# PRECEDENT AND SELECTIVITY IN REPARATIONS: WHY HAVE COMPARABLE ATROCITIES RECEIVED REDRESS WHILE AFRICAN ENSLAVEMENT HAS NOT?

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A Comparative Political Analysis with Reference to UN General Assembly Resolution A/RES/80/250 - Declaration of the Trafficking of Enslaved Africans and Racialized Chattel Enslavement of Africans as the Gravest Crime against Humanity (25th March, 2026)

## ABSTRACT

On 25th March 2026, the United Nations General Assembly adopted Resolution A/RES/80/250, formally declaring the trafficking of enslaved Africans and racialized chattel enslavement as the gravest crime against humanity. The Resolution arrives at a moment when the international legal architecture has long acknowledged reparatory obligations for grave historical wrongs, yet has produced frameworks of redress for the Holocaust, Japanese American internment, and apartheid while leaving the transatlantic slave trade without comprehensive remedy. This essay examines the political, structural, and jurisprudential conditions that enabled reparations in these three cases, and interrogates the specific barriers that have obstructed analogous justice for African enslavement. Drawing on international law, comparative politics, and historical analysis, it argues that the current international legal framework is structurally inadequate to meet the aspirations of peoples of African descent because it was itself constituted by the very states that perpetrated and benefited from these crimes. The essay concludes that meaningful reparatory justice requires not merely the application of existing law but its fundamental re-imagination.

## I. Introduction: The Asymmetry of Historical Justice

There is no neutral way to begin a discussion about reparations for the transatlantic slave trade. The very terms of the debate are contested: who owes whom, across what span of time, through what legal mechanism, and on what moral logic. Yet the adoption of United Nations General Assembly Resolution A/RES/80/250 on 25 March 2026 represents a decisive institutional moment. The General Assembly, the most representative body in international law, has unequivocally declared that the trafficking of enslaved Africans and racialized chattel enslavement of Africans constitutes the gravest crime against humanity. It has called upon Member States to engage in good-faith dialogue on reparatory justice, including formal apology, restitution, compensation, rehabilitation, and guarantees of non-repetition.

This declaration is not without precedent in the moral register of international politics. What is striking, and deeply troubling, is that it stands in sharp contrast to a pattern of selective redress in which other grave historical crimes, including the Holocaust, the wartime internment of Japanese Americans, and the systematic crimes of apartheid, have produced functioning reparations frameworks. African enslavement has not. The asymmetry demands explanation. It demands scrutiny. And it demands an honest accounting of whether the international legal order, as presently constituted, possesses the institutional will and structural capacity to remedy it.

This essay proceeds in five parts. It first examines the historical and legal architecture of the three comparative cases, identifying the conditions that made reparations possible. It then analyses the specific structural barriers that have frustrated analogous progress for African enslavement. It thereafter assesses Resolution A/RES/80/250 as a legal instrument and considers what normative work it can and cannot do. Finally, it interrogates the international legal framework itself, arguing that the framework carries within it the pathologies of the very system of racial capitalism that the Resolution seeks to condemn.

## II. Three Cases of Successful Reparations: Architecture and Conditions

### A. The Holocaust and the Luxembourg Agreement

The most frequently cited precedent for state-based reparations in international affairs is the Holocaust settlement between West Germany and the State of Israel, formalized in the

Luxembourg Agreement of 10 September 1952. Under the Agreement, West Germany committed to pay three billion Deutsche Marks to Israel and 450 million Deutsche Marks to the Conference on Jewish Material Claims Against Germany, to address the material losses suffered by the Jewish people under National Socialism. The Claims Conference, constituted in 1951, negotiated on behalf of Jewish individuals and communities worldwide who could not be represented through a bilateral state arrangement.

The Luxembourg Agreement succeeded for identifiable structural reasons. First, there was a clearly defined and acknowledged perpetrator state. West Germany accepted, through its government, that the Federal Republic bore legal and moral successor responsibility for acts committed by the Nazi regime. Chancellor Konrad Adenauer, in his statement of 27 September 1951 to the Bundestag, accepted German responsibility explicitly, stating that the Federal Republic was prepared to make good the material damage done in the name of the German people. Second, there existed an organized representative body on the victim side capable of conducting and sustaining negotiations. Third, the geopolitical context of the Cold War created incentives for West Germany to project itself as a responsible democratic state. Reparations served as both moral and diplomatic currency. Fourth, the harm was bounded in time and geography, having occurred within living memory between 1933 and 1945, enabling identification of victims and quantification of losses with a degree of legal tractability.

Subsequent legislation in Germany extended these frameworks. The Federal Compensation Law (Bundesentschadigungsgesetz) of 1953, substantially revised in 1956, provided individual compensation to survivors and their heirs. Later, specific funds were created to address forced labour, property loss, and other categories of harm. By the early twenty-first century, Germany had paid out over seventy billion Euros in Holocaust-related reparations. The German model, however imperfect, demonstrates that a state can acknowledge and institutionalize sustained reparatory obligations across decades.

### B. Japanese American Internment and the Civil Liberties Act of 1988

The second comparative case arises from within a single domestic legal order. Following the attack on Pearl Harbor in December 1941, President Franklin D. Roosevelt signed Executive

Order 9066, authorizing the forced relocation and incarceration of approximately 120,000 persons of Japanese ancestry, the majority of whom were American citizens. They were

stripped of property, liberty, and dignity on the basis solely of race.

Reparations for this wrong were achieved through the Civil Liberties Act of 1988, signed into law by President Ronald Reagan on 10 August 1988. The Act issued a formal congressional apology acknowledging that the internment was a product of race prejudice, war hysteria, and a failure of political leadership, and authorized payment of twenty thousand dollars to each surviving internee. Payments were made to approximately eighty-two thousand individuals before the fund was exhausted.

The conditions that made this outcome possible are instructive. The Commission on Wartime Relocation and Internment of Civilians, established by Congress in 1980, produced a rigorous historical and legal record in its 1982 report, Personal Justice Denied, which concluded that the internment was unjust and was not driven by military necessity. This documentary foundation was critical. Furthermore, the identified community of survivors was living, organized, and politically active within the American democratic system. Legislators of Japanese descent, including Senator Daniel Inouye of Hawaii and Representative Norman Mineta of California, were central advocates. The temporal proximity of the harm, with many survivors still alive in 1988, made the victim-perpetrator relationship legible to lawmakers and the public. The congressional majority ultimately accepted that an American governmental act had violated constitutional rights of American citizens, and that institutional repair was legally and morally warranted.

### C. Apartheid and Post-Conflict Reparatory Frameworks in South Africa

The third case is qualitatively different from the first two in that it was not resolved through interstate negotiation or domestic legislation but through a transitional justice process constructed by the successor government of a newly democratic state. The Truth and Reconciliation Commission of South Africa, established under the Promotion of National Unity and Reconciliation Act 34 of 1995, operated under a mandate that included the making of recommendations for reparation and rehabilitation of victims. The TRC Final Report, submitted to President Nelson Mandela in 1998, recommended a reparations package consisting of individual reparation grants to identified victims, symbolic reparations, community rehabilitation programmes, and institutional reform.

The South African government adopted only a portion of these recommendations. Individual

reparation grants of 30,000 Rand were paid to some 22,000 registered victims. The Khulumani Support Group and other civil society organizations litigated in both South African and United States courts to compel corporations that had aided the apartheid regime to contribute to reparations, with mixed results. The most notable transnational litigation, Khulumani v. Barclays National Bank (2007) in the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, addressed the question of whether corporate aiding and abetting of apartheid violations could ground liability under the Alien Tort Statute, a question that remained contested through subsequent Supreme Court jurisprudence.

What the South African case illustrates is that reparations were made possible by a political transition in which the successor state itself was constituted by the victim community, that a functioning truth commission produced a legitimate evidentiary and moral record, and that international norms of transitional justice provided a normative scaffolding. The political agency of the victim community within their own state was indispensable.

## III. Structural Barriers to Reparations for African Enslavement

### A. The Problem of State Continuity and Diffuse Responsibility

The most significant jurisprudential obstacle to reparations for the transatlantic slave trade is the problem of identifying responsible states in a form that generates actionable legal obligations. In the Holocaust context, the Federal Republic of Germany accepted successor responsibility for the acts of the Third Reich, which was constituted by the same German state. In the Japanese internment context, the United States government was both perpetrator and respondent within a single constitutional order. In South Africa, the successor democratic government acknowledged the crimes of the apartheid regime as acts of a prior government of the same territorial state.

The transatlantic slave trade presents a far more complex picture. Responsibility was distributed across numerous European states, including Portugal, Spain, Britain, France, the Netherlands, Denmark, and Sweden, each of which operated slave trading and slaveholding enterprises for different periods and in different colonial territories. The receiving states in the Americas were themselves colonial formations, some of which later became independent states whose populations include both the descendants of enslavers and the descendants of the enslaved. The corporate entities that financed and profited from the trade, such as the Royal

African Company, the Dutch West India Company (chartered 3 June 1621, as noted in Resolution A/RES/80/250), and various French trading monopolies, have no legal successors in the conventional sense.

International law has developed doctrines of state succession, codified in the Vienna Convention on Succession of States in Respect of State Property, Archives and Debts of 1983, and addressed in the International Law Commission's Articles on Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts (2001). Article 31 of the ILC Articles establishes that a responsible State is under an obligation to make full reparation for the injury caused by the internationally wrongful act, in forms that include restitution, compensation, and satisfaction. Resolution A/RES/80/250 explicitly invokes this framework, reaffirming that states bear responsibility for internationally wrongful acts and have an obligation to make full reparation for the injury caused.

Yet the application of this framework to historical slavery confronts the problem of intertemporal law: the principle that state conduct is assessed according to the law applicable at the time of the alleged wrong, not the law as it subsequently develops. Defenders of the status quo argue that while slavery was morally condemned by many, it was not universally illegal under positive international law during the period of the transatlantic trade. The Final Act of the Congress of Vienna of 1815 condemned the slave trade as repugnant to the principles of humanity and universal morality, a characterization noted in the Resolution, but fell short of criminalizing it in the manner that would generate reparatory obligations under contemporary doctrine.

Resolution A/RES/80/250 engages this objection directly and persuasively. It notes that African jurisprudence, including the Kouroukan Fouga (Manden Charter) of 1235, established the sovereignty of life over property. It observes that the progressive codification of racialized chattel enslavement through instruments such as the papal bulls Dum Diversas of 1452 and Romanus Pontifex of 1455, and the Spanish Asiento de Negros of 1518, represented deliberate legal choices to categorize human beings as property, choices made by states fully capable of making different choices. And it affirms the African principle that a crime does not rot, and that there can be no statutory limitations for crimes against humanity. These are not merely rhetorical moves. They constitute a legal argument that the gravity and deliberateness of the wrong generated obligations that the subsequent construction of international law cannot

dissolve.

**B. The Absence of a Unified Claimant**

A second structural barrier is the absence of a single representative body capable of negotiating on behalf of the affected community, analogous to the State of Israel and the Claims Conference in the Holocaust context. The descendants of enslaved Africans are distributed across the Caribbean, the Americas, Europe, and Africa itself. They are citizens of dozens of states with varying political relationships to the question of reparations. Within each of these states, the political organization of African-descended communities differs enormously.

Efforts to address this have been made at the regional level. The Caribbean Community has advanced a ten-point reparations plan articulated by the CARICOM Reparations Commission, which calls for a full formal apology, repatriation assistance, indigenous peoples development programme, cultural institution building, public health crisis, illiteracy eradication, African knowledge programme, psychological rehabilitation, technology transfer, and debt cancellation. The CARICOM plan is coherent, sophisticated, and grounded in both legal and developmental reasoning. Yet it represents the claims of a subregion, not the global community of Africandescended peoples.

At the continental level, the African Union has made increasingly formal moves toward organizing the reparations claim. African Union Assembly Decision 934 (XXXVIII) of 16 February 2025, noted in Resolution A/RES/80/250, qualified slavery, deportation and colonization as crimes against humanity and genocide against the peoples of Africa. The AU's designation of 2025 as the Year of Justice for Africans and People of African Descent through Reparations and the period 2026 to 2036 as the Decade of Action on Reparations and African Heritage represent a systematic attempt to build the institutional architecture for a unified claim. These are necessary but not yet sufficient.

The political science of reparations suggests that victim-side organization is a critical variable in successful reparations outcomes. Roy Brooks, in his comparative analysis of reparations politics, distinguishes between cases where the victim community possesses sufficient political leverage within the perpetrator's political system to compel legislative action, and cases where no such leverage exists. The Japanese American reparations succeeded in part because Japanese Americans were enfranchised citizens with electoral weight in states whose congressional

delegations supported the Civil Liberties Act. Peoples of African descent in Europe lack comparable political leverage over the governments of former slave-trading states. This is not a coincidence. It is a consequence of the very demographic displacement produced by the slave trade.

### C. The Temporal Distance and the Politics of Living Memory

A third barrier is the temporal distance of the wrong. The transatlantic slave trade operated primarily between the fifteenth and late nineteenth centuries. Its principal architects and most direct victims are not alive. The Civil Liberties Act of 1988 was passed forty-three years after the internment order, with tens of thousands of survivors still living. Holocaust reparations were negotiated within seven years of the end of the Second World War. In both cases, the causal chain between government act and identifiable victim was visible and relatively short.

With African enslavement, opponents of reparations argue that the causal chain is too attenuated, the beneficiaries too dispersed, and the harm too historically distant to generate legally cognizable claims. This argument is not entirely without merit as a technical legal proposition, though it gains considerably less traction when examined morally. The Resolution confronts this objection not by denying temporal distance but by insisting on the persistence of consequences. It states with precision that the legacies of slavery persist today in the form of structural racism, racial inequalities, underdevelopment, marginalization and socioeconomic disparities affecting Africans and people of African descent in all parts of the world. If the harm is ongoing, then the obligation is not historical but contemporary.

This is a critical jurisprudential move. It shifts the basis of the reparations claim from backward-looking compensation for past injury to forward-looking remedy for continuing harm. The United Nations Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination has in various concluding observations to state parties noted the persistent racial disparities in health, education, income, and criminal justice that map directly onto the historical geography of enslavement. If these disparities constitute ongoing violations of the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination, to which most states are party, then the reparations obligation is grounded not in the law of historical wrongs alone but in the law of present violations.

### D. The Political Economy of Denial

Perhaps the most candid explanation for the failure to achieve reparations for African enslavement is political economy. The states most directly implicated in the slave trade, Britain, France, Portugal, Spain, the Netherlands, and the United States, are among the most powerful states in the contemporary international system. They are permanent or influential members of multilateral institutions. They have no legal obligation to appear before an international tribunal that has jurisdiction over their historical conduct. And the domestic political cost of acknowledging reparatory obligations, in terms of the financial implications and the disturbance to national narratives of progress and benevolence, has consistently exceeded the political benefits of doing so.

This calculus reflects what scholars of transitional justice have called the problem of victor's justice operating in reverse: when the perpetrators of historical wrongs remain the dominant forces in the international legal order, they retain the power to shape the norms that would govern accountability for their own conduct. Antony Anghie's foundational scholarship on imperialism and international law argues that international law was not a pre-existing set of rules to which colonial powers subjected themselves, but was dynamically constituted through the colonial encounter itself in ways that legitimized European domination. The slave trade did not occur outside international law. It was systematically legalized by it.

## IV. Resolution A/RES/80/250: Legal Weight and Political Significance

Against this background, Resolution A/RES/80/250 must be assessed carefully. General Assembly resolutions are not legally binding instruments in the same sense as treaties or Security Council resolutions adopted under Chapter VII of the United Nations Charter. They are expressions of the will of Member States and contribute to the formation of customary international law when they reflect widespread and consistent state practice accompanied by opinio juris, the belief that the practice is legally required. A single resolution, even one adopted without reference to a Main Committee and on 25 March 2026, does not by itself create enforceable reparatory obligations.

What the Resolution does accomplish is normatively significant. First, by declaring the transatlantic slave trade the gravest crime against humanity, it establishes a hierarchical framework within the existing category of crimes against humanity that prioritizes this wrong above comparable grave crimes. The characterization matters because crimes against humanity,

as defined under the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, carry specific legal consequences, including the principle against statutory limitations reaffirmed in the Resolution. Second, the Resolution's invocation of jus cogens, the category of peremptory norms from which no derogation is permitted and which are binding on all states regardless of consent, is legally consequential. If the trafficking of Africans and racialized chattel enslavement constitute violations of jus cogens, then the obligations they generate are not merely moral but absolutely binding under international law.

Third, the Resolution's explicit invocation of the ILC Articles on State Responsibility provides a textual basis for formal legal claims. Article 41 of the ILC Articles addresses the particular consequences of serious breaches of peremptory norms, stating that states shall cooperate to bring to an end through lawful means any serious breach, and that no state shall recognize as lawful a situation created by a serious breach, nor render aid or assistance in maintaining that situation. If enslavement was a jus cogens violation, then the contemporary structures of racial inequality that it produced may constitute a situation created by a serious breach, and states may be under an obligation not to maintain it.

Fourth, the Resolution's call for engagement with reparatory justice frameworks is addressed to Member States collectively and individually. While this falls short of a binding directive, it creates a diplomatic record against which state conduct can be assessed. States that publicly commit to good-faith dialogue and then take no action may find themselves exposed to criticism before the General Assembly, the Human Rights Council, treaty bodies, and civil society organizations. Diplomatic embarrassment is not legal liability, but it is a tool of accountability.

Fifth, the Resolution's request that the Secretary-General submit a report to the General Assembly at its eighty-second session on actions taken by states creates a monitoring mechanism. The reporting function transforms the Resolution from a one-time declaration into an ongoing institutional process. It also creates space for the progressive elaboration of standards, analogous to the way in which the Vienna Declaration and Programme of Action of 1993 on human rights built upon earlier General Assembly declarations to eventually produce treaty obligations.

## V. Is the International Legal Framework Capable of Meeting This Challenge?

The most searching question raised by Resolution A/RES/80/250 is whether the existing

international legal framework is structurally capable of delivering the justice it mandates. The honest answer, viewed without sentiment, is that the framework as presently constituted is deeply inadequate to this task, and for reasons that are not merely technical but constitutive.

The Westphalian system of sovereign states that forms the architecture of international law was constructed by European powers during a period when the transatlantic slave trade was an organized, state-sanctioned enterprise. The legal categories of sovereignty, property, and personhood that form the foundations of this system were elaborated by theorists, including John Locke and Emmerich de Vattel, whose philosophical frameworks either excluded enslaved Africans from full personhood or were indifferent to the question. As the Resolution observes, instruments such as the Barbados Slave Code of 1661 and the French Code Noir of 1685 formally classified Africans as chattel property, while the principle of partus sequitur ventrem of 1662 transformed reproductive biology into an engine of capital accumulation. These were not aberrations within the legal system of the era. They were the legal system of the era.

International human rights law, developed principally after 1945, represents a genuine normative advance, but it was constructed by the same states whose colonial and slaveholding histories created the inequalities it purports to remedy. The Universal Declaration of Human Rights of 1948, the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, and the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, all referenced in Resolution A/RES/80/250, establish prohibitions on slavery and the slave trade and recognize the inherent dignity of all persons. These instruments did not, however, address the question of remedy for the two centuries of slavery that had preceded them. They were forward-looking instruments designed to prevent future violations, not backward-looking remedies for past ones.

The International Court of Justice, the principal judicial organ of the United Nations under Article 92 of the Charter, has jurisdiction over legal disputes between states that have accepted its compulsory jurisdiction. It does not have jurisdiction over claims brought by non-state actors, including diaspora communities or their representative organizations, against states. The International Criminal Court, established under the Rome Statute of 1998 and noted in the Resolution as having codified enslavement as a crime against humanity, has jurisdiction only over crimes committed after the Rome Statute entered into force in July 2002. It provides no mechanism for addressing historical crimes.

What the international legal framework lacks, in sum, is a tribunal with jurisdiction over historical state conduct, a mechanism for aggregating diffuse claims from a non-state victim community, and a compliance and enforcement mechanism capable of compelling powerful states to perform reparatory obligations they have not voluntarily assumed. The Inter-American Court of Human Rights, the African Court on Human and Peoples' Rights, and the European Court of Human Rights each have regional jurisdiction over states parties to their respective instruments, but none possesses comprehensive jurisdiction over the states most implicated in the transatlantic slave trade, and none has jurisdiction ratione temporis over crimes committed centuries before their establishment.

This does not mean that the framework is entirely useless. Several pathways remain available. Treaty bodies monitoring compliance with the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination are competent to receive state reports and can issue concluding observations identifying persistent racial disparities as violations requiring remedy. The Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination has in practice pushed states to acknowledge that historical wrongs contribute to present racial inequalities, and some scholars have argued that ICERD's obligations extend to addressing structural racism in its historical dimensions. The Universal Periodic Review mechanism of the Human Rights Council creates regular opportunities to raise the question of reparatory justice with individual states. Special procedures mandates, including the Special Rapporteur on contemporary forms of racism and the Working Group of Experts on People of African Descent, established under Commission on Human Rights resolution 2002/68, have produced influential reports connecting historical slavery to contemporary racial inequality.

Yet these mechanisms operate through persuasion, documentation, and diplomatic pressure, not legal enforcement. They are valuable precisely in the way that the Resolution is valuable: as norm-generating processes that shift the burden of justification onto those who deny the obligation. But they cannot compel compensation, restitution, or structural reform against a state that chooses to resist.

The deeper inadequacy is philosophical. The current international legal order rests on the assumption that sovereignty is a baseline condition of equality among states. But as Frantz Fanon argued in The Wretched of the Earth, and as W.E.B. Du Bois documented in Black Reconstruction in America, the formal equality of states in the international system coexists

with profound material inequalities that are the direct legacy of colonialism and slavery. A legal order built on formal equality cannot address substantive inequality if it lacks the capacity to trace the genealogy of that inequality and assign responsibility for it. Resolution A/RES/80/250, by declaring the transatlantic slave trade the gravest crime against humanity and by invoking the principle that a crime does not rot, demands precisely this genealogical work of the international legal order. The question is whether the order will perform it.

## VI. Conclusion: Beyond the Framework

The comparison between Holocaust reparations, Japanese internment compensation, and apartheid settlements on the one hand, and the absence of reparations for African enslavement on the other, reveals a pattern that is not accidental. The cases that succeeded shared common features: temporal proximity, identifiable survivor communities, perpetrator states that accepted successor responsibility, organized victim representation, and political incentives or domestic legal pressures that made reparations achievable. The case of African enslavement shares none of these features in their conventional form, and this is not a coincidence of historical circumstance. It reflects a structure of global power in which the states with the greatest reparatory obligations are also the states with the greatest capacity to resist them.

Resolution A/RES/80/250 is a significant legal and political document. Its declaration that the trafficking of enslaved Africans constitutes the gravest crime against humanity, its invocation of jus cogens, and its explicit engagement with the ILC Articles on State Responsibility represent a serious normative intervention by the General Assembly. The Resolution does what international law can do in the absence of enforcement: it names, it characterizes, it calls, and it records.

But the Resolution also implicitly acknowledges the limits of the existing framework. Its call for Member States to engage in inclusive, good-faith dialogue suggests an awareness that the existing legal architecture cannot compel what political will must supply. Its request for voluntary contributions to support coordination on remembrance, education, and capacity-building suggests that the institutional resources for reparatory justice must be built, not assumed. Its invitation to the African Union, the Caribbean Community, and other regional bodies to collaborate on developing frameworks for dialogue indicates that the work of constructing a reparatory architecture has barely begun.

What the Resolution does not do, and perhaps cannot do within its institutional constraints, is acknowledge that the international legal framework itself requires transformation. The framework was not merely indifferent to the transatlantic slave trade. It was constituted, in significant part, through the legal instruments of that trade, from papal bulls that authorized the reduction of Africans to perpetual slavery to commercial conventions that treated human beings as taxable commodities. A framework so constituted cannot reform itself without confronting the contradiction at its foundation.

The path forward, if there is one, runs through the kind of political mobilization that produced the Civil Liberties Act, the Luxembourg Agreement, and the South African TRC: organized communities, accumulated documentation, political allies within decision-making structures, and the sustained application of moral, legal, and political pressure. Resolution A/RES/80/250 contributes to this project by fixing a normative marker at the highest level of international institution. It establishes, as a matter of collective international recognition, that this crime was the gravest of its kind, that its consequences persist, that its victims had and have rights, and that the obligation of remedy has not expired.

Whether the international community will honor that recognition is a political question, not merely a legal one. But the question has now been asked, and asked formally, by the world's most representative deliberative body. The burden of answer lies with those who have, for too long, shaped a legal order in their own image and called it universal.

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