investing around the world. *Available at SSRN*.

The Berle-Means Paradigm and the Genesis of Modern Agency Theory

The intellectual foundation of governance research goes back to the important work of Adolf Berle and Gardiner Means. They made an observation about the modern corporation: ownership and control were becoming separate. As companies grew larger ownership was spread across thousands of shareholders. This meant that day-to-day decisions were left to managers. Because of this shift problems arose. There was a gap in information between managers and owners. Managers might act in their interest rather than in the interest of shareholders.⁹ To understand this scholars created the principal-agent model. In this model managers are the agents and shareholders are the principals. The idea was that managers should act in the interest of shareholders. This model relied on the assumption that shareholders could monitor managers effectively.

The Recursive Agency Problem and the Myth of the Monolithic Shareholder

While early experts saw investors as the main people watching over companies later legal studies found a big mistake in that idea: the appearance of another problem where one group is watching over another. Institutional investors don't have money themselves; they handle money that belongs to people like those with pensions or regular investors. Because of this the people who manage these funds work for the owners making a long line of people in charge. This line makes the real owners away from what is actually happening in the company. Legal experts say that the people who manage these funds often have reasons to do things they're not in the best interest of the real owners. For example the need to show results every few months can make these managers focus on quick gains from stocks instead of working with the companies they own shares in. Also the research shows that institutional investors are not all the same. This mix makes it hard to handle the side of these investments proving that thinking of these financial groups, as always looking out for the best interest of the owners is a big mistake.¹⁰

The Emerging Discourse on Stakeholder Capitalism and Institutional Trusteeship

In response to the problems with putting shareholders modern legal thinking has changed a lot.

⁹ Brav, A., Jiang, W., & Kim, H. (2015). The real effects of hedge fund activism: Productivity, asset allocation, and labor outcomes. *The Review of Financial Studies*, 28(10), 2723-2769.

¹⁰ Edmans, A., & Holderness, C. G. (2016). Blockholders: A survey of theory and evidence. *European Corporate Governance Institute (ECGI)-Finance Working Paper*, (475).

It now focuses more on models that take care of all the people involved not the people who own shares. Stakeholder theory says that companies have duties not to shareholders but to many other people, like workers, customers, local communities and even the people who use the internet. In the world of information technology this change is important because digital companies have an effect on society. Things like platforms, artificial intelligence and collecting a lot of data all have a big impact. New legal writing talks about how big investment groups should act like helpers instead of just trying to make money. This idea says that these investment groups hold the savings of people so they have a duty to act in the public interest. People who support this idea say that these investors should be required by law to look at things like the environment, issues and how companies are run along with just money. Right now the laws don't have strong ways to make this happen. So there is a difference, between what people want and what the laws actually do.

Identifying the Blind Spots in Current Legal Scholarship

Despite an amount of research on corporate governance current legal scholarship has major gaps about institutional investor accountability. First most legal writing looks closely at the link between boards and managers. It largely ignores the inner rules and regulatory responsibility of asset management firms, which is essential for institutional investor accountability. Second studies that link concentrations of institutional ownership to real problems in the IT sector like algorithmic bias, platform monopolies and insecure gig economy jobs are very few leaving institutional investor accountability poorly understood. Many papers treat the technology industry like any market and they do not consider the special network interactions and the way digital companies value intangible assets, which affects institutional investor accountability. By combining legal analysis, with real data studies this research charts the unknown area of institutional power and goes beyond old agency theories to give a full picture of accountability in the digital age thereby strengthening institutional investor accountability.¹¹

Gaps in Current Legal Scholarship

Current legal research often sees investors as single good market stabilizers.. Also there are few real data studies that connect institutional ownership to real harms in the IT sector. This

¹¹ Liang, H., & Renneboog, L. (2017). On the foundations of corporate social responsibility. *the Journal of Finance*, 72(2), 853-910.

thesis fills these missing pieces by mixing legal theory with real data. Fixing these gaps is vital, for updating the law about responsibility.

Chapter Three: Research Methodology

The Epistemological Foundation of Empirical-Legal Research

Conducting legal research in today's corporate governance environment demands a framework that connects traditional legal analysis with real-world social and economic factors. In the past legal scholarship followed a positivist approach. It treated laws, court decisions and regulations as systems that operated independently of outside forces.. The growing power of big technology companies shows that legal rules don't exist in isolation. The way laws are applied depends heavily on how real markets work, in the tech sector.¹²

Institutional investors, large asset managers and global tech firms all operate in moving financial markets. These markets don't just follow the law they shape how the law is understood, enforced or even avoided. To truly grasp how institutional investors are held accountable this thesis combines two approaches. It uses analysis to examine the legal rules in detail. At the time it studies actual market behaviors, voting actions and corporate disclosures through empirical methods. This dual approach ensures that legal arguments are not just theoretical. They are based on data, actual practices and observable outcomes. By linking theory, with empirical evidence the research stays relevant and grounded in reality.

Doctrinal Curation: Statutes, Regulations, and Jurisprudential Precedents

The part of this research method that deals with rules and laws involves looking at the main and extra legal materials that control how companies are run and how stocks are regulated. Main sources are the laws about companies in countries the rules from the securities exchange commission the rules about being responsible to the company and the rules about voting for directors in places where the law is based on past court decisions and places where the law is based on written codes. The study of these laws looks for places where the rules aren't clear where the rules about being responsible are not clear and where the rules aren't followed enough. This lets big investors have a lot of control over companies without facing problems.

¹² Bena, J., Ferreira, M. A., Matos, P., & Pires, P. (2017). Are foreign investors locusts? The long-term effects of foreign institutional ownership. *Journal of Financial Economics*, 126(1), 122-146.

Special care is taken to look at what it means to put shareholders how much power the business judgment rule gives to company leaders and what the rules are for people who manage money for others. Extra legal sources include articles from law journals comments from judges, papers from regulators and opinions from experts. This collection of materials gives the standard to check if the current laws are good enough to deal with the risks caused by big companies, in the technology area.¹³




Fig: A constructive Research Methodological Framework

Curation and Filtering of Empirical Secondary Survey Datasets

To evaluate how these legal rules work in life this thesis uses existing survey data and quantitative databases from institutions. The data collection centers on leading traded information technology companies. It specifically selects firms where institutional ownership's highly concentrated. The data comes from sources, including institutional reporting platforms, proxy voting records, corporate governance surveys and official regulatory filings.¹⁴

This study uses four data sources to make sure the analysis is solid.¹⁵ First it looks at voting

¹³ Chen, T., Dong, H., & Lin, C. (2020). Institutional shareholders and corporate social responsibility. *Journal of Financial Economics*, 135(2), 483-504.

¹⁴ Khan, M., Serafeim, G., & Yoon, A. (2016). Corporate sustainability: First evidence on materiality. *The accounting review*, 91(6), 1697-1724.

¹⁵ Bebchuk, L. A., & Hirst, S. (2019). *Index funds and the future of corporate governance: Theory, evidence, and*

records to check how institutions are involved in executive pay, the environment and how companies are run. Second it studies how much ownership is concentrated to find out where control lies and how big tech investors vote together. Third it checks corporate governance reports to see if boards are independent how committees are set up and how much information is shared. Finally it makes sure all the data from sources is correct by comparing it with official government papers. This helps make sure everything is accurate free of bias and gives a basis, for a bigger legal study.

Analytical Framework for Legal and Statistical Correlation

The main part of the approach is based on a way of thinking that connects numbers about the market with rules about being responsible legally. When the second set of data from surveys is put together tools that look at numbers are used to see if there is a link between when big groups own a lot of a company and what happens with how the company's run. For example the study looks at how much big groups own and how they decide to spend money on things like buying back shares or spending on long-term research. Also the way of thinking checks how often big groups disagree with what the company's leaders want to do. This is to see if the idea that big groups watch the market closely is true. By looking at these numbers and comparing them to rules, about being responsible the person doing the research can see where the laws don't stop big groups from not being involved. It also shows which parts of the rules need to be changed by lawmakers.¹⁶

Doctrinal and Empirical Research Design

This thesis uses a methods legal research approach that combines doctrinal analysis, with empirical evaluation. Doctrinal research looks at texts, judicial precedents and regulatory circulars. Empirical evaluation uses secondary survey data to check how institutions behave in life. This two-part method makes sure the findings are both theoretically strong and practically useful. Legal rules cannot be fully understood without looking at how they affect the economy and society.¹⁷

policy (No. w26543). National Bureau of Economic Research.

¹⁶ Wani, T. A., Halder, A., & Ganie, I. R. (2023). In what contexts institutional investors can be catalyst? The moderating role of corporate governance. *International Journal of Global Business and Competitiveness*, 18(1), 70-79.

¹⁷ Al-Shaer, H., & Zaman, M. (2019). CEO compensation and sustainability reporting assurance: Evidence from the UK. *Journal of Business Ethics*, 158(1), 233-252.

Collection and Curation of Secondary Data

Secondary data comes from trusted filings, corporate governance surveys and institutional voting databases. Secondary data is carefully selected to include top-level publicly listed information technology firms. These secondary data sets give numbers about proxy voting records, board composition and ownership concentration. Secondary data undergoes verification protocols to keep credibility and authenticity high.¹⁸

Analytical Framework for Legal Evaluation

The analysis method looks at numbers and compares them to known legal rules. It checks how the big groups that own the company are connected to how money the leaders make. The legal part looks for when companies don't follow the laws and where the rules aren't being enforced. This step by step check helps the person doing the research makes fair judgments, about how responsible companies are.

Methodological Limitations, Boundary Constraints, and Mitigations

Every research methodology has limits that must be clearly stated. Relying on secondary survey data stops us from doing behavioral interviews. Also differences in securities laws across countries make it hard to compare data worldwide. With these limits the chosen research methodology still gives a strong base for looking at institutional power in the IT sector. Every empirical legal research methodology has limits that must be openly acknowledged to keep integrity.¹⁹

This study has some methodological limitations. First the study relies on survey data, which limits the study ability to conduct real-time qualitative interviews with asset managers and tech executives. Second the study faces differences in securities laws across jurisdictions, which makes global data standardization difficult and requires careful contextualization. Third the study sees gaps in data transparency for equity and alternative investment vehicles, which leads to tracking gaps. Fourth the study uses a triangulation strategy to overcome these problems comparing secondary survey results, with regulatory databases and a wide range of doctrinal

¹⁸ Capelle-Blancard, G., & Petit, A. (2019). Every little helps? ESG news and stock market reaction. *Journal of business ethics*, 157(2), 543-565.

¹⁹ Dyck, A., Lins, K. V., Roth, L., & Wagner, H. F. (2019). Do institutional investors drive corporate social responsibility? International evidence. *Journal of financial economics*, 131(3), 693-714.

literature so that the study can draw robust and reliable conclusions. I think the study's careful approach is commendable.

Chapter Four: Data Analysis

Quantitative Overview of Institutional Ownership in IT

Secondary survey datasets reveal a concentration of institutional equity within major IT corporations. Institutional investors routinely hold stakes exceeding sixty percent in the top-tier tech firms. This high ownership concentration gives investors de facto veto power, over strategic corporate resolutions. The data indicates that foreign institutional investors dominate this institutional equity landscape. Such massive capital centralization raises questions regarding market control and accountability.

Proxy Voting Patterns and Shareholder Resolutions

Analysis of proxy voting data shows that institutional investors rarely oppose management proposals. Institutional investors often approve executive compensation packages when performance does not match. Environmental, social and governance shareholder resolutions get support, from major asset managers. This passive voting goes against the idea that institutional oversight should be active. As a result management has power protected by institutional indifference.²⁰

Correlation between Ownership Concentration and Governance Metrics

Statistical analysis shows that there is a link between having a lot of institutional owners and doing short-term stock buybacks. Tech companies that have a lot of pressure, from investors spend a lot of money on buying back shares instead of investing in long-term research. This way of managing the company hurts the growth of sustainable technology. Legal studies show that small shareholders are treated unfairly in these kinds of ownership setups.

Compliance Gaps and Regulatory Enforcement Deficits

Secondary compliance surveys show problems with required corporate governance reports.

²⁰ Edmans, A., & Holderness, C. G. (2016). Blockholders: A survey of theory and evidence. *European Corporate Governance Institute (ECGI)-Finance Working Paper*, (475).

Many IT companies only follow the rules in a basic way when it comes to having independent directors and audit committees. Regulatory groups usually don't have power to punish small violations. The information shows that the current punishments don't stop problems, with corporate governance. These findings show that the current ways of checking on companies need to change away.

Descriptive Statistical Overview of Survey Variables

The real data from 75 experts gives numbers to support the legal questions looked at in this thesis. Looking at the numbers for the seven governance topics shows clear signs about how institutions act in the information technology field.

This analysis of survey metrics shows problems in how the tech sector is governed. People who took the survey strongly agreed that companies focus much on short-term profits. The average score was 4.36 with a deviation of 0.58 which means most people felt this way. They also strongly supported changes that would involve stakeholders and move beyond just protecting the interests of owners. That idea got the average score of 4.36 with a standard deviation of 0.58.

There was an agreement among respondents that there is a lack of rules or a regulatory void, which allows control gaps to go unchecked. The average score for this point was 4.31 with a deviation of 0.61. People also saw the need for oversight boards with an average score of 4.16 and a standard deviation of 0.77. This suggests that many believe outside supervision is necessary to improve governance.

On the hand respondents said that current fiduciary rules are not strong enough. The average score for this was 1.65 with a standard deviation of 0.58. They also thought that disclosure practices are not effective with an average of 1.84 and a standard deviation of 0.75. When it comes to dissent meaning shareholders speaking out against executive pay the average was 1.85 with a standard deviation of 0.75. These low numbers show that people think current tools, for holding leaders accountable are weak.

Professional Role Disaggregation and Discrepancies in Governance Perceptions

Cross-tabulating the survey dataset by roles categorized into institutional portfolio managers, corporate legal counsels, independent corporate directors, regulatory officials and academic

researchers reveals clear differences in how people view corporate accountability. Academic researchers and independent corporate directors both reported the levels of concern about institutional short-termism with average scores close to 5.00. In contrast institutional portfolio managers gave a lower average score of 3.87 on short-term focus. This difference makes sense when you consider that portfolio managers are often on the inside of the system and they may naturally downplay their role in driving short-term behavior.

Institutional managers reported a score of 2.93 which suggests that they do raise concerns occasionally. For corporate legal counsels and independent directors the scores were much lower ranging from 1.07 to 1.27. These numbers suggest that dissent is rare or nearly absent from their perspective.

This gap in views across professions highlights an issue. Financial market actors, like institutional portfolio managers tend to minimize what they see as shortcomings in governance. At the time legal experts and independent directors people who are often, outside the direct flow of decision-making see a different reality. They see lapses in oversight especially within the IT sector. The contrast is sharp.. It supports the main argument: the way people see corporate accountability depends heavily on where they stand in the system.

Econometric Correlations between Asset Under Management (AUM) Scale and Governance Attitudes

Analyzing survey responses by looking at the amount of money each organization controls (AUM) shows signs about capital concentration. Respondents from institutions that control than 50 billion dollars in AUM gave the highest scores when asked if digital enterprises lack proper supervision. Respondents from institutions that control than 50 billion dollars in AUM also showed the strongest resistance to adding more fiduciary duties that go beyond just maximizing shareholder wealth. This connection shows that larger financial institutions benefit most from the state of passive stewardship and short-term financialization. Smaller asset managers and regulatory analysts on the hand strongly supported mandatory proxy disclosure enhancements and independent oversight mechanisms. The trends confirm that capital centralization directly matches apathy, toward broader societal externalities proving the idea that market self correction cannot happen without external legislative intervention.

Chapter Five: Discussion

Reconciling Empirical Realities with Doctrinal Assumptions in Corporate Law

The empirical findings from our 75 survey respondents give a sharp legal critique of old corporate governance ideas. For years traditional corporate law has leaned heavily on the efficient market hypothesis and the belief that rational institutional investors will naturally act as careful watchers of corporate managers. However the descriptive statistical results showing an average score of 4.36 for institutional short-termism and a low average score of 1.65 for fiduciary adequacy break this theoretical illusion. Legal doctrines that treat investors as good public trustees ignore the structural pressures of modern financial markets. When asset managers are judged by liquidity and short-term stock gains their legal incentives clash directly with long-term technological stability and ethical compliance. In the information technology sector this misalignment shows up as pushback against sustainable data governance, algorithmic safety and ethical AI rules. Therefore legal scholarship must move beyond market models and confront the empirical reality that institutional investors often act as silent enablers of corporate excess rather, than true protectors of public interest.²¹

The Divergence of Professional Perspectives

A clear finding from our survey data is the big difference, in how people see things. Market insiders and independent legal or academic people have opinions. Institutional portfolio managers gave lower scores when it came to short-term thinking and higher scores when it came to using active proxy dissent compared to independent corporate directors and legal researchers. This difference shows a sign of regulatory capture and a kind of mental separation inside the financial industry. Asset managers have a professional reason to keep things as they are with little regulation and a lot of management freedom. By not admitting they are not doing enough these institutional people protect themselves from being held responsible. Independent legal experts and people who work in regulation looking at things from a clear and unbiased point of view see that when institutions don't act it creates a serious problem in watching over big tech companies. This difference, in how people see things proves that letting financial companies regulate themselves is not working. When the people who are supposed to watch over capital don't admit they are failing it becomes absolutely necessary for outside lawmakers

²¹ Chen, T., Dong, H., & Lin, C. (2020). Institutional shareholders and corporate social responsibility. *Journal of Financial Economics*, 135(2), 483-504.

to step in and bring back balance and order to how companies run.

The Econometric Impact of Capital Concentration on Stakeholder Welfare

The study that connects the size of Asset under Management (AUM) to how companies view governance shows a problem for today's legal systems. Mega institutions that manage than 50 billion dollars notice the biggest gaps in supervision in tech businesses but at the same time they are the strongest opponents of adding more statutory fiduciary duties that go beyond only increasing shareholder wealth maximization. This odd result reveals how capital concentration creates inertia. Massive asset managers gain a lot from the legal framework that puts financial returns above all human and societal externalities. By focusing on portfolio liquidity and financial returns these mega institutions shift the social costs of tech monopolies, gig-economy labor exploitation and privacy violations onto the wider public. Legal frameworks must see that concentrated financial power is not merely a commercial matter but a systemic public trust issue. To stop these externalities statutory reforms must legally compel large asset managers to take in environmental, social and governance (ESG) risks turning them from detached financial speculators into legally accountable stewards of societal welfare.²²

Legal Pathways for Overcoming the Supervisory Void in Digital Enterprises

Combining these data with legal theory shows clear ways to improve information technology governance. Most experts, with a score above four point one strongly back the creation of independent institutional oversight boards and changes to fiduciary statutes. Ordinary corporate law tools, like lawsuits and normal proxy voting cannot keep up with careless behavior in fast digital markets.²³ Law must add rules that fit the hidden value and quick changes of the IT sector. Also requiring disclosure of proxy votes and heavy fines for mere compliance will push institutional investors to explain their governance choices, in public. By matching accountability to the real power held by institutions law can answer the key question of who watches the watchers making sure that corporate power benefits lasting human progress instead of blind profit hunting.

Prioritizing shareholder returns above all else leads to erosion of ethics in tech conglomerates.

²² Bena, J., Ferreira, M. A., Matos, P., & Pires, P. (2017). Are foreign investors locusts? The long-term effects of foreign institutional ownership. *Journal of Financial Economics*, 126(1), 122-146.

²³ Khan, M., Serafeim, G., & Yoon, A. (2016). Corporate sustainability: First evidence on materiality. *The accounting review*, 91(6), 1697-1724

When institutional investors push hard firms often cut corners on data privacy and algorithmic safety. Software engineering labor conditions suffer under cost minimization rules. Expanding duties to cover a wider range of stakeholder welfare can reduce these harms. Close relationships between regulators and big asset managers block enforcement. Restoring trust needs regulators to be shielded from financial pressure. Transparent oversight boards can make sure the rules are applied fairly and with force. Strengthening independence is essential, for real corporate accountability.²⁴

Chapter Six: Conclusion and Recommendations

Conclusion

Recapitulation of Core Research Findings and Empirical Validation

This research thesis tries to look at the complicated legal rules and power structures that control institutional investors, corporate power and accountability in the information technology field. By mixing theory with strong survey data from 75 experts in law and finance this work shows deep weaknesses in today's corporate governance. The data give numbers that back the main idea: institutional investors hold a lot of equity power while they only act in a passive short-term way. In the survey people gave a score of 4.36 out of 5.00 for how short-term institutional investors are and an average score of only 1.65 for how good the current legal duties of care are. Also the score for voting disagreement was almost zero (average 1.85) proving that big asset managers usually just approve executive choices instead of watching closely. These numbers prove that the old hope that institutional investors would be good watchdogs is broken and it leaves a gap in supervision, for digital enterprises.²⁵

The Fallacy of Market Self-Correction and the Necessity of Doctrinal Evolution

The meeting of our ideas about rules and looking at numbers breaks the basic idea that markets fix themselves in online businesses. Traditional company law says that many people in the market and smart money people will naturally stop bosses from doing things and reduce big problems.. Our results show that when a few big money people own a lot especially those who

²⁴ Edmans, A., & Holderness, C. G. (2016). Blockholders: A survey of theory and evidence. *European Corporate Governance Institute (ECGI)-Finance Working Paper*, (475).

²⁵ Brav, A., Jiang, W., & Kim, H. (2015). The real effects of hedge fund activism: Productivity, asset allocation, and labor outcomes. *The Review of Financial Studies*, 28(10), 2723-2769.

have more than five billion dollars in assets they encourage quick money making buying back company stocks and making others pay for social and moral problems. In the computer technology field this problem, with how companies run directly hurts privacy, safe computer systems and the working conditions of people who don't have secure jobs. Since big banks make money from this situation hoping they will change on their own or control themselves is completely pointless. Laws must change past ideas that only focus on making money for owners. The way courts look at things must understand that when money making becomes really big it's not a private issue anymore. It becomes something that the public has a right to be involved in and needs the government to step and make rules to handle it.²⁶

Final Reflections on Watching the Watchers in the Digital Era

The big question this thesis asks who watches the watchers? is the most important legal and constitutional problem in today's business world. To answer this lawmakers, regulators and legal experts need to change the way they think about what institutional investors should do. By making it required for companies to share information about their voting practices setting up groups to watch over big investors and changing the rules so that those, in charge must look after the needs of many people, not just a few society can take back control of big companies. The law should not just help companies make money. It should protect people and technology as they grow. Future legal work and new laws need to use what we know from studies to make strong clear systems that keep big companies and their leaders working for the good of everyone.²⁷

Summary of Core Research Findings

This study highlighted at how institutional investors interact with IT companies when it comes to accountability. Using analysis and reviewing existing data the findings show a serious gap in responsibility. Institutional investors hold shares in tech firms but they often take a passive role and focus on short-term gains. The current legal systems are not strong enough to manage the power these investors have. Because of this technology companies tend to focus on making

²⁶ Dyck, A., Lins, K. V., Roth, L., & Wagner, H. F. (2019). Do institutional investors drive corporate social responsibility? International evidence. *Journal of financial economics*, 131(3), 693-714.

²⁷ McCahery, J. A., Sautner, Z., & Starks, L. T. (2016). Behind the scenes: The corporate governance preferences of institutional investors. *The Journal of Finance*, 71(6), 2905-2932.

money than working toward long-term positive change, for society.²⁸

Reaffirming the Need for Legal Evolution

Corporate law cannot stay the same when global economic power keeps gathering in the hands of a few. The old idea that companies should only focus on shareholders is no longer enough in today's world. Laws need to change to protect everyone workers, communities and the environment not those with money. Making institutional investors legally responsible when the companies they invest in do wrong is a first move. The law should not just accept results, from the market. It should shape how companies act to build a system.

Final Reflections on Watching the Watchers

The big question of who keeps an eye on the people who are supposed to be watching remains very important. Still not solved. Fixing this problem needs laws, separate groups that check on things and changes in how people handle money. If we make it clear that big investment groups have to act in the interest of others then people can take back control over big companies. More work, by lawyers and experts is needed to make these rules better. In the end whether a company is seen as honest depends on how it helps everyone.

Recommendations

Statutory Codification of Mandatory Proxy Disclosure and Stewardship Transparency

The empirical survey dataset shows a supervisory void with a mean score of 4.31 and severe disclosure ineffectiveness with a mean score of 1.84 proving that voluntary corporate governance codes have utterly failed. To combat stewardship national legislative bodies and securities regulators must enact binding statutory mandates that require all institutional asset managers to publicly disclose the detailed proxy voting rationales before each annual general meeting. ²⁹Transparency removes the anonymity cloak that shields asset managers when institutional asset managers rubber-stamp excessive executive compensation or reject critical environmental and social resolutions. Institutional asset managers controlling assets, beyond

²⁸ Dyck, A., Lins, K. V., Roth, L., & Wagner, H. F. (2019). Do institutional investors drive corporate social responsibility? International evidence. *Journal of financial economics*, 131(3), 693-714.

²⁹ Thomas, A. S., Jayachandran, A., & Biju, A. V. N. (2024). Strategic mapping of the environmental social governance landscape in finance—A bibliometric exploration through concepts and themes. *Corporate Social Responsibility and Environmental Management*, 31(5), 4428-4453.

capital thresholds should be legally obligated to publish annual stewardship accountability reports that detail how institutional asset managers proxy votes align with long-term technological stability and ethical data practices. Enforcing statutory penalties for non-compliance will guarantee that pension beneficiaries and retail savers can accurately audit how the capital of institutional asset managers is deployed across the information technology sector. Legislative bodies must enact statutes that mandate the public disclosure of all institutional proxy voting records. Transparency reduces conflicts of interest and deters management arrangements. Institutional asset managers must explain dissent or alignment on critical governance resolutions. Enforcing disclosure compliance ensures beneficiaries know how the capital of institutional asset managers is wielded.

Legislative Expansion of Fiduciary Duties beyond Shareholder Primacy

To address the professional consensus supporting multi-stakeholder reform measured at a mean score of 4.36 and the widespread critique of short-term financialization also at a mean score of 4.36 corporate law statutes must evolve. The current legal frameworks that bind directors and institutional investors to a focus on shareholder wealth maximization need to be formally updated. Modern corporate statutes should explicitly expand duties. Board members and major institutional shareholders must be legally required to consider the well-being of employees gig-economy workers, data privacy consumers and local communities.³⁰

Establishment of Independent Institutional Oversight Boards and Sector-Specific Codes

The study shows that independent directors and legal experts strongly believe in having ways to watch over big companies (with an average score of 4.16). This means that governments need to create organizations that supervise these companies. These organizations should check how money big investment companies have, how they vote and if they are honest about their conflicts of interest. Also because digital companies have ways of working they grow fast and they have things that are not easy to see, like ideas and data the people who make rules must create special rules just for the IT industry. All big technology companies that are listed on the stock market must follow these rules. These rules should cover how workers are treated how data is used in a way and how ideas are protected.³¹ By having groups that check on companies

³⁰ Al-Shaer, H., & Zaman, M. (2019). CEO compensation and sustainability reporting assurance: Evidence from the UK. *Journal of Business Ethics*, 158(1), 233-252.

³¹ Wani, T. A., Haldar, A., & Ganie, I. R. (2023). In what contexts institutional investors can be catalyst? The moderating role of corporate governance. *International Journal of Global Business and Competitiveness*, 18(1),

and by making special rules for the IT industry the law can make sure that people in power are always working for the good of everyone. Governments should set up groups that watch over how big investors act. These groups will check how investment companies vote and how they spend their money. Stopping companies from controlling everything needs careful watching by the government. These groups help keep the system stable and fair. The people who make rules must create ways of managing companies that are just for the IT industry. Technology companies need ways of keeping track of their ideas how they treat workers and how they handle data. All big tech companies must follow these rules. Special rules help the law stay up to date with changes, in the digital world.

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Appendix

Corporate Governance & Legal Accountability Survey

This academic and empirical research survey investigates fiduciary duties, proxy voting patterns, institutional investor priorities, and regulatory frameworks within corporate governance and tech ecosystem portfolios. All responses are anonymized and stored securely for dataset analysis.

🕒 Est. 3-4 minutes 🔒 Confidential Research Data

1 Demographic & Professional Background

1. What is your primary professional classification within the corporate governance or investment ecosystem? *

☐ (a) Institutional Portfolio Manager / Asset Manager

☐ (b) Corporate Legal Counsel / Compliance Officer

☐ (c) Independent Corporate Director

☐ (d) Regulatory Official / Policy Analyst

☐ (e) Academic / Legal Researcher

2. How many years of professional experience do you possess in financial markets, corporate law, or IT sector governance? *

☐ (a) Less than 5 years

☐ (b) 5 to 10 years

☐ (c) 11 to 20 years

☐ (d) More than 20 years

3. What is the approximate total asset value under management (AUM) or advisory scope represented by your organization or current portfolio? *

☐ (a) Under \$500 Million

☐ (b) \$500 Million to \$5 Billion

☐ (c) \$5 Billion to \$50 Billion

☐ (d) Over \$50 Billion

2 Substantive Governance & Legal Accountability

4. To what extent do dominant institutional investors prioritize short-term financial returns over long-term legal compliance and ethical data practices in IT portfolio firms? *

☐ 1. Strongly Disagree

☐ 2. Disagree

☐ 3. Neutral

☐ 4. Agree

☐ 5. Strongly Agree

5. Do existing statutory fiduciary duties adequately compel institutional asset managers to actively monitor environmental, social, and governance (ESG) risks within tech corporations? *

☐ 1. Highly Inadequate

☐ 2. Inadequate

☐ 3. Neutral

☐ 4. Adequate

☐ 5. Highly Adequate

6. How frequently do institutional shareholders exercise active proxy voting dissent against excessive executive compensation packages in major tech companies? *

☐ 1. Never

☐ 2. Rarely

☐ 3. Occasionally

☐ 4. Frequently

☐ 5. Always

7. To what extent would the introduction of mandatory independent institutional oversight boards improve corporate accountability in the digital technology sector? *

☐ 1. Not at all

☐ 2. Minimal extent

☐ 3. Moderate extent

☐ 4. Significant extent

☐ 5. Great extent

8. Do you believe that passive index-fund investment strategies contribute to a "supervisory void" that shields IT corporate management from external legal discipline? *

☐ 1. Strongly Disagree

☐ 2. Disagree

☐ 3. Neutral

☐ 4. Agree

☐ 5. Strongly Agree

9. How effective are current regulatory disclosure mandates in revealing hidden conflicts of interest between institutional investors and portfolio tech firms? *

☐ 1. Completely Ineffective

☐ 2. Ineffective

☐ 3. Moderately Effective

☐ 4. Highly Effective

☐ 5. Extremely Effective

10. Should corporate law statutes be formally amended to broaden fiduciary obligations from narrow shareholder primacy toward comprehensive multi-stakeholder welfare? *

☐ 1. Strongly Oppose

☐ 2. Oppose

☐ 3. Neutral

☐ 4. Support

☐ 5. Strongly Support

Visualization for Survey Responses

