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## **ARBITRATION AS AN INSTRUMENT OF CORPORATE DOMINANCE: A SHIELD AGAINST ACCOUNTABILITY?**

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### **ABSTRACT**

Originally conceived as a quick and flexible alternative to litigation, arbitration has turned out to be increasingly an instrument of corporate dominance. Corporations have translated arbitration into a shield against public accountability and legal scrutiny by means of compulsory arbitration clauses, selective arbitrator appointments, and strident confidentiality provisions. Such a paper is critical to arbitration and proves how it falls frequently under the rhetoric of power imbalances, thereby curbing access to justice for consumers, employees, and small businesses. The mandatory arbitration clauses limit the ability of the weaker parties to redress their grievances before open courts, while repeated appointments of arbitrators inject implicit bias in favor of powerful corporations. Moreover, confidentiality in arbitration proceedings bars the establishment of potential legal precedents and hides corporate misbehaviours from public view. In consumer and employment disputes, this balance would significantly destroy procedural fairness, reducing arbitration to a tool for preserving the corporate interest. It critiques mechanisms investor-state arbitration provisions create by corporations against the former public policies adopted to provide an efficient means, henceforth gaining more and better-quality control while avoiding all elements of democratic values in deciding who the right policy-makers ought to be. To a close end, this paper would offer certain reform mechanisms needed to achieve equilibrium between stronger states' wilful arbitral exercises on their subordinates' vital needs that undermine equality.

## **Introduction**

Arbitration was designed to be an efficient, neutral alternative to litigation. It would agree disputes relatively speedily and without soaking up the courts' time and resources. But reality has quite often turned it into a weapon that large corporations wield to their own advantage. Businesses do this by making way for ubiquitous mandatory arbitration clauses, which essentially strong-arm weaker parties-whether they are consumers, employees, or small businesses-to forego their option to have disputes heard in public court. This imposition restricts access to procedural safeguards, transparency, and appeal rights, thus creating an uneven playing field.

Moreover, corporations wield considerable power in arbitration, especially through the repeated appointment of arbitrators who may be motivated to favor them for future appointments. The confidential nature of arbitration also limits accountability because corporate malpractices are kept away from public scrutiny and prevent the establishment of legal precedents. All these factors combine to undermine the very principles of justice and fairness that arbitration was supposed to uphold.

This paper critically examines the way arbitration has become an instrument of corporate dominance, thereby evading accountability on the part of powerful entities. It reviews arbitration's effect on access to justice, analyses structural defects in it, and shows areas where procedural fairness is violated. It further provides a proposal for critical reforms that will bring about more balanced and transparent arbitration.

## **Historical Context and Purpose of Arbitration**

Arbitration, being the method of alternative dispute resolution, dates back to ancient times, and is established in many early Greek, Roman, and Islamic legal traditions, designed to be an alternative remedy to formal litigation by the mutual consent of both parties before neutral, independent and impartially acting arbitrators with a view of settling their differences amicably and with utmost efficiency. The underlying idea was to support flexibility, increased speed, and reduced costs and still maintain the autonomy of the parties involved. With time, arbitration became an increasingly popular forum for commercial disputes, where discretion and expertise on complex business issues were considered essentials.

The development of arbitration in modern times has been significantly influenced by international conventions and legal reforms. Among the most important treaties is the **New York Convention of 1958**<sup>1</sup>, which has facilitated the recognition and enforcement of foreign arbitral awards in more than 150 jurisdictions. In India, the **Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996**<sup>2</sup>, brought domestic arbitration laws into line with international standards by adopting principles from the **UNCITRAL Model Law**.<sup>3</sup>

Arbitration was thus meant to balance the efficiency sought with fairness: greater process flexibility, faster timelines, and reduced costs. An ethos of party autonomy—allowing parties to control key aspects of the process, such as arbitrator selection, procedural rules, and applicable law—was viewed as part of the pull of arbitration. This was particularly so for the large businesses seeking cross-border transactions where litigation in foreign and sometimes alien legal systems risked becoming fraught with uncertainty.

Yet institutionalization of arbitration has led corporations to dominate its process. For instance, through mandatory arbitration clauses, repeat arbitrator appointments, and procedural opacity, arbitration is increasingly criticized as no longer meeting its original ends. Instead, it often cements power imbalances, denies corporate entities liability, and subverts access to justice for already vulnerable parties. This paper engages with these criticisms in depth.

### **Corporate Control over Arbitration**

The growing criticism of arbitration today is the lack of proper check on the discretion of corporate entities to influence the dispute resolution process. The idea behind its conception was as neutral and efficient an alternative to litigation, but in the existing framework of arbitration, it favors big corporations over others, curbing the rights and protections for the weaker party- consumers, employees, or small businesses.

One of the most powerful weapons of corporate power is the **mandatory arbitration clause**, often inserted in employment, consumer goods, financial services, and technology platforms'

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<sup>1</sup> UNITED NATIONS. *Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards*. Legal document, 2015.

<sup>2</sup> United Nations Commission on International Trade Law (UNCITRAL). *THE ARBITRATION AND CONCILIATION ACT, 1996. THE ARBITRATION AND CONCILIATION ACT, 1996*, 1996.

<sup>3</sup> UNCITRAL Model Law on International Commercial Arbitration (1985), With Amendments as Adopted in 2006 | United Nations Commission on International Trade Law.

contracts.<sup>4</sup> This clause forces arbitration of disputes and thus denies access to public courts. Since the contracts are non-negotiable, the weaker party has little choice but to accept terms favorable to corporations. This way, companies shield themselves from class actions, legal precedents, and public scrutiny and establish a privatized system of justice designed to serve corporate interests.

**Selection and repeat appointments of arbitrators** by corporations also impact arbitration. Corporations, in most instances, repeatedly involve the same arbitrators, creating implicit bias<sup>5</sup>. Such arbitrators may be motivated to make decisions that favor corporate clients, knowing that decisions to contradict corporate clients may jeopardize future opportunities for professional service. This undermines the principle of neutrality and raises concerns about impartiality in arbitration proceedings.

Another mechanism of corporate control is **confidentiality**, usually built into arbitration agreements<sup>6</sup>. Because arbitration is secret, the process as well as its outcome usually is not disclosed to the public. This would deprive precedents from emerging in court judgments, and would prevent evidence that can be proof of systemic wrong-doing to come to the public eye. As such, arbitration can serve the interests of corporations to manage reputation risks at the expense of withholding information deemed vital to public interest.

More, **limited judicial review** over arbitral awards limits aggrieved parties from attacking biased or unfair decisions made through arbitration<sup>7</sup>. There is resistance to the idea of courts reviewing arbitration awards in an effort not to undermine arbitration and its privatized nature but limit recourse available for weaker parties.

These factors taken together turn arbitration into a structure that perpetuates corporate hegemony, thus propelling crucial questioning regarding the merit of fairness and justice and pushing the call for increased regulation and change.

### **Procedural Concerns: Is Arbitration Really Fair?**

The promise of efficiency and impartiality that arbitration has held up has been growing

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<sup>4</sup> “The Case against Mandatory Consumer Arbitration Clauses.” *Center for American Progress*

<sup>5</sup> *CODE of CONDUCT -BACKGROUND PAPERS REPEAT APPOINTMENTS I*

<sup>6</sup> Hollander, Mindy, and Maurice Deane. “Overcoming the Achilles’ Heel of Consumer Protection: Limiting Mandatory Arbitration Clauses in Consumer Contracts.” *Hofstra Law Review*, vol. 46, 2018

<sup>7</sup> “Arbitrator Bias: Why We Should Adopt the Ninth Circuit’s Approach.” *Journal of Dispute Resolution*, 2023

criticism over procedural concerns that raise questions about the fairness of arbitration, especially to weaker parties involved in disputes with large corporations. The very features that make arbitration attractive to businesses—confidentiality, flexibility, and limited judicial oversight—often work to the detriment of consumers, employees, and small businesses.

**Procedural power unbalanced:** In most instances, the procedural terms are issued by the stronger party, usually through non-negotiable mandatory arbitration clauses.<sup>8</sup> Seldom do such clauses not prescribe procedural rules, an arbitration institution, or even venue, usually to the detriment of the weaker party. Again, this negates party autonomy, one of the underpinnings of arbitration.

Another issue is **confidentiality**, which raises fairness concerns. Arbitration proceedings and awards are usually confidential, and access to case information is not possible in public.<sup>9</sup> Although this confidentiality is sold as a benefit, it often allows corporations to hide patterns of abuse. Unlike court judgments, arbitral decisions do not create precedents, so similarly situated parties have no idea what the law will do.

The **selection of arbitrators** also has fairness concerns. Corporations using arbitration regularly end up appointing the same "business-friendly" arbitrators, who become conscious of the huge financial incentives to be reappointed.<sup>10</sup> In effect, such an arbitrator can be prone to favor corporate clients, thereby betraying the idea of neutrality and independence which is supposed to form the foundation for arbitration.

The scope of **judicial review** is further limited when arbitral awards are concerned, as it leaves less room for challenging biased or procedurally unfair decisions by the aggrieved party.<sup>11</sup> Courts often resist interference in arbitration, considering finality and efficiency over procedural fairness. This leads to frequent failures to correct mistakes in law or bias on the part of arbitrators.

Finally, the **arbitration costs** are always higher than that of litigation, which further disfavors

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<sup>8</sup> Ware, Stephen J. "The Centrist Case for Enforcing Adhesive Arbitration Agreements." *Harvard Negotiation Law Review*, vol. 23, 2018, pp. 29-31

<sup>9</sup> Stipanowich, Thomas J. "Arbitration: The 'New Litigation'." *University of Illinois Law Review*, vol. 2010, no. 1, 2010, pp. 1-59

<sup>10</sup> Puig, Sergio J. "Social Capital in the Arbitration Market." *European Journal of International Law*, vol. 25, no. 2, 2014, pp. 387-424

<sup>11</sup> Carbonneau, Thomas E. *The Law and Practice of Arbitration*. 5th ed., Juris Publishing, 2014, pp. 451-455

weaker parties.<sup>12</sup> Sometimes, administrative fees, arbitrator fees, and legal costs make arbitration inaccessible for individuals and small businesses.

Such procedural concerns bring into question whether, in its present form, arbitration is the fair and equitable process it purports to be. Without such radical reforms, arbitration risks becoming a privatized justice system that will favor corporate interests over access to justice and fairness.

### **Criticism on Arbitration Based on Specific Cases**

In reality, although arbitration is promoted as a fair and efficient alternative to litigation, severe criticism has met its application in numerous contexts. In consumer, employment, investor-state, and other kinds of disputes, it often acts contrary to access to justice and tends to hide corporate actors from public accountability. The paper suggests that, instead of promoting equality, the mechanism of arbitration becomes a tool for consolidating corporate power and exploiting the vulnerable procedural weaknesses of weaker parties. Here are important key points that indicate criticism regarding arbitration in specific contexts.

#### **1. Consumer Disputes: Denial of Collective Redress:**

Arbitration clauses are usually non-negotiable and buried in fine print in consumer contracts, leading to the automatic waiver of consumers' rights to bring their disputes to court<sup>13</sup>. These clauses also cancel collective redress actions in the form of class actions, which is very important in addressing mass harm, whether in the form of undisplayed fees or defective products. In arbitration, there are usually high administrative fees and complicated procedure that discourages consumers from pursuing small legitimate claims. Arbitration is also secretive, which denies public scrutiny and allows corporations to keep evidence of systemic misconduct. This has been criticised as the outsourcing of justice which undermines consumer protection and encourages abusive business practices.

#### **2. Employment Disputes: Gagging Workplace Conduct:**

In the work environment, the arbitration clauses are most employed to suppress claims of

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<sup>12</sup> Hensler, Deborah R. "A Research Agenda: What We Need to Know About Court-Connected ADR." RAND Corporation, 2000

<sup>13</sup> "Arbitration Study: Report to Congress, 2015." Consumer Financial Protection Bureau, March 2015

discrimination, wrongful termination and sexual harassment<sup>14</sup>. These clauses force employees to resolve disputes confidentially. For the most part, it deprives them of the public exposure of systemic misconduct. Furthermore, the arbitration selection process has been criticized because repeat appointments can create a bias toward corporate interests. Studies have indicated that employees tend to have lower win rates and receive smaller awards in arbitration compared to court cases. Critics argue that arbitration of employment disputes perpetuates a culture of silence and impunity, which protects corporations from reputational damage and systemic reform.

### **3. Investor-State Dispute Settlement (ISDS): Undermining Sovereignty:**

The Investor-State Dispute Settlement mechanism permits multinational enterprises to take host states to court regarding regulations it perceives may affect its investment negatively.<sup>15</sup> Opponents claim ISDS systematically undermines a state's ability to set policies and acts disproportionately in favor of corporate interests. ISDS arbitration claims against states for making public health, environmental, or labour protection regulations have resulted in a "chilling effect" on policy-making. The high cost of defending against ISDS claims is more especially a challenge to developing countries. Besides, ISDS practice is not transparent and is not in public accountability, which is the most significant question of public interest, although it involves matters of public significance.

### **4. Repeated Arbitrator Appointments: Compromising Impartiality:**

This raises grave concerns over impartiality as corporations, due to their frequent arbitration cases, can select the arbitrators of their choice<sup>16</sup>. Most often, these are the ones considered to be business friendly. In turn, the arbitrators will do all that is necessary to win future appointments from such corporate clients, thereby violating the fundamental tenets of arbitration: neutrality and fairness. Critics argue that this creates an "arbitrator marketplace" of corporate interests shaping outcomes, thereby decimating trust in arbitration.

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<sup>14</sup> olvin, Alexander J.S. "The Growing Use of Mandatory Arbitration." Economic Policy Institute, April 6, 2018

<sup>15</sup> Franck, Susan D. "Empirically Evaluating Claims about Investment Treaty Arbitration." North Carolina Law Review, vol. 86, no. 1, 2007, pp. 1-88

<sup>16</sup> ogers, Catherine A. "The Vocation of the International Arbitrator." American University International Law Review, vol. 20, no. 5, 2005, pp. 957-1020

## **5. Confidentially: Respecting Corporate Misconduct**

The only other advantage, allegedly, is privacy, though considerable disadvantages also characterise it-privacy that holds arbitration proceedings, as well as results of that process, without public access for information regarding what corporations have undertaken<sup>17</sup>. This opaqueness has saved corporations from reputational losses and legal audits. In fraud cases against consumers, harassment cases in the workplace, or in environmental damage cases, confidentiality saves the affected community from knowing earlier misconduct. Judgments by the courts do not set precedents in law. Thus, this restricts public law development. According to some critics, arbitral awards provisions of confidentiality have been designed more to protect corporate wrongdoers than to further the cause of efficient dispute resolution.

## **6. Limited Scope of Judicial Review: Limitation on Legal Remedies:**

The limited judicial review of arbitral awards makes the practice inaccessible to weaker parties that cannot appeal a decision by the arbitration tribunal due to biased or procedurally unfair proceedings<sup>18</sup>. Generally, courts are very hesitant to reverse an arbitral award as this may have negative effects on finality and efficiency. Yet, in exercising such deference, injustice can prevail in arbitration decisions. Critics argue that weaker parties, such as consumers, employees, and small businesses, are denied essential procedural protections available in litigation, including the right to appeal on substantive grounds.

## **7. High Costs: An Illusion of Affordability:**

Although arbitration is perceived as a cheap form of dispute resolution, it may be too expensive for the weaker party<sup>19</sup>. The fees associated with arbitration, such as administrative fees and arbitrator compensation, are in most cases much higher than filing fees in court. Such costs prevent consumers and small businesses from pursuing their claims since their recovery would be a small sum. Furthermore, critics argue that the more financial muscle a corporation has, the longer it can drag arbitration, thereby depleting the opponent's resources. This criticism thus negates the argument that arbitration is cheaper and more accessible than litigation.

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<sup>17</sup> tipanowich, Thomas J. "Arbitration: The 'New Litigation'." University of Illinois Law Review, vol. 2010, no. 1, 2010, pp. 1-59

<sup>18</sup> Carbonneau, Thomas E. The Law and Practice of Arbitration. 5th ed., Juris Publishing, 2014, pp. 451-455

<sup>19</sup> "Samsung Case Highlights Costs of Arbitrating Mass Claims." Reuters, July 26, 2024



## **8. Imbalance of Power and Procedural Control:**

Arbitration frequently suffers from significant imbalances of power, especially in contracts of adhesion, in which the more powerful party makes terms<sup>20</sup>. Corporations usually dominate key procedural elements, such as who selects arbitrators, which rules to use, and where proceedings will occur. This place in the sun enables them to craft arbitration procedures that serve their interests while curtailing the procedural rights of weaker parties. This has been criticized for undermining the principle of party autonomy because the weaker party's consent to arbitration is often coerced or illusory.

## **Conclusion:**

Arbitration has, in practice, taken off course from the original intent of offering a fair, efficient, and impartial forum for dispute resolution. In contexts that relate to consumer, employment, or investor-state disputes, it tends to fortify corporate power by restricting access to justice, procedural fairness, and public accountability. Some of the problems are confidentiality, arbitrator bias, poor judicial review, and high cost. They underscore systemic failures in arbitration. Unless meaningful reforms include expanded transparency, stricter regulation of how arbitrators are selected, and limitations on the use of mandatory arbitration clauses, arbitration threatens to become a vehicle for privatized injustice rather than a legitimate alternative to litigation. Absent such reform," critics say, "arbitration will forever be a corporate shield and never a vehicle of fair dispute resolution".

## **Impact on Access to Justice**

One of the major criticisms of arbitration is its effect on access to justice, which is especially dire for vulnerable parties such as consumers, employees, and small businesses. Although arbitration is touted as a more efficient and cost-effective alternative to litigation, critics claim that it actually functions as a privatized system designed to serve the interests of powerful corporations. Arbitration can delay justice instead of facilitating it as it involves procedural imbalances, limited transparency, high costs, and restricted legal recourse.

## **1. Procedural Power Imbalance:**

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<sup>20</sup> "Diffusing Disputes: The Public in the Private of Arbitration." Yale Law Journal, vol. 122, no. 8, 2013, pp. 2804-2911

Arbitration clauses are often foisted on the weaker party by more powerful contracting parties in adhesion contracts, stripping the latter of bargaining power. For instance, corporations use the clause mandatorily binding consumers and employees to arbitration with consumers and employees; this would have them forego their right to take a claim to court. Such clauses determine the procedure that should be adopted, who will serve as arbitrators, and even the location of proceedings to favor the strong party.

Genuine consent to arbitration underlies the idea of party autonomy. This will make it seem as though one is forced to agree to something in which the implications of an agreement may be poorly understood and weaker parties agreeing to unfair terms as a result of bargaining disparities. The proponents believe that in actuality, such disparity has deprived weaker parties of the forum to a neutral and impartial adjudicator for a genuine redress of their rights.

## **2. High Costs and Financial Barriers**

While arbitration is claimed to be less costly than litigation, its costs are prohibitively expensive for more vulnerable parties. The principal fees in arbitration include administrative costs, arbitrator fees, and attorney fees. These often exceed the typical court filing fees. For small claim plaintiffs or low-income litigants, such costs can serve as a deterrent to bringing valid claims at all.

Corporations also take leverage of arbitration by protracting the procedure; hence, they increase the cost against their opponent. Critics argue that arbitration instead of a cost-effective option favors corporations as it financially exhausts the weaker party, and for this reason, it hinders access to justice.

## **3. Absence of Legal Counsel and Advocacy:**

In a lawsuit, a weaker party can rely on process protections, like legal aid, discovery rights, and the right to appeal an adverse judgment. Arbitration generally does not have these protections. Weaker parties, such as consumers and employees, may lack access to inexpensive legal counsel and are therefore not on an equal footing with a well-represented corporate party.

In addition, arbitration's discovery is limited; thereby, a weak party will find it challenging to obtain important evidence that would strengthen their claim. Critics have thus argued that the

procedural restriction reduces the process of fact-finding and deprives the weak party of having an opportunity for fair outcome.

#### **4. Lack of Confidentiality and Lack of Transparency:**

Arbitration is usually private, which detractors argue defeats the purpose of openness and accountability. Unlike a court process, which is open to the public and recorded in publicly available documents, arbitration keeps the process as well as the result confidential. This can help corporations avoid public scrutiny of their practices and prevent reputational damage.

This lack of transparency creates barriers to the legal awareness of affected parties and the rest of society. Victims of similar disputes will not learn about prior cases or decisions that can support their claims. Furthermore, this absence of public records cannot enable the development of legal precedents; the processes of the law will not evolve, nor will access to uniform legal standards be provided.

#### **5. Limited Judicial Review and Legal Recourse:**

The arbitral award thus enjoys limited judicial review. This feature was, in fact, designed towards finality and efficiency. The courts have been very reluctant to interfere with arbitral awards even when there has been procedural error or substantive injustice. Critics hold the view that this restricted oversight denies weaker parties an opportunity to challenge biased or unfair decisions.

A main argument for resort to litigation involves having the chance for appeal within appellate courts of jurisdictions. Under an arbitration arrangement, no provision or mechanism ensures recourse against judgments arising from illegal steps or orders rendered in their disposition. By issuing an award in arbitration, for instance, any weaker parties lack adequate or suitable means and access to contest judgment in order to redress whatever procedural disabilities attended its inception.

#### **6. Erosion of Public Law and Legal Precedents**

The courts are central in the shaping of public law. Judicial precedents are formed as a result of court rulings, which offer guidelines for subsequent cases, create uniformity in the application of the law, and contribute to the development of standards in law. Arbitration is

private case-by-case; the decisions reached are not made public and have no binding force over future disputes.

Critics of this loss of public law hold that the very access to justice on the part of society is thus undermined. In turn, weaker parties do not know what their legal rights and remedies entail due to publicly inaccessible precedents. Further, this does not assist the courts in dealing with emerging legal issues while being adaptive to societal change.

## **7. Disproportionate impact on Marginalized Groups:**

Impact on access to justice: The issue has a most severe impact for the marginalized: the poor, racial and ethnic minorities, and workers in precarious employment. They are groups usually most vulnerable to access barriers of representation, financial access barriers, and imbalance of arbitration power. The mandatory arbitration clauses in consumer and employment contracts exacerbate this inequality by keeping these marginalized persons away from courts where they could receive procedural protection and public scrutiny.

Critics hold that arbitration, as practiced today, only perpetuates structural inequalities rather than changing them. Improving access to justice through reforms such as increased legal aid for arbitration, regulation of mandatory arbitration clauses, and procedural safeguards would protect the rights of disempowered groups.

## **Comparative Analysis**

The application of arbitration in diverse jurisdictions depicts varied approaches towards finding a balance among efficiency, equity, and accessibility to justice. The United States, the United Kingdom, and Singapore, respectively, have frameworks for arbitration which depict similarity at one point while starkly showing differences at the other in their implementation and regulation of arbitration. A comparative analysis throws a light on strengths and weaknesses of these systems to understand how jurisdictions succeed in restricting the abuse of arbitration and where they fail in protecting the weak parties.

### **1. United States: Corporate-Driven Model of Arbitration:**

The structure of arbitration in the United States has been grossly criticized in terms of playing to the benefits of corporate advantage. U.S. law supports the use of mandatory arbitration

provisions in consumer and employment contracts; such provisions upheld by courts, under the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA), force a weaker party into private dispute settlement, usually in an unfair bargaining position<sup>21</sup>. Not infrequently are class action bans found in the arbitration agreement preventing collective redress. Critics hold that these practices erode access to justice by limiting procedural safeguards, transparency, and legal recourse for consumers and employees.

## **2. United Kingdom: Balancing Functionality with Judicial Oversight through Stricter Control of Arbitration:**

A more balanced, in the sense of a stricter judicial approach, to that above will be found in the arbitral system in the United Kingdom. Here, under the Arbitration Act 1996<sup>22</sup>, courts hold limited power but ones well-defined so as to intervene into cases where procedural fairness is impaired. Finally, importantly, public interest issues should not be undermined by arbitration. Unlike in the U.S., employment disputes and other matters of significant power imbalance are less frequently subject to binding arbitration<sup>23</sup>. That means that the weaker parties are given greater access to public courts and legal remedies, thereby maintaining procedural justice.

## **3. Singapore: Business-Friendly Yet Balanced:**

Singapore has emerged as one of the major arbitration hubs. The system seeks to balance efficiency with fairness and is well-regulated. Under the International Arbitration Act, the Singapore Arbitration Centre, SIAC, is designed to attract business without procedural abuse. Singapore has strong procedural rules, ensuring that the arbitrator has no conflict of interest and ensuring measures of transparency for some kinds of disputes<sup>24</sup>. The country obliges arbitration as a mode of resolving commercial disputes, while allowing only a meager amount of mandatory arbitration clauses in consumer or employment contracts to balance out corporate influence over the weaker parties.

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<sup>21</sup> United States: A Corporate-Driven Arbitration Model Jain, Sankalp. "Arbitration in USA and UK: A Comparative Study." SSRN, 2021.

<sup>22</sup> "Arbitration Act 1996,"

<sup>23</sup> United Kingdom: Judicial Oversight and Limitations on Arbitration, Akinsola, O. Kayode. "Comparative Analysis of Arbitration Laws: Examining the Differences and Similarities in Arbitration Laws Across Various Jurisdictions." ResearchGate, 2024.

<sup>24</sup> Singapore: Pro-Business, Yet Balanced, Edwards, Michael. "Comparative Analysis of Arbitration Laws Across Different Jurisdictions." MichaelEdwards.uk, 2020.

#### **4. Lessons for Reform:**

The cross-country comparison suggests that jurisdictions with stronger judicial control and more restrictions on mandatory arbitration do a better job of safeguarding access to justice. For example, though the US system is faulted for corporatism, the UK and Singapore show that arbitration can indeed be effective without judicial and statutory accommodations to corporatism. Reform of arbitration practice, particularly in low-regulatory environments, should concentrate on increasing judicial review, curtailing further the scope of mandatory arbitration, and enhancing procedural openness.

These comparisons underpin the importance of global reforms, balancing, as it were, arbitration's efficiency with fairness, to ensure equity in outcomes for all parties.

#### **Recommendations for Reform**

Arbitration, meant to provide an efficient and fair alternative to litigation, all too often fails to extend justice in cases of power imbalances. Meaningful reforms are needed in arbitration in different areas. The following recommendations seek to redress critical concerns relating to issues about procedural bias, lack of transparency, excessive financial burdens, and a lack of access to legal recourse.

##### **1. Regulation of Compulsory Arbitration Clauses:**

The strongest reforms would certainly include the regulation or prohibition altogether of compulsory arbitration clauses in the contract of adhesion. Thereby, compulsorily mandating arbitration may compel consumers and employees, for instance, along with small-sized businesses, against their wills, to eschew any litigation rights entirely. The policymakers should make compulsory arbitration clauses in a contract be discretionary and place them in public view so the weaker party gets a choice while deciding. Other specific categories of disputes, like cases of workplace harassment, discrimination, or essential public services, should be exempt from mandatory arbitration.

##### **2. More transparency:**

Secret arbitration processes hide the wrongdoings of companies from the public eye, limiting the possibility of advancing the rules of law. The reforms should be aimed at enhancing

transparency through the publishing arbitral awards regarding disputes of public interest, redacting sensitive information, and having databases of anonymized awards which shall be used for guidance on the definition of legal norms and for harmonization of decisions taken.

### **3. Institutional Measures Strengthening Independence and Accountability of Arbitrators:**

Repeat appointments by corporate clients are likely to generate implicit bias against the process, and one can argue that rules for selection must be instituted at arbitration institutions in order to provide for selection that is unbiased. These rules can include either random or jointly controlled appointment procedures, as well as limits on how many times the same arbitrator can serve with the same party. These would include mechanisms such as performance review and public reporting on the arbitrator appointments and outcomes.

### **4. Increasing Judicial Control Over Arbitral Awards:**

Insufficient judicial review of arbitral awards may oftentimes deprive the weaker parties of redress due to bias and procedural unfairness. Yet, courts should not intervene in arbitration at excessive length; reforms must expand the bases for judicial control, especially when there are procedural violations, where public policy also plays a relevant role. Limited appeals on issues of vital substantive legal error would ensure that the process is fair without undermining the efficiency of arbitration.

### **5. Removing Financial Inhibitors:**

Arbitration fees are often too high, which deters many people and small businesses from bringing valid claims. Reforms to increase access to justice need to reduce the financial burden of arbitration. Subsidized or tiered fee structures for low-income parties need to be available from governments and arbitration institutions. Fee-shifting provisions, under which the loser pays, need to be properly controlled to prevent abuse of the financial power by wealthier parties.

### **6. Access to Justice in Representation:**

Parties involved in arbitration tend to struggle in getting better representation due to high costs incurred during the proceedings. Reforms would involve developing more legal aid schemes for the arbitration process. Consumers and labor-related disputes could particularly benefit.

Additionally, associations with the Bar should promote the services of offering legal aid to all parties under a pro bono or reduced costs basis for an effective plea before the courts.

### **7. Introduce Procedural Safeguards:**

Arbitration usually does not have a typical procedural safeguard that would be available for litigants, like discovery rights and access to evidence. Reforms should provide minimum procedural standards setting forth fair discovery procedures that enable both parties to fully present their respective cases adequately. The arbitration institutions should also enforce timelines to prevent procedural delay and minimize the risk of long and protracted proceedings designed to wear down weaker parties.

### **8. Balanced Arbitration Rules Across the Jurisdictions:**

Comparison of arbitration systems across various jurisdictions reveals that Singapore and the United Kingdom have more successfully balanced efficiency with fairness compared with the United States. Reform efforts will not take enough lessons from these authorities unless such a framework of clear judicial oversight exists. Impartial selection procedures for arbitrators, and fortification of protection of more vulnerable parties, are some lessons from such authorities. It would ensure that similar cross-border disputes have more consistent outcomes across nations.

### **9. Promoting Voluntary ADR Mechanisms:**

Rather than forced arbitration, reform efforts should highlight voluntary alternative dispute resolution mechanisms, including mediation and conciliation. Such processes give parties the flexibility to negotiate solutions mutually acceptable to them while holding open the possibility of litigation when they so choose. Governments and arbitration institutions must encourage ADR as a precursor to arbitration with the latter remaining a choice by the parties, both of whom must agree on the terms and conditions of arbitration.

In conclusion, the new reforms are meant to make arbitration fair and effective as an alternative dispute resolution mechanism. Regulation of mandatory arbitration clauses, increased transparency, strengthening the independence of arbitrators, and reduction of barriers of cost will bring arbitration back in favor with all parties involved. Increasing procedural safeguards and judicial review will further build trust in the process so that arbitration delivers justice as



intended: namely, to afford parties access to legal remedies without placing arbitral processes above or outside of legal remedies. Absent these reforms, arbitration threatens to be maintained as a privatized system of justice that favors the mighty at the expense of the weak.

## **Conclusion**

Arbitration, which supposedly is faster and cheaper than litigation, has been made into a machinery that all too often consolidates inequalities instead of abolishing them. This trend prevails widely in consumer, employment, and commercial contracts. This trend increasingly tends to favor the business efficacy and corporate control over the fair procedure and access to justice. Mandatory arbitration clauses, high costs, limited judicial oversight, and arbitrator bias are among some of the issues that lead people to criticise arbitration increasingly today as a privatized system of justice shielding corporations from accountability.

Confervaility, as conceived to protect sensitive information, looks primarily to protect corporate malfeasance and forestalls the articulation of standards of public law. Procedural restrictions on access to evidence, restricted appellate review, and representation all contribute to prevent parties who are weaker to properly vindicate their rights in arbitration proceedings. These inadequacies operate totally contrary to principles of fairness, transparency, and accountability that find a core place at the heart of any process for the peaceful resolution of disputes.

However, arbitration has much more scope to become a viable alternative to litigation if genuine reforms are instituted. Regulation of mandatory arbitration clauses, greater transparency, independent and impartial selection of arbitrators, and increased judicial oversight would serve to restore equilibrium to arbitration processes. Further, financial access should be made more accessible, along with the representation of parties so that both may be treated fairly.

Arbitration should evolve into an essentially fair space for dispute resolution. Lessons can be drawn from best practices across jurisdictions such as Singapore and the United Kingdom that can help policymakers and arbitration institutions design a system that balances efficiency with procedural fairness. If reforms are not reached, arbitration runs the risk of losing further legitimacy and consolidating existing inequalities at the cost of public trust in legal systems. In

such a manner, a reformed arbitration framework will balance private resolution and public accountability for sure to protect proper justice for all.