
BEYOND SILOS: THE IMPORTANCE OF INTEGRATED LEGAL REASONING IN THE AGE OF ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE

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ABSTRACT

The quick use of artificial intelligence in many areas, such as healthcare and government, has totally transformed how legal disputes are handled. An approach to legal education that divides Tort Law, Constitutional Law, and Jurisprudence into isolated disciplines, is not equipped to solve contemporary legal problems. An example of a contemporary legal problem that involves AI is a scenario that raises questions of private liability, state liability, and legal philosophy. This article suggests that integrated legal reasoning is no longer an academic option. Rather, it is a necessity for students, practitioners, judges, and policymakers.

This paper shows that integrated legal reasoning, when combined with the analysis of classical doctrines and emerging technological threats, Indian and comparative jurisprudence, and contemporary regulatory systems, leads to new and better analyses and solutions. The article investigates the problems posed by autonomous systems, algorithmic discrimination, and AI combined with negligent governance and automated decision making. It provides a new way of thinking about legal and governance challenges posed by automated systems. It also considers the challenges autonomous systems create for legal drafting and litigation. This paper investigates the question of when, and if, a harm that results from an algorithmic decision is considered negligent.

Keywords: Artificial Intelligence, Tort Law, Constitutional Law, Jurisprudence, Integrated Legal Reasoning, Algorithmic Accountability, Constitutional Torts, Legal Education.

Introduction

Law has always revolved around this question: when there is harm in society, who is responsible? For centuries, legal systems answered this dilemma through identifiable human wrongdoers, corporations, and institutions. In the case of Artificial Intelligence (AI), the traditional concepts of human conduct and wrongdoing have been destabilized. Harm today may arise not from direct human conduct, but from an algorithmic recommendation, a predictive system, automated decision making, an autonomous vehicle, facial recognition software, and other systems.

Modern legal disputes hardly remain within a single doctrinal category. The use of AI technology in facial recognition resulting in a wrongful arrest is not merely a case pertaining to violation of Article 21 of the Constitution of India. It raises several issues relating to tortious negligence on the part of the technology company, product liability of the developers, vicarious liability of the State, and other issues concerning legal personality and responsibility. Similarly, the question of liability in the case of an accident caused by a self-driving vehicle raises issues of negligence, violation of constitutional duties by the regulatory authority, and issues related to the nature of autonomous agents.

The purpose of this article is to present the case for the use of integrated legal reasoning as an essential component of contemporary legal practice and theory. The article is divided into seven parts. The first part critically evaluates the traditional compartmentalization of legal education. The second part evaluates the continued importance of torts in the context of harms caused by technology. The third part evaluates the scope of constitutional accountability in the contemporary digital age. The fourth part delves into the theories of legal responsibility and AI personhood. The fifth part assesses the current state of laws and regulation in India and the international community. The sixth part presents an integrated legal design for legal practitioners, scholars and students. The last part of the article highlights the state of legal reasoning in future, and its implications in an age of advanced automation.

I. The Problem with Fragmented Legal Thinking

Tearing subjects into separate silos has been the standard of teaching law. This tradition has separated law into government action, private action, philosophy and thinking, and action against the state. This separation convinces the teacher that students have learned, but often

results in a loss to the learner, for, in practice, it often fails to resolve where technology today blurs the line between private and public power.

Digital technology today plays the power of government. Regulation of digital technology, especially social media, influences the control of citizen speech, the ability to change the outcome of public and private elections, the shaping of the public and private of the democracy, and the alteration of the means and methods of the citizen's participation in democracy. Government-made artificial intelligence influences the control and prediction of the enforcement of the law, the control and prediction of the distribution of government services, and the control and prediction of government actions to enforce the law against a citizen. This results in the intertwining of the State's power of enforcement, the rights of the citizen, and the thinking and philosophy of the law.

Roscoe Pound termed the law as the means for social engineering. In the case of legally codified rigid separation, the law fails to produced a gap filling mechanism.¹ In such cases, the lawyer looking at the tort of negligence for the damage done by an algorithm or an AI system, for example, would not look at the constitutional violations caused by the State in the deployment of the algorithm. On the contrary, a purely constitutional case will not help the victims in any way. The inadequacies of fragmented legal reasoning became more apparent during the COVID 19 pandemic. The right to privacy, State negligence, and the ethics of automated governance were interlinked in the context of Digital surveillance, enforcement of contact tracing, and control of biometrics coupled with governance and the moderation of online platforms.

It is imperative that legal education shifts from an isolated doctrinal approach to an integrated legal reasoning. Indian legal scholar Upendra Baxi criticized excessively formal and compartmentalized legal education for failing to address the lived realities of power, governance, and social injustice. In *The Crisis of the Indian Legal System*, Baxi argues that legal reasoning must move beyond rigid doctrinal boundaries and engage with social realities, institutional failures, and structural inequalities. His critique becomes particularly relevant in the age of artificial intelligence where technological governance affects marginalized communities disproportionately through digital exclusion, surveillance, and algorithmic bias.

¹ Pound, R. (1959). *Jurisprudence (Vol. 3)*. West Publishing Co. Retrieved from <https://archive.org/details/jurisprudence0003poun/page/n111/mode/2up>

Integrated legal reasoning therefore reflects not only an academic necessity but also a democratic and constitutional imperative.²

II. Tort Law in the Age of Artificial Intelligence

A. The Continuing Relevance of Negligence

Some of the fundamental concepts of negligence have proven to be remarkably enduring, even with the rapid changes to technology that we have witnessed. We are still able to use a technology-related tort framework placing the elements of negligence as duty, breach, causation, remoteness and damage to the harms we have experienced.

The case of *Donoghue v Stevenson*³, House of Lords, 1932, remains the foundation for a more contemporary application of negligence. With Lord Atkin's neighbour principle, the law recognizes that a duty of care exists to those whom the defendant's actions could be reasonably expected to affect. The formulation here is in the case of a snail which was found in a decomposed state in a bottle of Ginger beer. The case has a far-reaching impact on Artificial Intelligence.

AI developers, software vendors, hospitals using diagnostic systems, and even manufacturers of autonomous vehicles all pose foreseeable dangers to both users and third parties. Just because AI is more advanced doesn't mean we ignore legal obligations.

The Five Pillars of Negligence in AI Related Harm

1. Duty of Care

The developers and deployers of AI systems have more and more obligations to their users, consumers, patients, employees, and even the general public. In *Caparo Industries plc v Dickman*⁴, the House of Lords, established a three-stage test to determine duty of care: foreseeability, proximity, and whether it would be fair, just, and reasonable to impose such a duty. AI systems in healthcare, transport, and the justice system would pose foreseeable threats.

² Baxi, U. (1982). *The crisis of the Indian legal system*. Vikas Publishing House.

³ *Donoghue v Stevenson*, [1932] AC 562. Retrieved from <https://www.bailii.org/uk/cases/UKHL/1932/100.html>

⁴ *Caparo Industries plc v Dickman*, [1990] 2 AC 605. Retrieved from <https://www.bailii.org/uk/cases/UKHL/1990/2.html>

The Indian court systems have also acknowledged increased duty of care in complicated technological environments. In the 1995 case of the Indian Medical Association v. V.P. Shantha⁵, the Supreme Court of India recognized medical negligence in consumer protection law. Therefore, hospitals using defective AI diagnostics would not be able to avoid liability solely due to the fact that a decision-making algorithm was used.

2. Breach of Duty

The standard of the reasonable person changes alongside the advancement of technology. If risks associated with AI are known and achievable, continued use of that AI system may be considered a breach.

The emerging debate surrounding autonomous vehicles illustrates this problem vividly. In 2018, an autonomous vehicle operated by Uber struck and killed Elaine Herzberg in Arizona. Investigations revealed limitations in the system's object detection and emergency braking features. The case raised questions not merely about driver negligence but systemic corporate responsibility. Similarly, in medical AI contexts, over reliance upon algorithmic outputs without independent verification may constitute breach. The professional duty of care cannot be delegated entirely to software.

3. Causation

AI systems create even more complex issues for a traditional analysis of causation due to the multiplicity of harm-causing agents; that would be the developer who built it, the person who deployed it, the person who provided the data, the regulator, and of course the user.

The traditional "but for" test from the Barnett case⁶ remains applicable, and is now increasingly more difficult, due to algorithms that have the ability to learn. Imagine an AI hiring tool that employs a biased algorithm to reject job applicants based on their location. Where does the fault lie: with the programmer, the employer who uses the software, or the biased data? This is a perfect example of why integrated analysis is critical.

⁵ *Indian Medical Association v V.P. Shantha*, (1995) 6 SCC 651. Retrieved from <https://indiankanoon.org/doc/723973/>

⁶ *Barnett v Chelsea and Kensington Hospital Management Committee*, [1969] 1 QB 428. Retrieved from <https://careerinlaw.net/uk/case-summary-barnett-v-chelsea-and-kensington-hospital-management-committee-1969-1-qb-428>

4. Remoteness

The Wagon Mound case's⁷ Privy Council principles still set the boundaries on how we define the foreseeability of damage. Once the risks associated with automation and algorithm bias are documented, the discernible impacts of automation will cross the threshold of reasonably foreseeable.

5. Damage

The range of harms that result from the deployment of AI products extends beyond traditional injuries. Harms can include psychological and reputational injuries, violations of privacy, and financial loss. The use of deepfake porn, algorithmic exclusion, and injury to reputation through manipulative predictive policing, all cause legally recognized injuries.

B. Strict Liability and Product Liability

Attributing negligence to a party when a dangerous activity results in injury is no longer possible under the case of *Rylands v. Fletcher*⁸. The same is true for AI. The use of autonomous weapons, predictive policing, and self-driving cars can cause injuries that are both unimaginable and irrevocable. In such cases, exacting the standard of proof as programmer negligence from victims becomes impossible.

Autonomous weapons, predictive policing tools, medical diagnostic systems, and self driving vehicles operate in domains where errors may cause catastrophic harm. In such settings, requiring victims to prove specific programmer negligence may become practically impossible.

The Consumer Protection Act of 2019 is the starting point for product liability in India. AI that is not only self-evolving, but also alters its functionality after deployment. The Bhopal Gas Disaster case and *M.C. Mehta v Union of India (Oleum Gas Leak Case)*⁹ provides guidelines. The Supreme Court of India has expanded the horizon of absolute liability for cases in which

⁷ *Overseas Tankship (UK) Ltd v Morts Dock and Engineering Co Ltd (The Wagon Mound)*, [1961] AC 388. Retrieved from <https://www.lawcases.net/cases/overseas-tankship-uk-ltd-v-morts-dock-and-engineering-co-ltd-wagon-mound-no-2-1961-ukpc-2/>

⁸ *Rylands v. Fletcher*, (1868) LR 3 HL 330. Retrieved from https://www.uni-trier.de/fileadmin/fb5/FFA/KURSUNTERLAGEN/Anglo-Amerikanisches_Recht/Law_of_Torts/Siry-SS-2012/Rylands_v_Fletcher_1868_UKHL_1_17_July_1868_.pdf

⁹ *M.C. Mehta v Union of India (Oleum Gas Leak Case)*, AIR 1987 SC 1086. Retrieved from <https://indiankanoon.org/doc/1486949/>

a defense is not extended.

This doctrine may become increasingly relevant in regulating high risk AI systems.

III. Constitutional Law and Algorithmic Governance

A. Constitutionalism Beyond Traditional State Action

In traditional societal terms, the law represents the relationship between citizens and the State. Increasingly, digital governance is blurring the divide between public and private authority.

Dominating commercial entities are impacting citizens' speech, privacy, political involvement, and access to information. Governments are increasingly obtaining surveillance, the distribution of welfare, facial recognition, and digital identification from private companies. This results in a constitutional conundrum, where private companies exercise quasi-judicial powers and are often exempt from constitutional responsibilities.

H.M. Seervai emphasized that constitutional guarantees must be interpreted in light of evolving State functions and institutional realities rather than through narrow formalism. Contemporary digital governance complicates this distinction because private technology corporations increasingly perform functions traditionally associated with the State, including surveillance, information control, and public communication infrastructure. Seervai's constitutional approach supports a broader interpretation of constitutional accountability where the exercise of public power, rather than formal governmental identity alone, becomes central to constitutional scrutiny.¹⁰

B. Article 14 and Algorithmic Discrimination

Every individual is entitled to legal equality and protection under Article 14 of the Constitution. The Supreme Court of India has consistently held that the Article guarantees individuals protection against arbitrariness.

In *E.P. Royappa v State of Tamil Nadu*¹¹, Supreme Court of India, 1974, the Court held that equality encompasses the absence of arbitrariness. An algorithm trained on a biased sample

¹⁰ Seervai, H. M. (1983). *Constitutional law of India: A critical commentary* (3rd ed.). Tripathi. Retrieved from <https://archive.org/details/constitutionalla0000seer/page/n5/mode/2up>.

¹¹ *E.P. Royappa v State of Tamil Nadu*, (1974) 4 SCC 3. Retrieved from <https://indiankanoon.org/doc/1327287/>

may yield discriminatory outputs in a multitude of sectors, including employment, lending, policing, healthcare, and education.

The United States case concerning COMPAS, an algorithm-based predictive policing, caused a worldwide furor after it was shown that it was racially biased with respect to predicting future offending and future harm.¹² Although it was not a case before the Indian Courts, it shows how the lack of transparency of algorithms can result in inequality. Likewise, systems of facial recognition have shown large discrepancies with respect to women and people of darker complexions. The State's use of these systems of facial recognition would violate Article 14.

At present, India has no adequate and comprehensive laws regulating algorithmic discrimination. The absence of such laws creates serious constitutional issues.

C. Article 19 and Digital Expression

The ability to exercise freedom of speech in India, as provided under Article 19(1)(a), is increasingly becoming dependent on digital technology, the control of which is in the hands of both State actors and private bodies.

In *Shreya Singhal v Union of India*, 2015¹³, the Supreme Court of India, decided that Section 66A of the Information Technology Act, 2000 decelerates free speech, thus, suppressing the fundamental right to free speech. Providing that internet access is fundamental to the right to free speech, this position was reiterated in *Anuradha Bhasin v. Union of India*¹⁴, Supreme Court of India, 2020.

Through the use of AI, automated takedowns, shadow banning, algorithmic amplification, and predictive moderation, speech regulation creates new and more advanced ways to control speech through regulation, that is the "Chilling effect".¹⁵ The challenge is to delineate the

¹² Mallika Chawla. (2021, December 10). *COMPAS case study: Investigating algorithmic fairness of predictive policing*. Medium. Retrieved May 12, 2026, from <https://mallika-chawla.medium.com/compas-case-study-investigating-algorithmic-fairness-of-predictive-policing-339fe6e5dd72>

¹³ *Shreya Singhal v Union of India*, (2015) 5 SCC 1. Retrieved from <https://indiankanoon.org/doc/110813550/>

¹⁴ *Anuradha Bhasin v Union of India*, (2020) 3 SCC 637. Retrieved from <https://indiankanoon.org/doc/82461587/>

¹⁵ The doctrine of chilling effect refers to the inhibition or discouragement of the legitimate exercise of natural or legal rights (especially free speech) by the threat of legal sanction or government reprisal. It causes individuals to self-censor, avoiding lawful expression to avoid potential penalties, ultimately creating a climate of fear.

jurisdictional boundaries that limit the legislative provisions aimed at regulating platform governance and the constitutional obligations that may be imposed on the States.¹⁶

D. Article 21 and Informational Privacy

The most significant event that affected Indian digital rights was when in *Justice K.S. Puttaswamy v Union of India*, 2017¹⁷, the Supreme Court of India held that privacy is a fundamental right. This Constitution Bench held that privacy is not a mere right to secrecy but is a right to a person's autonomy, dignity, right to self determination, and a person's right to make his/her own decisions.

AI systems rely fundamentally upon data. Extraction, predictive policing, targeted advertising, biometric surveillance, and behavioral profiling pose direct risks under Article 21. The Aadhaar litigation and the Court's endorsement of certain provisions of the Act while retaining the surveillance framework concern the balancing between technology and governance.

The EU GDPR in its Article 22, talks about automated decision-making and data processing under certain conditions and sets safeguards to protect data subjects in the decision-making process. The Digital Personal Data Protection Act, 2023 of India, while a step in the positive direction, has been criticized for the excessive state exemptions. The doctrine of constitutional torts has been recognized in India for state actions infringing the fundamental rights.

E. Constitutional Torts and State Accountability

The doctrine of constitutional torts has been recognized in India where state actions infringe the fundamental rights.

In *Nilabati Behera v State of Orissa*¹⁸, the Supreme Court ordered, for the first time, compensation for custodial death and held it to be within the purview of public law. In a similar vein, in *Rudal Shah v State of Bihar*¹⁹, the Supreme Court of India, 1983, ordered compensation for illegal detention.

¹⁶ Dworkin, R. (1977). *Taking rights seriously*. Harvard University Press. Retrieved from <https://cdn.bookee.app/files/pdf/book/en/taking-rights-seriously.pdf>

¹⁷ *Justice K.S. Puttaswamy v Union of India*, (2017) 10 SCC 1. Retrieved from <https://indiankanoon.org/doc/91938676/>

¹⁸ *Nilabati Behera v State of Orissa*, (1993) 2 SCC 746. Retrieved from <https://indiankanoon.org/doc/1628260/>

¹⁹ *Rudal Shah v State of Bihar*, (1983) 4 SCC 141. Retrieved from <https://indiankanoon.org/doc/810491/>

These decisions have also made it clear that constitutional remedies go beyond a mere declaration. If a citizen is wrongfully detained by AI predictive policing due to fundamentally flawed extreme algorithmic profiling, then the doctrine of constitutional torts will be the focus.

IV. Jurisprudence and the Question of AI Responsibility

A. Legal Positivism and Artificial Intelligence

For legal positivists like John Austin²⁰ and H.L.A. Hart²¹, law derives its authority from recognized legal sources and not from morality. From a positivist stance, AI incurs no legal personhood, as no legal system grants it. Legal personality is a construct of law.

*Thaler v Comptroller-General of Patents, Designs and Trade Marks*²² is an example of the UK Supreme Court confirming that, in regard to existing patent legislation, an AI cannot be deemed an inventor. The Court argued that it is Parliament, not the Courts, who are to determine the extension of legal personhood.

B. Natural Law Theory

Law, according to Natural Law theorists such as Aquinas, must be both rational and moral. Under such circumstances it is impossible to endow AI with legal rights as it will lack reason, moral agency as well as free will.

AI can optimize for the “best” statistical outcomes; however, they still do not develop ethical systems in the codified sense. Accordingly, Natural Law Theory will not support the granting of legal rights to AI. This theory has a significant influence to the debates on ethics of AI and ethics of Autonomous Weapons Systems and Robotic Personhood.

C. Analytical Jurisprudence and Legal Fiction

While Salmond²³ and other analytical jurists acknowledge that legal personality is a legal

²⁰ Austin, J. (1863). *Lectures on jurisprudence, or, The philosophy of positive law* (4th ed., Vol. 1). John Murray. Retrieved from <https://archive.org/details/lecturesonjurisp1laust/page/80/mode/2up>

²¹ Hart, H. L. A. (1961). *The concept of law*. Clarendon Press. Retrieved from <https://www.scribd.com/document/86751444/HLA-Hart-The-Concept-of-Law>

²² *Thaler v Comptroller-General of Patents, Designs and Trade Marks*, [2023] UKSC 49. Retrieved from https://supremecourt.uk/uploads/uksc_2021_0201_judgment_3f445a5dc7.pdf

²³ Salmond, J. W. (1902). *Jurisprudence or the theory of the law*. Stevens and Haynes. Retrieved from <https://archive.org/details/cu31924021182112/page/334/mode/2up?q=personality>

construction, they argue that corporations, temples, and even ships can be regarded as juristic persons, even though they have no consciousness.

This situation motivates speculation on how autonomous systems will evolve. If legal fictions can breathe life into companies, then perhaps even a more constrained legal personality for AI may be conceivable. The 2017 European Parliament discussions on ‘electronic personhood’ argued that, as systems continue to gain greater autonomy, we will need to be more adaptable in our understanding of legal agency.

D. Sociological Jurisprudence

Roscoe Pound's idea of sociological jurisprudence is that the balancing of competing interests is the function of law.

From that perspective, the defendant's AI entity may or may not have a conscience, will not matter, as long as there is a remedy. The concern is more substantive than metaphysical, and that concern is, how should law distribute the inevitable risks of sophisticated, complex and technologically advanced societies? The concern is more pragmatic than metaphysical, and that is shaping the law more and more.

The legal thought concerning artificial intelligence shows that not one single school of legal thought is autonomous. Positivism shows how autonomous systems are legal, natural law shows how end driven systems are autonomous and ethical, flexible legal personality, and sociological jurisprudence is the balancing of competing social interests. Integrated legal reasoning therefore does not reject traditional jurisprudence. Instead, it combines multiple jurisprudential methods to address technological realities that transcend classical legal categories.

V. Emerging Legislative and Regulatory Frameworks

A. India's Digital Personal Data Protection Act, 2023

India's Digital Personal Data Protection Act, 2023, is an example of legislation regulating the processing of personal data. The Act contains provisions for the processing of data with the consent of the data subject, as well as the obligations of a data fiduciary and rights of data subjects. While there is much debate as to the actual scope of privacy protection, critics believe

that overly broad State exemptions invalid the protection of privacy. Unlike the GDPR, the Act does not contain any provisions regulating algorithmic transparency or provisions regarding automated decision making. The lack of frameworks for the governance of AI is one of the Act's greatest shortcomings.

B. The Information Technology Act, 2000

The primary legislation governing cyber law in India is the Information Technology Act, 2000. Despite the law having important provisions on intermediary liability, cyber crimes, and electronic governance, the law is a product of its time. Therefore, it is unable to address the challenges posed by modern technologies, such as deepfakes, the use of generative AI, algorithms that cause discrimination, and AI systems that operate without human control. The removal of Section 66A following the case of *Shreya Singhal v Union of India*²⁴, Supreme Court of India, 2015, showed the balance between regulation of technology and the right to free speech

C. Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, 2023

The Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita (which replaces the Indian Penal Code of 1860, retains the traditional criminal law structure which is built on the concepts of actus reus and mens rea. Where the intentional use of AI to cause fraud, cheating, deepfakes, market manipulation, or cyber harassment occurs, some provisions of the law may be applicable. However, harm caused by AI acting without human control remains largely unaddressed. The BNS does not offer a framework that is adequate to address the challenges posed by the use of AI or the harm caused by AI algorithms or autonomous systems. This unaddressed gap will be the cause of a lot of litigation in the foreseeable future.

D. European Union AI Act

The European Union AI Act²⁵, is one of the most ambitious pieces of legislation in the area of regulation of artificial intelligence. The legislation adopts a regulation by risk approach. Some AI practices are banned, such as social scoring and manipulative systems, while others are classified as high risk and are subject to stricter rules. The applicability of this Act is beyond

²⁴ *Shreya Singhal v Union of India*, (2015) 5 SCC 1. Retrieved from <https://indiankanoon.org/doc/110813550/>

²⁵ European Union. (2024). *Artificial Intelligence Act, Regulation (EU) 2024/1689*. https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/HTML/?uri=OJ:L_202401689

regulation. It demonstrates the understanding that the governance of AI is a realm of law that must be approached in a proactive manner, rather than being the responsibility of a law that is created reactively. Currently, India does not have a similar legislation that is comprehensive in the area of AI regulation.

E. Comparative Developments

1. United States - The US has taken a sector-specific and piecemeal approach to AI regulation. Lawsuits about algorithmic discrimination, privacy, and accountability of platforms are ongoing.
2. China - China has quickly moved to regulate recommendation algorithms and generative AI systems and increased its State surveillance.
3. United Kingdom - The UK prefers to provide Adaptive Regulatory Guidance, instead of a holistic approach to AI legislation.

These comparative approaches demonstrate that no jurisdiction has fully resolved the challenges posed by autonomous systems. Every country is dealing with the issues that autonomous systems create.

VI. Integrated Legal Reasoning in Practice

A. The Autonomous Vehicle Self-driving car Example

Consider the following scenario, where an autonomous vehicle fatally injures a pedestrian at night. Internal company documents reveal prior knowledge of low light detection failures. Regulators had received complaints but failed to intervene.

Tort Law Analysis

The manufacturer, software vendor, and operating company may be liable for negligence and product liability. The duty of care is owed to all road users. Suppressing safety data constitutes a breach. The algorithmic failure caused harm that was foreseeable.

Constitutional Law Analysis

If regulators turned a blind eye to previous complaints, constitutional issues would emerge with

respect to arbitrary State inaction under Article 14 and positive obligations under Article 21. A failure to act on the part of the regulators may be challenged through public interest litigation.

Jurisprudential Analysis

The case also raises more complex issues around the distribution of liability with respect to autonomous systems. Should liability for the most part be distributed to the human component of the system? Should high risk AI systems be subject to a compulsory insurance regime? Should some autonomous systems be granted a form of limited legal personality?

A lawyer analysing only one dimension misses the full picture and the extent of dispute.

B. Why Students Need Integrated Legal Training

Students trained only in doctrine may fail to address the complex issues of modern reality. Dealing with interdisciplinary litigation becomes the norm for lawyers of the modern era. Intersecting elements of technology, constitutional and civil rights, tort law, cyber law, consumer protection, intellectual property, and international law are incorporated simultaneously.

Integrated legal education develops the following skills :

- Analytical flexibility.
- Better statutory interpretation.
- Comparative reasoning.
- Constitutional sensitivity.
- Technological literacy.
- Ethical awareness.
- Practical litigation strategy.

A teaching methodology combining clinical and problem-based education is essential. This allows students to move past memorization and to apply multiple legal frameworks to real

world cases.

C. Why Practitioners Need Integrated Legal Reasoning

For practitioners, integrating multiple viewpoints significantly improves the outcome of litigation. A narrower tort claim, for example, may be unsuccessful where a broader claim addressing the same issue also includes a constitutional component. A stand-alone constitutional claim may be granted a declaration of rights, but no damages would be awarded.

Integrated legal drafting enables:

- Multi layered pleadings.
- Alternative causes of action.
- Expanded remedies.
- Better evidentiary framing.
- Strategic forum selection.
- Stronger constitutional grounding.
- More persuasive advocacy.

Cross-disciplinary collaboration is the norm in technology-based dispute resolution.

D. Why Academicians Must Move Beyond Doctrinal Isolation

Academicians are the architects of future legal reasoning. The more focused legal thinking becomes, the more likely it is to become obsolete in rapidly changing technological environments.

Legal thought of the modern era must integrate:

- AI ethics.
- Comparative constitutionalism.

- Platform governance.
- Digital labour
- Surveillance capitalism.
- Algorithmic discrimination.
- Data colonialism.
- Regulatory theory.
- Computational governance.

An integration of social, philosophical, economic, and political theories and thinking is the strongest in legal thinking.

VII. Critical Challenges and Future Directions

- A. The Opacity Problem: Due to AI's decision black boxes, proving negligence, forming standards for evidence, and achieving fairness in due process becomes an insurmountable challenge.
- B. The Accountability Gap: Due to AI's many parties, developers blame owners, owners blame data, and governments blame the providers of the data. Victims are left in a state of no accountability due to the lack of integrated legal thinking.
- C. Regulatory Lag: Technology is more advanced than the law. Courts must deal with issues where the facts create a reality that has not existed before. The court has primary responsibility for the governance foundation of a constitution.
- D. Risks of Over Regulation: Regulation is important, but too much control can kill progress and surge in technological advances. The struggle lies in the accommodation in innovation and responsibility. Regulation based on risk may provide the most effective solution.

VIII. Drafting Through an Integrated Legal Lens

A. What Students Should Think About

When analyzing legal problems concerning technology, it is important for students not to

oversimplify and limit disputes to just one dimension. Instead, it is more important to consider the following common dimensions:

1. Is this a private wrong, a public wrong, or both?
2. What is the constitutional duty of the state?
3. What are the implications of public and private law?
4. Does a jurisprudential gap presently exist? Where?
5. Which forum will provide the best opportunity for achieving the relief?
6. Is the use of a comparative approach warranted?
7. What is the relationship of the dispute to privacy, dignity, equality, and/or autonomy?

Considering multiple legal dimensions enhances intellectual rigor and professional flexibility.

B. What Practitioners Should Think About

When formulating pleadings, practitioners should:

1. Articulate disputes across a number of legal dimensions.
2. Articulate the appropriate legal provisions of the Constitution.
3. Plead in the alternative.
4. Consider rights' protection failures.
5. Identify the use of technology-based defenses.
6. Identify the use of technology-based defenses.
7. Utilize a comparative approach to the law.
8. Utilize expert evidence.

9. Consider ethics and policy.
10. Consider the impact of litigation on the larger goal of achieving a justice-based society.

The best lawyers are able to combine an extensive knowledge of the law with the ability to reason across disciplines.

C. What Scholars and Authors Should Think About

Legal authors must be aware that new technologies affect and lead to the revision of some of the assumptions of traditional legal concepts.

Legal scholars must therefore:

1. Discard traditional legal concepts that have become outmoded.
2. Become involved with and embrace technology.
3. Use a comparative approach.
4. Consider the social impact of the technology-based governance of Artificial Intelligence.
5. Research the impact of private technology use on governing the law.
6. Embrace innovative concepts of technology-based governance.
7. Become involved with and embrace technology.
8. Analyze the law.
9. Protect Human Rights in Technology.

Legal scholarship should not only describe the evolution of technology but also influence how we should respond to technology.

Conclusion

The use of artificial intelligence demonstrates the need for a more cohesive legal framework.

Many contemporary issues are not divided into traditional legal answers. The example given can be negligence law for the injury, a breach of an individual's right, a failure by a government to fulfill its obligations, an ethical dilemma, and psychological unsettledness of the legal thinker.

An integrated legal thinking should not only be a preferred academic approach but should also be a professional. The law of torts offers. Laws of a constitution defend. The principles of law give guidance on new legal issues. This ensures that the law holds individuals responsible when technology changes how individuals act.

Lawyers of the future must be skilled in multiple areas of law. Students need to be trained in many different areas. Practitioners need to be able to work in many different areas. The question being asked will always begin with, when someone is wronged, who is responsible? The use of AI makes the answer to this question more difficult. However, the need for an answer is still there.

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