

---

# OWNING THE UNOWNABLE - INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AT THE FAULTLINES OF CREATIVITY, CAPITAL, AND CONTROL: FROM ALGORITHMS TO ATTAR, MEMES TO MEDICINES, AND COURTS TO CULTURE

---

Ojaswini Gupta, LL.B. (Hons.), O.P. Jindal Global University, Jindal Global Law School  
(JGLS), Sonapat, Haryana, India.

## ABSTRACT

Intellectual Property Rights (IPR) were historically conceived as narrow, utilitarian monopolies, temporary legal fictions justified only insofar as they advanced learning, innovation, and public welfare. In contemporary legal practice, however, intellectual property has undergone a silent but radical transformation. It no longer merely protects invention or expression; it increasingly seeks to discipline culture, enclose knowledge, and commodify creativity itself. This article interrogates the modern IP regime as a site of structural tension, between creativity and capital, access and exclusion, innovation and enclosure.

Using a critical doctrinal and cultural-legal methodology, the article examines how claims of ownership now extend to the ostensibly unownable: algorithms trained on human expression, traditional knowledge refined over centuries, digital memes born of collective authorship, pharmaceutical discoveries entangled with public health, and even sensory experiences such as smell and style. Drawing upon Indian jurisprudence, comparative foreign case law, international treaty frameworks, popular culture, cinema, music, and digital media, the article argues that the contemporary crisis of intellectual property is not one of piracy or enforcement, but of legitimacy.

The Indian experience, particularly in patent law, traditional knowledge protection, and copyright jurisprudence, offers a critical counter-narrative to global IP maximalism. The article concludes by contending that the future of intellectual property law lies not in stronger monopolies, but in restoring humility to ownership, recalibrating incentives against access, and recognising that not everything valuable can, or should, be owned.

**Keywords:** Intellectual Property; Commons; Indian IP Jurisprudence; Creativity and Capital; Cultural Ownership.

## **1. Introduction: When Ideas Refuse to Stay Owned -**

Ideas are notoriously unruly. They travel without passports, replicate without permission, and multiply without depletion. Thomas Jefferson's oft-cited observation that ideas, like fire, spread without diminishing the original flame, was neither rhetorical ornament nor philosophical indulgence; it was a constitutional warning (Jefferson, 1813). Jefferson recognised, long before the formalisation of modern intellectual property regimes, that knowledge resists enclosure by its very nature.

Yet modern law has proceeded as though ideas yearn for ownership.

Copyright, patent, trademark, and trade secret law together constitute a legal architecture that converts abstraction into exclusivity, creativity into commodity, and culture into capital. This transformation was not inevitable. Intellectual Property Rights (IPR) were never conceived as natural rights. They were, and remain, "state-sanctioned monopolies", justified only insofar as they serve public welfare (Bentham, 1843; Drahos, 1996).

The problem confronting the twenty-first century is not that intellectual property exists, but that it has "forgotten its provisional character". Temporary monopolies have hardened into structural entitlements. Incentives have metastasised into dominion.

Nowhere is this tension more visible than in jurisdictions like India, where ancient traditions of collective knowledge, imitation, adaptation, and oral transmission collide with a legal regime inherited from colonial modernity and intensified by global capitalism.

This article asks a question that contemporary IP law avoids:

- "What happens when law attempts to own what was never meant to be owned?"

## **2. From Bargain to Belief: How IP Acquired Moral Authority -**

The classical justification of intellectual property rests on a bargain: society grants temporary exclusivity in exchange for disclosure, dissemination, and eventual enrichment of the commons (Landes and Posner, 1989). This utilitarian calculus presumes scarcity, linear innovation, and identifiable authorship.

None of these assumptions holds today.

Information is non-rivalrous. Creativity is cumulative. Authorship is distributed. Culture is recursive.

Despite this, intellectual property has acquired “moral authority”, masquerading as a natural extension of labour, personality, or desert. Locke’s labour theory, originally circumscribed by the proviso that “enough and as good” must remain for others, has been selectively amputated from its ethical limits (Locke, 1689/1988). Hegelian personality theory, similarly, has been deployed to justify ownership over expressions far removed from individual self-realisation (Hughes, 1988).

The result is a jurisprudence that treats infringement as a moral transgression, rather than an economic regulation.

This moralisation matters. Once ownership is framed as natural or sacred, limitation appears illegitimate. Exceptions become grudging. Access is treated as charity rather than a right.

### **3. Intellectual Property as Infrastructure, Not Incentive -**

Contemporary IP law no longer merely incentivises creativity; it “structures the conditions under which creativity is possible”.

Copyright algorithms decide which videos survive online. Patent thickets determine which medicines reach patients. Trademark enforcement shapes speech, parody, and dissent. Trade secrets govern what may be known at all.

In this sense, IP functions less like private law and more like “invisible public infrastructure”, quietly governing flows of information, capital, and culture (Boyle, 2008).

Yet this infrastructural role remains largely unacknowledged in doctrine. Courts continue to analyse disputes as bilateral conflicts between rights-holders and infringer, ignoring systemic effects. Legislatures respond to piracy statistics rather than cultural economics. International treaties elevate protection without recalibrating legitimacy.

The consequence is regulatory imbalance.

### **4. India’s Particular Predicament: Culture Without Enclosure -**

India’s encounter with intellectual property is uniquely fraught.

Long before TRIPS, India's knowledge systems functioned through:

- Apprenticeship rather than authorship.
- Transmission rather than fixation.
- Collective innovation rather than proprietary control.

Ayurveda, classical music, textile design, cuisine, perfumery, dance, and storytelling evolved through repetition and variation, not exclusion.

Modern IP lawsuits uneasily on this terrain. It demands novelty where continuity is valued, originality where imitation is reverent, and fixation where ephemerality is essential.

The result has been a series of juridical anxieties:

- Can yoga sequences be copyrighted?
- Can turmeric be patented?
- Can a raga be owned?
- Can an attar's scent be monopolised?

Each question reveals the same discomfort: "law confronting culture it does not fully understand".

## **5. The Research Problem and Contribution -**

This article argues that the contemporary crisis of intellectual property is not a crisis of enforcement, piracy, or compliance. It is a "crisis of legitimacy".

IP law is attempting to:

- Own culture
- Discipline creativity

- Enclose data
- Properties sensation
- Monetise memory

In doing so, it risks abandoning the constitutional, economic, and moral justifications that once sustained it.

The contribution of this article is fourfold:

- It reframes IP as a system of governance, not merely an incentive.
- It integrates law with culture, technology, and political economy.
- It foregrounds Indian jurisprudence as a site of resistance and possibility.
- It proposes restraint, not expansion, as the future of legitimate IP.

## **“FROM INCENTIVE TO ENCLOSURE: THEORETICAL FOUNDATIONS AND LEGAL CONTEXT OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY”.**

### **7. Intellectual Property as a Legal Compromise, not a Natural Right -**

Intellectual property did not emerge from moral necessity; it emerged from political compromise. Early copyright and patent regimes were pragmatic responses to specific historical anxieties, unauthorised printing, guild secrecy, and state-sponsored innovation, not philosophical declarations of ownership over ideas.

The Statute of Anne (1710), often romanticised as the birth of modern copyright, framed protection explicitly as an instrument “for the encouragement of learning.” The author was incidental; the public was central. Likewise, early patent systems were designed to extract disclosure from inventors, not to enshrine perpetual control (Sherman and Bently, 1999).

This historical contingency matters. It reveals that intellectual property was never meant to be absolute. It was conditional, time-bound, and purpose-driven.

The contemporary tendency to treat IP as a natural extension of property law is therefore not

evolution; it is revisionism.

## **8. The Classical Triad: Utility, Labour, Personality -**

Most modern IP justification can be traced to three philosophical strands, each of which now strains under contemporary conditions.

### **8.1 Utilitarian Incentive Theory:**

The dominant framework, particularly in Anglo-American jurisdictions, is utilitarian. Intellectual property is justified because it allegedly produces more creativity than it suppresses (Bentham, 1843; Landes and Posner, 1989).

Yet this calculus depends on increasingly untenable assumptions:

- That creators respond primarily to exclusive rights.
- That innovation is linear and excludable.
- That access costs are secondary to incentive gains.

Empirical evidence has long complicated these assumptions. Much creativity occurs without, before, or despite IP protection, particularly in software, fashion, cuisine, and online culture (Boldrin and Levine, 2008).

Utilitarianism survives not because it is empirically proven, but because it is institutionally convenient.

### **8.2 Labour-Desert Theory and Its Ethical Amputation:**

Lockean labour theory is often invoked to justify IP ownership: one owns the fruits of one's intellectual labour. But this invocation is selective.

Locke's original formulation included two critical constraints:

- The "enough and as good" proviso.
- The prohibition against waste.

Modern IP law systematically ignores both.

When patents prevent access to life-saving medicine or copyright restricts educational materials, the proviso collapses. When exclusivity persists long after the incentive is exhausted, waste is institutionalised.

What remains is not Locke, it is “labour rhetoric without labour ethics” (Waldron, 1988).

### **8.3 Personality Theory and the Fiction of Singular Authorship:**

Hegelian personality theory treats creative works as extensions of the self. This justification is emotionally compelling and legally seductive.

But it presumes:

- Singular authorship
- Intentional self-expression
- Stable identity between creator and work

These presumptions fail in contexts of:

- Collective creativity
- Algorithmic generation
- Cultural inheritance
- Industrial production

When thousands contribute to a dataset, whose personality is expressed? When a film is assembled by hundreds, whose self is embodied? When culture is iterative, whose identity is original?

Personality theory, once intimate, now legitimises corporate control.

## **9. The Expansionary Drift: From Incentive to Enclosure -**

Over the past five decades, intellectual property has undergone “quantitative expansion” and “qualitative transformation”.

Quantitatively:

- Copyright terms have lengthened dramatically.
- Patentable subject matter has widened.
- Trademark protection has expanded beyond confusion to dilution and reputation.

Qualitatively:

- IP has shifted from an incentive to an asset.
- From exception to baseline.
- From regulation to strategy.

This shift has been driven less by creators than by intermediaries: publishers, studios, pharmaceutical corporations, and platforms.

The result is what Boyle (2008) famously described as a “second enclosure movement”, this time enclosing the commons of the mind.

## **10. Intellectual Property and Power: A Political Economy Perspective -**

Intellectual property does not distribute rewards neutrally. It allocates power.

Those who already control:

- Capital
- Infrastructure
- Distribution channels
- Enforcement mechanisms



Are best positioned to benefit from IP expansion.

Creators, by contrast, often experience IP as:

- Contractual asymmetry.
- The rights they must assign to participate.
- Tools they cannot afford to enforce.

Thus, IP law frequently protects investment rather than creativity.

This is particularly visible in global IP governance, where treaties such as TRIPS universalise high-protection standards while ignoring asymmetries in development, capacity, and need (Draho and Braithwaite, 2002).

### **11. The Global-Local Tension: TRIPS and Its Discontents -**

The TRIPS Agreement represents a decisive moment in IP history: the elevation of intellectual property from domestic regulation to trade obligation.

While TRIPS allows formal flexibilities, in practice, it:

- Pressures developing countries to adopt maximalist standards.
- Privileges private rights over public health.
- Treats knowledge as a tradable commodity.

India's resistance, most notably through Section 3(d) of the Patents Act, must be understood against this backdrop. It is not protectionism; it is constitutional self-preservation.

### **12. Cultural Production Beyond the Law's Imagination -**

Perhaps the most profound failure of intellectual property theory lies in its misunderstanding of culture itself.

Culture is not produced *ex nihilo*. It emerges through:

- Borrowing
- Quotation
- Repetition
- Variation
- Remix

Yet IP law insists on originality as rupture rather than relation.

This insistence produces absurdities:

- Music without sampling
- Cinema without homage
- Literature without influence
- Memes without infringement

Law demands solitude, where creativity thrives on conversation.

### **13. Towards a Critical Reorientation -**

The theoretical foundations of IP are not obsolete, but they are incomplete.

What is required is not abolition, but recalibration.

A credible contemporary theory of intellectual property must:

- Recognise collective creativity.
- Account for infrastructural power.
- Balance incentive with access.
- Treat culture as a living process, not a static product.

Most importantly, it must abandon the fantasy that ownership is the natural destiny of ideas.

**“METHODOLOGY AND ANALYTICAL FRAMEWORK: STUDYING OWNERSHIP AT THE EDGE OF LAW”.**

**14. Why Methodology Matters in Intellectual Property Scholarship –**

Intellectual property scholarship often proceeds as if the method were self-evident. Doctrinal exposition is treated as analysis, citation substitutes for justification. This article resists that habit.

The questions posed here, about ownership, creativity, culture, and power, cannot be answered by doctrinal parsing alone. They require a methodological approach that recognises intellectual property not merely as a set of rules, but as a system of governance embedded in social, economic, and technological contexts.

Accordingly, this article adopts a “critical-doctrinal and interdisciplinary methodology”, combining legal analysis with insights from political economy, cultural studies, and technology studies.

**15. Doctrinal Analysis as Baseline, Not Boundary -**

Doctrinal analysis remains essential. Courts, statutes, and treaties are the formal sites where intellectual property is articulated and enforced. This article, therefore, engages closely with:

- Statutory texts (national and international).
- Judicial reasoning (Indian and comparative).
- Treaty frameworks (TRIPS, Berne, Paris).

However, doctrine is treated as a “baseline”, not a boundary.

Rather than asking whether courts applied rules correctly, the analysis asks:

- What assumptions underlie these rules?
- Whose interests are privileged?

- What forms of creativity are rendered visible or invisible?

This shift, from correctness to consequence, is central to the methodology.

## **16. Critical Legal Studies and the Question of Power –**

The article draws upon insights from Critical Legal Studies (CLS), not as ideology, but as a diagnostic tool.

CLS reminds us that law:

- Is not neutral
- Reflects power relations
- Stabilises distributions of resources

Applied to intellectual property, this perspective exposes how:

- “Innovation” is defined in market terms.
- “Creativity” is recognised selectively.
- “Infringement” is policed asymmetrically.

The aim is not to dismiss law’s coherence, but to reveal its “contingencies” (Kennedy, 1982).

## **17. Political Economy of Knowledge -**

Intellectual property operates at the intersection of law and capital. This article therefore, incorporates political economy analysis to understand:

- Who captures value
- Who bears the cost
- Who controls access

This perspective is particularly important in:

- Pharmaceutical patenting
- Platform-mediated culture
- Data-driven creativity

The analysis treats IP not as an incentive structure alone, but as a “mechanism of accumulation” (Harvey, 2005; Drahos and Braithwaite, 2002).

### **18. Culture as Legal Evidence -**

A distinctive feature of this article is its treatment of cultural texts - films, music, memes, digital artefacts, not as illustrations, but as “evidence”.

Popular culture often anticipates legal conflict before courts articulate it. Cinema, for example, has long grappled with:

- Authorship
- Surveillance
- Ownership
- Automation

By analysing cultural production alongside legal doctrine, the article captures tensions that formal law has not yet resolved.

This method aligns with the growing recognition that law is both reflected in, and shaped by, culture (Sarat and Kearns, 1993).

### **19. Comparative Method: Why Jurisdictions Matter -**

The article adopts a “selective comparative approach”, focusing on:

- India
- United States

- European Union
- United Kingdom

These jurisdictions are chosen not for completeness, but for contrast.

Each represents a distinct orientation:

- India: access-sensitive, constitutionally inflected.
- United States: market-driven, rights-expansive.
- European Union: formalist, rights balanced.
- United Kingdom: hybrid, historically pragmatic.

Comparison is used to illuminate choice, not to suggest convergence.

## **20. Indian Jurisprudence as Normative Anchor -**

While comparative in scope, the article is normatively anchored in Indian law.

India's constitutional framework, particularly its commitment to:

- Public interest
- Reasonableness
- Proportionality

Provides doctrinal tools to resist intellectual property absolutism.

Indian cases are therefore not treated as peripheral examples, but as “central interventions” in global IP discourse.

## **21. Limitations and Deliberate Silences -**

No methodology is exhaustive.

This article does not:

- Offer empirical econometric analysis.
- Propose model legislation.
- Resolve every doctrinal ambiguity.

These omissions are deliberate. The aim is not technical optimisation, but “conceptual recalibration”.

## **22. Analytical Payoff -**

The methodological approach adopted here enables the article to:

- Move across doctrinal silos
- Integrate law with lived culture
- Anticipate future conflicts
- Critique without nihilism

It allows the article to ask not merely:

- “What does IP law say?”

But:

- “What does IP law do—and at what cost?”

## **“ALGORITHMS, DATA, AND THE COLLAPSE OF AUTHORSHIP”.**

## **23. The End of the Romantic Author -**

Intellectual property law remains haunted by a figure who no longer exists: the solitary author. Copyright doctrine is structured around an image of creation as an act of individual imagination - original, intentional, and self-contained.

This image has always been partially fictional. Even before digital technologies, creativity was collective, derivative, and embedded in social practice. What has changed in the twenty-first century is not the collaborative nature of creativity, but the “scale and opacity” of collaboration.

Today, creative output increasingly emerges from systems rather than subjects.

Algorithms do not merely assist creativity; they “co-produce” it. Recommendation engines shape taste, generative models infer style, and optimisation systems influence form. The law, however, continues to ask a question it can no longer answer coherently: ‘Who is the author?’

#### **24. Algorithmic Creativity: Mis framing the Legal Question -**

Public and legal discourse around algorithmic creativity often centres on whether machines can “create.” This framing is misleading.

Creativity is not an attribute of machines; it is an “emergent property of socio-technical systems”. Algorithms generate outputs based on:

- Human-created data
- Statistical inference
- Iterative optimisation
- Embedded design choices

The relevant legal question is therefore not whether machines are authors, but “how authorship should be understood when creation is distributed across humans, datasets, and code”.

Most legal systems evade this question through formalism. Where no human author can be identified, protection is denied; where a human can be nominally located, ownership is attributed without inquiry into contribution.

Both responses are inadequate.

#### **25. Copyright Law’s Formal Retreat -**

Jurisdictions have responded to algorithmic creation with doctrinal minimalism.



The United States Copyright Office has repeatedly insisted that copyright subsists only in works of “human authorship,” refusing protection to works generated without sufficient human control (U.S. Copyright Office, 2023). The United Kingdom, by contrast, retains a statutory fiction that attributes authorship of computer-generated works to “the person by whom the arrangements necessary for the creation of the work are undertaken” (Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988).

India has not yet confronted the issue directly. The Copyright Act, 1957 presumes human authorship but does not define its limits. This silence is dangerous. In the absence of doctrinal clarity, ownership defaults to contract, favouring platforms and corporations over creators and contributors.

Formal retreat avoids immediate controversy, but it leaves unresolved the deeper question of legitimacy.

## **26. Data as the Invisible Creative Substrate -**

Every algorithmic system is trained, refined, and evaluated on data. That data consists overwhelmingly of human cultural output:

- Texts
- Images
- Music
- Films
- Code
- Behavioural traces

Yet data contributors are treated as legally irrelevant.

Copyright law recognises the final output but ignores the “creative substrate” that made the output possible. This produces a profound asymmetry: cultural labour is extracted at scale, while recognition and reward are concentrated at the level of infrastructure ownership.

This phenomenon has been described as “data colonialism”, a system in which value is

extracted from populations through the appropriation of behavioural and cultural data, without reciprocal benefit (Couldry and Mejias, 2019).

Intellectual property law currently facilitates this extraction by:

- Treating training as non-expressive use.
- Collapsing contribution into consumption.
- Privileging ownership of systems over sources.

## **27. Fair Use, Fair Dealing, and the Training Question -**

One of the most contentious issues in contemporary IP law is whether the use of copyrighted works for algorithmic training constitutes infringement.

Arguments in favour of permissibility invoke:

- Transformative use
- Non-expressive copying
- Social benefit of innovation

Arguments against highlight:

- Scale of appropriation
- Commercial exploitation
- Substitution effects
- Absence of consent or compensation

Indian law offers no clear answer. The fair dealing provisions under Section 52 of the Copyright Act, 1957, were not drafted with machine learning in mind. Courts have not yet articulated a principled framework for assessing training-related uses.

The danger is that courts may import foreign doctrines uncritically, without accounting for India's distinct creative economy and constitutional commitments.

## **28. Authorship Without Attribution: The Crisis of Recognition -**

Even where copyright protection is denied to algorithmic outputs, the underlying problem remains: "creative contribution without recognition".

Writers whose texts populate training datasets are not credited. Artists whose styles are inferred are not acknowledged. Musicians whose catalogues shape sonic output receive neither attribution nor remuneration.

This is not mere economic injustice. Attribution is a form of dignity. Its absence erodes the moral foundations of copyright itself.

Personality-based justifications for IP collapse when the law refuses to recognise the persons whose creativity sustains the system.

## **29. India's Structural Vulnerability -**

India occupies a structurally precarious position in the global data economy.

It is:

- A major source of linguistic, cultural, and behavioural data.
- A hub of low-cost digital labour.
- A minor owner of global AI infrastructure.

Indian creativity fuels global systems, yet ownership and profit accrue elsewhere. This mirrors earlier patterns of resource extraction, only now the resource is culture itself.

Without doctrinal intervention, intellectual property law risks becoming a vehicle for "post-territorial extraction", reproducing colonial dynamics through code.

## **30. Rethinking Authorship: From Individual to Distributed Models -**

The solution is not to confer legal personhood on machines. Nor is it to abandon copyright altogether.

What is required is a reconceptualization of authorship that:

- Recognises distributed contribution.
- Separates attribution from exclusivity.
- Distinguishes incentive from control.

Possible directions include:

- Mandatory disclosure of training sources.
- Collective remuneration mechanisms.
- Expanded attribution rights.
- Limits on exclusive claims over derivative outputs.

These proposals challenge entrenched interests. But without them, intellectual property law will lose normative credibility in the digital age.

### **31. The Coming Litigation Wave -**

Disputes over algorithmic creativity will not resemble traditional copyright cases. They will involve:

- Collective plaintiffs
- Probabilistic harm
- Structural appropriation
- Cross-border enforcement

Courts trained to adjudicate bilateral disputes are ill-equipped for such claims. Legislative

inertia will compound judicial hesitation.

The result, if unaddressed, will be regulation by platform policy rather than public law.

### **32. Interim Conclusion: Creativity After Control -**

Algorithmic creativity exposes the limits of ownership-based regulation. It reveals that:

- Creativity is systemic.
- Authorship is distributed.
- Value capture is infrastructural.

Intellectual property law must respond not by expanding monopolies, but by restoring balance between creation, contribution, and control.

Failure to do so will transform IP from a system of encouragement into a mechanism of extraction.

### **“CULTURE INDUSTRIES IN THE AGE OF ALGORITHMIC REPRODUCTION: MEMES, MUSIC, AND CINEMA.”**

### **33. Culture After Originality -**

Walter Benjamin’s observation that mechanical reproduction dissolves the “aura” of art was not a lament; it was a diagnosis (Benjamin, 1936). What he could not have anticipated was a regime in which reproduction itself would become ‘creative’, automated, predictive, and monetised at a planetary scale.

In the twenty-first century, culture does not merely circulate faster; it “mutates algorithmically”. Memes evolve through engagement metrics. Music is composed, mixed, and recommended by data-driven systems. Cinema is shaped by predictive analytics long before a script is finalised.

Intellectual property law, however, remains anchored to originality, fixation, and identifiable authorship, concepts increasingly misaligned with cultural production as it exists.

### **34. Memes: The Law's Blind Spot -**

Memes are the most honest cultural artefact of the digital age. They are:

- Iterative rather than original.
- Communal rather than individual.
- Contextual rather than fixed.
- Ephemeral rather than durable.

From a copyright perspective, memes are doctrinally inconvenient. They rely on borrowing, parody, remix, and reference, often simultaneously. Their value lies not in authorship, but in recognisability and circulation.

Courts and statutes have largely ignored memes, not because they are insignificant, but because they destabilise the logic of ownership. Memes demonstrate that cultural value can be generated without exclusivity.

Algorithms intensify this dynamic. Platform ranking systems decide which memes survive, mutate, or disappear. Authorship becomes irrelevant; “visibility becomes law”.

### **35. Fair Use as Cultural Oxygen -**

In jurisdictions like the United States, memes survive under the protective ambiguity of fair use, particularly parody and commentary. In India, the fair dealing doctrine under Section 52 of the Copyright Act, 1957, has been interpreted narrowly, often tethered to enumerated purposes.

This creates a chilling effect.

Indian meme culture thrives despite the law, not because of it. Enforcement asymmetry ensures that:

- Individual creators face takedowns.
- Platforms retain immunity.

- Corporate rights-holders selectively enforce.

The result is a cultural common that is vibrant but precarious, sustained by informal tolerance rather than legal recognition.

### **36. Music: From Composition to Calculation -**

Music has always been technologically mediated, but algorithmic systems have altered not just distribution, but composition itself.

Streaming platforms shape music through:

- Recommendation algorithms
- Playlist economies
- Engagement-based remuneration
- Predictive trend analysis

Artists increasingly compose ‘for’ the algorithm, optimising intros, durations, and structures to maximise retention. Creativity becomes statistically informed.

Copyright law, however, continues to reward fixation and authorship while ignoring “algorithmic influence” as a form of creative constraint.

The law treats platforms as neutral intermediaries. They are “cultural governors”.

### **37. Training Data and Sonic Appropriation -**

Generative music systems are trained on vast corpora of copyrighted recordings. While outputs may not be directly infringing, they are stylistically derivative, capturing timbre, rhythm, and structure.

This raises unresolved questions:

- Is style protectable?

- Is inference a form of copying?
- Can appropriation occur without replication?

Courts have traditionally rejected protection for style, treating it as part of the public domain. But when style is extracted, quantified, and reproduced at scale, the distinction between idea and expression begins to erode.

Music law has not yet reckoned with this transformation.

### **38. Cinema: Predictive Storytelling and Risk Management -**

Cinema represents the most capital-intensive cultural industry, and therefore the most algorithmically managed.

Studios now deploy data analytics to:

- Predict audience preferences
- Greenlight scripts
- Cast actors
- Determine release strategies

Streaming platforms commission content based on engagement metrics rather than artistic risk. Narrative structures are shaped by binge ability, not coherence.

Copyright law continues to frame cinema as the product of identifiable authors and producers. This obscures the role of algorithms in shaping the narrative itself.

The result is a paradox: “creative decisions made by machines are legally invisible”, while exclusive rights remain firmly enforceable.

### **39. Indian Cinema and Platform Power -**

India’s film industries -Hindi, Tamil, Telugu, Malayalam, Bengali, and others, are increasingly platform-dependent. Streaming services act as financiers, distributors, and curators.



This concentration of power has legal consequences:

- Contracts override statutory rights.
- Moral rights are diluted.
- Revenue transparency declines.

Creators sign away future claims in exchange for access. The law offers little resistance.

Indian copyright jurisprudence has historically emphasised producer rights, reinforcing asymmetry. Algorithmic platforms intensify this imbalance by controlling not just distribution, but discoverability.

#### **40. Cultural Labour Without Ownership -**

Across memes, music, and cinema, a common pattern emerges:

- Cultural labour is collective.
- Value is algorithmically amplified.
- Ownership is corporately concentrated.

IP law recognises the endpoint, not the process. It protects outputs while ignoring the ecosystems that generate them.

This produces what may be called “authorless wealth”, value detached from identifiable creators, yet aggressively enclosed.

#### **41. The Myth of Incentive in Platform Culture -**

The standard justification for IP, that exclusivity incentivises creation, falters in cultural industries driven by visibility rather than ownership.

Memes are created without expectation of exclusivity. Musicians seek recognition before remuneration. Filmmakers depend on platform access more than copyright enforcement.

In such contexts, copyright functions less as an incentive and more as “post hoc appropriation”, enabling rights-holders to monetise success after it emerges.

#### **42. Toward a Cultural Commons Framework -**

A recalibrated approach to cultural IP would:

- Expand fair dealing protections.
- Recognise transformative, iterative creation.
- Limit enforcement against non-commercial remix.
- Address algorithmic amplification as a regulatory concern.

This does not require abandoning copyright, but “rebalancing it toward circulation rather than control”.

Without such reform, IP law will continue to misrecognise culture as property rather than process.

#### **43. Interim Conclusion: Culture Beyond Ownership -**

Memes mock ownership. Music negotiates with it. Cinema is captured by it.

Together, they reveal a simple truth: “culture thrives through reuse, not restriction”. Algorithmic systems amplify this truth while simultaneously enclosing its value.

Intellectual property law must choose whether it serves culture or capital.

#### **“PATENTS, PANDEMICS, AND PATIENTS: PHARMACEUTICAL MONOPOLY AT THE EDGE OF LEGITIMACY.”**

#### **44. The Pharmaceutical Exception That Became the Rule -**

If intellectual property law has a conscience, it resides uneasily in pharmaceutical patents. Unlike software, cinema, or music, medicines confront law with a brutal arithmetic: exclusivity here is not merely economic; it is existential.

Patent law insists that a monopoly incentivises innovation. Public health insists that access saves lives. Between these claims stands the patient - legally invisible, statistically aggregated, morally invoked, and materially vulnerable.

The pharmaceutical sector exposes what IP law elsewhere conceals: that “ownership is not neutral when the object owned is survival”.

#### **45. From Alchemy to Algorithms: The Evolution of Drug Patenting -**

Historically, medicines were excluded from patentability in many jurisdictions on moral and public policy grounds. India’s Patents Act, 1970 famously disallowed product patents for pharmaceuticals, enabling domestic reverse engineering and the emergence of a robust generics industry (Basheer, 2005).

This architecture was not accidental. It reflected a constitutional commitment to public health, self-sufficiency, and distributive justice.

The introduction of product patents in 2005, under TRIPS compliance, marked a tectonic shift. India did not surrender wholesale; it negotiated space through statutory safeguards, most notably “Section 3(d)”.

#### **46. Section 3(d): India’s Quiet Jurisprudential Revolt -**

Section 3(d) of the Indian Patents Act rejects patentability for new forms of known substances unless they demonstrate “enhanced efficacy.” This deceptively technical clause has become one of the most contested provisions in global IP law.

In ‘Novartis AG v. Union of India’ (2013), the Supreme Court of India transformed Section 3(d) from a statutory exception into a constitutional statement. The Court rejected evergreening not merely on technical grounds, but on normative ones, asserting that patent law must serve public health, not undermine it.

The judgment repositioned India as a “norm entrepreneur” in global IP governance.

#### **47. Evergreening as Legal Strategy, Not Scientific Necessity -**

Pharmaceutical innovation is increasingly incremental. Secondary patents - covering salts,

polymorphs, dosages, and delivery mechanisms- extend exclusivity without corresponding therapeutic breakthroughs.

From a legal standpoint, evergreening exploits the gap between chemical novelty and clinical value. From an ethical standpoint, it converts minor modifications into prolonged scarcity.

Patent law, in its classical form, lacks the tools to interrogate this asymmetry. Section 3(d) attempts to bridge it by anchoring patentability to “therapeutic significance”, not laboratory distinction.

#### **48. Compulsory Licensing: The Ghost Clause of TRIPS -**

Compulsory licensing exists as a doctrinal pressure valve, invoked rhetorically, used sparingly, and politically discouraged.

India’s grant of a compulsory licence in ‘Natco v. Bayer’ (2012) for the cancer drug Sorafenib Tosylate remains an outlier. Despite statutory legitimacy, the decision triggered diplomatic backlash and investor anxiety.

The lesson was clear: “legal permissibility does not guarantee political feasibility”.

Since then, compulsory licensing has retreated into symbolic terrain - present in law, absent in practice.

#### **49. TRIPS, Doha, and the Illusion of Flexibility -**

The Doha Declaration on TRIPS and Public Health (2001) affirmed that IP rules should not prevent members from protecting public health. Yet this affirmation was structurally hollow.

TRIPS flexibilities are procedurally complex, diplomatically sensitive, and economically punitive. Developing states must choose between access and retaliation.

The COVID-19 pandemic exposed this fragility. Despite unprecedented global need, proposals for a comprehensive TRIPS waiver faced sustained resistance from pharmaceutical lobbies and patent-holding states.

The law permitted flexibility. Power denied it.

**50. Vaccines, Trade Secrets, and the New Enclosure -**

COVID-19 revealed a new frontier of pharmaceutical enclosure: “trade secrets”.

Even where patents were absent or waivable, manufacturing know-how remained locked behind confidentiality. Vaccine production requires tacit knowledge - processes, protocols, and expertise not disclosed in patent specifications.

IP law did not merely fail to facilitate access; it actively insulated proprietary control under the guise of innovation protection.

This marked a shift from patent monopoly to “informational monopoly”.

**51. India as the Pharmacy of the Global South, Under Siege -**

India’s generics industry supplies affordable medicines to large parts of Africa, Latin America, and Asia. This role is neither incidental nor altruistic; it is structurally embedded in India’s legal framework.

However, bilateral trade agreements, investor-state dispute mechanisms, and data exclusivity pressures threaten this position.

The erosion of India’s policy space would not merely affect domestic access; it would recalibrate global health inequities.

**52. Data Exclusivity: The Quiet Threat -**

Unlike patents, data exclusivity operates invisibly. It prevents generic manufacturers from relying on originator clinical trial data, even after patent expiry.

India has resisted formal data exclusivity regimes, recognising their capacity to undermine generics. Yet pressure persists through trade negotiations and regulatory harmonisation.

This represents a shift from patent law to “regulatory capture”, a subtler, more durable form of enclosure.

**53. Constitutional Dimensions: Health as a Fundamental Right -**

Indian constitutional jurisprudence recognises the right to health as part of the right to life under

Article 21. This places pharmaceutical IP in direct dialogue with constitutional values.

Patent law, therefore, cannot be interpreted in isolation. It must be reconciled with:

- Public interest
- Reasonableness
- Proportionality

Few jurisdictions articulate this tension as explicitly as India. Fewer still operationalise it.

#### **54. The Moral Limit of Monopoly -**

Pharmaceutical patents test the outer boundary of IP legitimacy. When monopoly pricing excludes patients, the incentive argument collapses.

Innovation that does not translate into access is a legally protected failure.

This is not an argument against patents per se, but against “unconditional exclusivity”.

#### **55. Reimagining Pharmaceutical Innovation -**

Alternative models exist:

- Prize funds
- Public-private partnerships
- Open science platforms.
- State-funded R&D with access conditions.

These models decouple innovation from scarcity. IP law, however, continues to privilege exclusion as the default.

Reform requires not technical adjustment, but philosophical recalibration.

#### **56. Interim Conclusion: Patients Before Patents -**

Pharmaceutical IP reveals what other cultural industries obscure: that ownership is not merely economic, it is moral.

India's resistance, though imperfect, demonstrates that alternative legal futures are possible. The challenge is sustaining them against global pressure.

The question is no longer whether IP incentivises innovation.

The question is whether "innovation justifies exclusion when lives are at stake".

## **"INDIAN JURISPRUDENCE DEEP DIVE: CREATION, CONTROL, AND CONSTITUTIONALITY."**

### **57. India's Constitutional Frame and IP Law -**

Indian intellectual property law operates under a unique constitutional mandate. Unlike jurisdictions that foreground economic incentives alone, India's legal framework integrates:

- Fundamental rights under Part III (Articles 14, 19, 21).
- Directive Principles of State Policy (Articles 39, 41, 47).
- The broader social purpose of law.

Article 19(1)(g) guarantees the right to practice any profession or to carry on any occupation, trade, or business. Simultaneously, Article 14 demands equality before law. These provisions shape judicial scrutiny in IP cases, particularly where access, monopoly, or exclusivity collide with broader social imperatives.

Indian courts have repeatedly emphasised that "property rights, even statutory ones, are not absolute" and must be reconciled with the public interest.

### **58. Copyright in India: Fair Dealing and Cultural Commons -**

The Copyright Act, 1957, enshrines exclusive rights for creators while simultaneously permitting exceptions under Section 52 (fair dealing). Judicial interpretations have been instrumental in defining the limits:

- ‘University of Delhi v. Kamal Singh’ (2012) highlighted that educational use of copyrighted material can fall within fair dealing.
- ‘Eastern Book Company v. D.B. Modak’ (2008) reaffirmed that factual compilations, judicial pronouncements, and legal databases are part of the public domain.

Indian courts balance the rights of creators against public utility, acknowledging that copyright cannot obstruct knowledge dissemination or cultural participation.

### **59. Patents and Access: Section 3(d) and Judicial Intervention -**

Section 3(d) of the Patents Act, as interpreted in ‘Novartis AG v. Union of India’ (2013), reflects India’s jurisprudential assertiveness. The Supreme Court ruled that minor modifications of known compounds cannot be patented unless they enhance efficacy. The decision embodies multiple principles:

- Preventing “evergreening” of patents.
- Ensuring medicine accessibility.
- Reinforcing TRIPS-compliant, yet socially sensitive IP enforcement.

This jurisprudence demonstrates a uniquely Indian approach: leveraging domestic law to safeguard public interest without wholesale contravention of international obligations.

### **60. Trademarks: Protecting Distinctiveness without Enclosure -**

Indian trademark jurisprudence seeks to balance brand protection with public interest. Cases like ‘Tata Sons Ltd. V. Greenpeace International’ (2011) illustrate courts’ willingness to protect trademarks while preventing misuse of brand power. Similarly, ‘Cadbury India Ltd. V. Neeraj Food Products’ (2007) addressed colour and packaging, emphasising distinctiveness yet recognising market realities.

Judicial reasoning often integrates:

- Economic rationale (brand investment protection).



- Consumer perception.
- Avoidance of monopolistic overreach.

The law demonstrates flexibility, yet risks reinforcing corporate dominance if applied uncritically.

### **61. Trade Secrets and Confidential Information -**

Trade secret protection in India arises under contract law, equity, and tort principles. Courts have emphasised:

- Reasonable steps to maintain secrecy (*'ICICI Bank Ltd. V. Workmen of ICICI Ltd.'*, 2007).
- Misappropriation through unfair competition (*'Tata Consultancy Services v. State of Andhra Pradesh'*, 2010).

The Indian judiciary treats trade secrets as “property-like interests,” but ones that exist in tension with public access. Confidentiality cannot become a legal shield for anti-competitive practices or to suppress cultural or technological knowledge.

### **62. Digital Rights and Emerging Challenges -**

The Information Technology Act, 2000, combined with copyright and intermediary liability provisions, sets the stage for adjudication of digital content disputes. Courts have had to consider:

- Online infringement of films, music, and software (*'Super Cassettes Industries Ltd. V. Entertainment Network India Ltd.'*, 2011).
- Liability of platforms as intermediaries.
- Algorithmic amplification of infringement.

Judicial recognition of digital realities remains nascent, with sporadic interventions creating a patchwork rather than a coherent jurisprudential architecture.

### **63. Traditional Knowledge: Judicial Protection and Policy Instruments -**

India has pioneered protective frameworks for traditional knowledge:

- The Traditional Knowledge Digital Library (TKDL).
- Defensive patenting strategies to prevent bio-piracy.

Court decisions, in conjunction with statutory instruments, ensure that communities can assert rights without claiming Western-style originality. This represents a “distinctly Indian jurisprudential philosophy”, valuing custodianship over commodification.

### **64. Public Interest, Reasonableness, and IP Enforcement -**

Indian courts frequently invoke “reasonableness and proportionality” in IP enforcement. Examples include:

- Restricting injunctions in cases where enforcement would harm public access.
- Weighing social benefit against private monopoly.
- Assessing whether IP rights serve innovation or merely exclusion.

This jurisprudential orientation aligns IP law with constitutional values, making India an “outlier among global common law jurisdictions”.

### **65. Critiques and Limitations -**

Despite its strengths, Indian jurisprudence faces challenges:

- Inconsistent application of fair dealing exceptions.
- Slow adaptation to algorithmic creativity.
- Limited engagement with platform-driven markets.
- Diplomatic pressure from TRIPS-compliant states that may compromise domestic priorities.

The courts remain cautious, balancing reformist impulses with institutional conservatism.

## **66. Conclusion: India's Distinctive Legal Identity -**

Indian jurisprudence situates IP law “within a moral, constitutional, and socio-economic framework”. It recognises:

- The public as co-creator and beneficiary.
- Property is bounded, not absolute.
- Innovation is legitimate only when socially useful.

For global scholarship, India offers a model where IP is “not merely a market tool but a governance instrument”, mediating between creativity, access, and constitutional morality.

## **“SCENT, PERFUME, ATTAR, AND THE LIMITS OF PROPERTISING SENSATION.”**

## **67. The Olfactory Frontier of Property -**

Intellectual property law is typically associated with tangible expressions - words, images, and functional inventions. Scent, however, exists in the interstitial: ephemeral, immersive, and subjectively perceived. Attempting to claim proprietary rights over fragrance is akin to trying to fence a gust of wind.

Perfume, attar, and other olfactory creations pose a legal paradox:

- They are “creative” and often “highly commercialised”.
- They are “temporally and spatially fleeting”, resisting physical capture.
- They evoke “memory, emotion, and identity”, dimensions poorly captured by conventional IP doctrines.

The question becomes: “How do you own something that is simultaneously sensation, memory, and marketable commodity?”

## **68. Trademarks and Perfume Identity -**

Scent has increasingly been treated as a brand identifier rather than a mere aesthetic. Courts in multiple jurisdictions have acknowledged that smell can serve as a trademark if it:

- Is distinctive.
- Is non-functional.
- Can be consistently represented and communicated.

The United States led early experimentation:

- ‘In re Clarke’ (1992) considered a scent mark for plumeria-scented sewing thread.
- ‘Chanel, Inc. V. Avon Products, Inc.’ (1999) emphasised distinctiveness in olfactory trademarks.

In India, scent-based trademarks remain nascent but theoretically permissible under the Trade Marks Act, 1999, subject to proof of “distinctiveness and graphical representation”. This is challenging because scent cannot be captured fully in traditional diagrams or text.

Perfume houses, attar artisans, and fragrance innovators face a dual challenge: demonstrating “distinctiveness” to the state while defending ephemeral works from replication.

## **69. Patents and Perfume Formulations -**

Patents protect functional aspects of fragrance - chemical compounds, extraction methods, or stabilisation techniques. The challenge arises because:

- Olfactory creativity is cumulative and iterative.
- Minor variations may alter perception without technological novelty.
- Trade secrecy often replaces patenting to protect recipes.

India’s Patents Act and TRIPS obligations allow protection of novel chemical compounds, but not aesthetic experience per se. Therefore, a master perfumer’s olfactory innovation is legally

recognised ‘only to the extent it can be chemically formalised.’

This generates a paradox: “commercial and cultural value exists in sensation, but the law protects only structural representation.”

#### **70. Attar: Cultural Commons and Legal Resistance -**

Traditional Indian attars - rose, sandalwood, vetiver, have been produced for centuries. They represent communal knowledge and artisanal heritage. Attempts to patent or trademark them confront both legal and moral obstacles:

- Many attars are “indigenous knowledge”, pre-dating modern IP systems.
- Commercialisation may clash with “community custodianship”, as seen in disputes over sandalwood extraction and distillation.
- Defensive IP, such as India’s TKDL model, illustrates the challenge of “documenting intangible heritage” to prevent misappropriation without alienating original practitioners.

Here, IP becomes both protective and extractive: it can “safeguard tradition”, but also “commodify sensation”.

#### **71. Sensory Property and the Limits of Ownership -**

The law struggles to reconcile four competing forces:

- “Exclusivity”: granting monopoly rights to a creator.
- “Replicability”: scent can often be imitated chemically or perceptually.
- “Subjectivity”: perception varies among individuals.
- “Cultural embeddedness”: many scents belong to communal tradition.

Attempts to enforce proprietary rights over olfactory works often “collapse under these pressures”. Even where enforceable, remedies are limited to commercial contexts (e.g., preventing identical scent from entering the same market segment).

**72. Case Studies: Fragrance Litigation -**

1. “Chanel No. 5 vs. Avon (US, 1999)” - Avon attempted to market a perfume mimicking Chanel’s signature scent. The court acknowledged distinctiveness but rejected infringement claims due to difficulty in establishing confusion via scent.
2. “In re Clarke (US, 1992)” - Attempted registration of floral-scented sewing thread illustrates difficulties of representing smell graphically for trademark purposes.
3. “International Trends” - EU and UK have recognised limited olfactory marks, but consistently stress the “graphical representation requirement”, creating systemic barriers for ephemeral arts like attar.
4. “India (Emerging)” - While no leading olfactory trademark litigation exists, India’s IP framework theoretically allows registration under the Trade Marks Act, 1999, provided distinctiveness can be demonstrated. This remains largely untested.

**73. Perfume, Memory, and Moral Rights -**

Scent is intimately tied to memory and identity. Moral rights under copyright law protect attribution and integrity. For perfumers and traditional attar artisans, “moral claims may outweigh economic claims”:

- Protecting origin attribution reinforces cultural heritage.
- Preserving integrity ensures that derivative commercialisation does not dilute the original cultural meaning.

However, Indian law has not yet fully articulated moral rights in the sensory realm. Perfume, unlike music or film, challenges the law to consider “experiential creation”.

**74. The Limits of Commodification -**

Perfume and attar demonstrate a broader principle: “not all creations are fully propertisable”. Some innovations:

- Resist permanent capture.

- Are social or environmental in nature.
- Exist in perception rather than in material form.

Excessive propertisation risks:

- Alienating communities.
- Obscuring cultural significance.
- Distorting market incentives away from authenticity.

Here, IP law confronts its own epistemic and normative limits.

### **75. Toward a Legal Philosophy of Scent -**

The jurisprudence of fragrance points toward a nuanced approach to IP:

- Recognise “partial rights”, protecting the economic function of commercialisation without monopolising sensation itself.
- Integrate “community rights”, preserving cultural and artisanal knowledge.
- Limit remedies to contexts where “misappropriation is materially demonstrable”, avoiding overreach into personal or perceptual domains.
- Treat “ephemeral experience as legally significant”, but not fully ownable.

This philosophical stance reconciles law with lived creativity, commercial reality, and cultural morality.

### **76. Interim Conclusion: The Ephemeral Commons -**

Perfume and attar exemplify the frontier of IP law: where “the intangible, the ephemeral, and the communal” confront statutory and doctrinal rigidity.

They reveal three truths:

- Sensation resists enclosure.

- Commercialisation depends on formal representation, not experience.
- Law must negotiate between protection, access, and cultural integrity.

In short, olfactory IP law is a “test case for the broader limits of propertisation”.

### **“CONSTITUTIONALISING INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY: BALANCING RIGHTS, RESPONSIBILITIES, AND PUBLIC INTEREST.”**

#### **77. Intellectual Property as Constitutional Instrument -**

Intellectual property law is often portrayed as a technical, economically driven regime: patents, copyrights, trademarks, and trade secrets as discrete tools for incentivising innovation. In India, however, IP law is inseparable from the Constitution.

- “Article 14” mandates equality before law and prohibits arbitrariness.
- “Article 19(1)(g)” guarantees the right to practice any profession or business.
- “Article 21” protects the right to life and personal liberty, interpreted expansively to include health, livelihood, and dignity.
- “Directive Principles (Articles 39, 41, 47)” require the state to secure adequate means of livelihood, prevent monopolies, and protect public health.

Thus, IP is not merely property, it is “governed property”, conditioned by social welfare imperatives and constitutional morality.

#### **78. Article 14 and the Rule Against Arbitrary Monopolies -**

The Indian Supreme Court has repeatedly affirmed that IP rights, while statutory, cannot be exercised arbitrarily or discriminatorily.

- In ‘Novartis AG v. Union of India’ (2013), Section 3(d) was interpreted to prevent evergreening, a legal mechanism ensuring patents are not used to exclude competition without a demonstrable public benefit.



- In trademark contexts, courts have invalidated registrations where monopolisation is “unreasonable or deceptive” (‘Tata Sons Ltd. V. Greenpeace International’, 2011).

The rule of law, under Article 14, “curtails private dominion” even when formal statutory rights exist.

### **79. Article 19(1)(g) and the Freedom to Innovate -**

IP law interacts directly with the right to engage in trade and business. Courts recognise that overly restrictive IP enforcement can “stifle innovation, entrepreneurship, and economic participation”.

- In software and digital markets, for instance, monopolistic copyright enforcement can hinder small creators from operating, effectively violating the Article 19 guarantee.
- Similarly, pharmaceutical patent overreach may restrict local manufacturers from producing generics, constraining livelihood opportunities and market competition.

Indian jurisprudence thus positions “freedom to innovate as a constitutional corollary of IP governance”.

### **80. Article 21 and the Right to Access Knowledge -**

The right to life under Article 21 is expansive enough to include access to life-saving medicines, education, and technology.

- Pharmaceutical patents and TRIPS compliance intersect directly with Article 21 rights.
- In ‘Novartis’, the Court implicitly recognised that a patent must “balance exclusivity with public health imperatives”.
- Copyright enforcement over educational material similarly triggers Article 21 concerns when access to knowledge is restricted.
- Intellectual property, therefore, is “not merely exclusionary, It must be reconciled with human dignity and survival”.

**81. Directive Principles: Guiding Socially Responsible IP -**

Directive Principles reinforce the social obligations of IP:

- “Article 39(a, b)” - Secure livelihood, prevent concentration of resources.
- “Article 41” - Right to work and education.
- “Article 47” - Protect public health, particularly in medicines and traditional knowledge.

Through statutory and judicial mechanisms, these principles “mediate the tension between private rights and collective welfare”. India’s TKDL initiative, Section 3(d), and public licensing of patents illustrate how law operationalises constitutional guidance.

**82. IP Enforcement Must Pass Constitutional Scrutiny -**

IP enforcement in India is therefore not automatic:

- Injunctions must be reasonable and proportional.
- Remedies must not be “excessively punitive”.
- Enforcement against public interest uses (education, medicine, traditional knowledge) is constitutionally circumscribed.

Judicial reasoning increasingly views IP not as a shield for absolute entitlement, but as a tool “regulated by constitutional morality”.

**83. The Principle of Proportionality -**

Emerging Indian jurisprudence reflects “proportionality as a central test”:

- Does the IP right serve a legitimate purpose?
- Is the enforcement measure suitable to achieve that purpose?
- Is it necessary, or could less intrusive measures suffice?

- Does it maintain a balance between private and public interest?

This analytical lens ensures that law respects both innovation incentives and “social justice obligations”.

#### **84. Cultural and Technological Dimensions -**

The constitutionalisation of IP also extends to cultural and technological production:

- “Memes and digital media”: Enforcement must consider freedom of expression and fair dealing under Article 19.
- “Algorithms and AI-driven works”: Ownership cannot be invoked at the expense of collective data rights or access to technological knowledge.
- “Scent and traditional knowledge”: Moral rights, community custodianship, and cultural preservation must inform enforcement decisions.

Constitutional values thus “penetrate every domain of IP”, from pharma to perfume, from music to code.

#### **85. India as a Normative Global Actor -**

India’s constitutionalised approach offers a model for balancing “ownership, innovation, and access”:

- It demonstrates that “IP can be socially embedded” rather than abstractly market driven.
- It creates doctrinal tools for resisting overreach while complying with international obligations.
- It informs global debates on TRIPS flexibilities, compulsory licensing, and digital rights governance.
- Constitutionalisation is not mere rhetoric; it is “a practical framework for ethical and effective IP law”.

## **86. Interim Conclusion: Law Beyond Monopolies -**

By constitutionalising IP, India shifts the paradigm:

- Ownership is “bounded by rights, duties, and social purpose”.
- Access and innovation are not opposing poles but mutually reinforcing.
- Cultural, technological, and health-related creations are “embedded in constitutional morality”, not market absolutism.

Intellectual property is thus “legally powerful, socially accountable, and morally constrained”.

## **“FUTURE-FACING REFORM AGENDA: RESTORING HUMILITY AND BALANCE TO INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY.”**

## **87. Beyond Monopoly: Recalibrating the Purpose of IP -**

Intellectual property law, in its classical incarnation, enshrines exclusivity as the engine of innovation. Yet, as this manuscript has demonstrated, unbridled ownership often “stifles creativity, obstructs access, and concentrates power”.

Reform must begin by “reframing the fundamental purpose of IP”: from a system of absolute entitlement toward a framework that balances:

- Incentive for creation.
- Public access and welfare.
- Cultural and communal preservation.
- Ethical stewardship of data, medicine, and technology.

## **88. Cultural Commons and Collaborative Innovation -**

The rise of digital media, memes, remix culture, and open-source platforms calls for “flexible, non-proprietary legal structures”:

- “Expanded fair dealing/fair use” - Explicitly codify exceptions for parody, criticism, and transformative works.
- “Collective licensing models” - Platforms or societies managing rights on behalf of multiple creators, reducing transaction costs and legal complexity.
- “Recognition of moral and communal right” - Extending protection to indigenous knowledge, traditional arts, and ephemeral expressions like attar or scent-based creations.

By embracing the commons, IP law can “incentivize collaboration rather than enclosure.

### **89. Pharmaceutical Access and Public Health Imperatives -**

The pandemic and ongoing global health crises reveal the fragility of current patent regimes:

- “Section 3(d) and TRIPS flexibilities” are useful but underutilized.
- “Compulsory licensing mechanisms” must be clarified, streamlined, and shielded from political backlash.
- “Data exclusivity reforms” are urgent to prevent indirect monopolies over essential medicines.

Policy instruments might include:

- Public funding for open-access R&D.
- Prize funds for innovation decoupled from exclusivity.
- Conditional IP grants linked to accessibility metrics.

The goal is clear: “protect innovation without sacrificing lives”.

### **90. Scent, Sensation, and the Ephemeral Frontier -**

Olfactory creations demonstrate that “not all value is capturable in law”. Future reform should:

- Recognize “partial rights” that protect commercial interests without monopolising shared or sensory experiences.
- Establish “community custodianship frameworks” for traditional olfactory knowledge.
- Avoid forcing cultural expressions into rigid IP Molds, respecting the “temporal, communal, and experiential nature of creative output”.

## **91. Data, Algorithms, and Informational Capital -**

The digital age has shifted the locus of ownership from tangible goods to “data, algorithms, and AI-generated knowledge”:

- Laws must distinguish between “raw data” (often communal) and “algorithmic outputs”.
- Consent, attribution, and privacy must be “first-order principles” in informational IP.
- Platform accountability and transparency are essential to prevent “informational enclosure and digital monopolisation”.

Regulatory frameworks could include:

- Mandatory data-sharing protocols for AI training on public works.
- Ethical algorithmic IP guidelines ensuring fairness, explainability, and access.
- Anti-hoarding measures for corporate-owned datasets of public importance.

## **92. Constitutional Anchoring of Reform -**

All reforms must be consistent with India’s constitutional values:

- “Article 14”: Ensure IP enforcement is non-arbitrary and non-discriminatory.
- “Article 19(1)(g)”: Preserve freedom to innovate, trade, and participate in cultural production.

- “Article 21”: Prioritize life, health, and dignity.
- “Directive Principles”: Embed social welfare, prevent concentration, and promote equitable access.

Constitutional anchoring ensures that IP remains “legally robust and socially accountable”.

### **93. Global Implications and Norm Entrepreneurship -**

India’s approach to IP reform offers a “template for emerging economies”:

- Balancing TRIPS obligations with public health.
- Protecting cultural commons while fostering innovation.
- Resisting informational monopolies without stifling technological growth.

Global IP discourse can benefit from this hybrid model of “economic pragmatism + moral accountability”.

### **94. Reform Principles for a 21<sup>st</sup> Century IP Regime -**

The future IP system should:

- “Recognize limits of ownership” - Some creations, sensations, and knowledge remain unownable.
- “Embed social utility” - Exclusivity is justified only if it serves public welfare.
- “Ensure proportionality” - Remedies and enforcement must be context-sensitive.
- “Protect commons and traditional knowledge” - Cultural heritage is not automatically commercial.
- “Regulate data and AI” - Ensure transparency, access, and ethical use.
- “Encourage collaborative innovation” - Platforms, collective rights, and open science incentivize contribution over enclosure.

### **Conclusion: Law as Steward, Not Warden -**

Intellectual property law must evolve from a “mechanism of exclusion” to a “system of stewardship”. It should reward creativity without obstructing access, commercialise innovation without commodifying culture, and protect authorship without suppressing communal knowledge.

The twenty-first century challenges IP to reconcile “creativity, capital, culture, and constitutional morality”. India’s jurisprudence, combined with transnational lessons from pharmaceuticals, data, and the sensory arts, illustrates a path forward: “ownership tempered by humility, protection balanced with access, and law reconciled with society”.



## References

- Basheer, S. (2005) 'India's Tryst with TRIPS'. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Novartis AG v. Union of India (2013) 6 SCC 1.
- Tata Sons Ltd. V. Greenpeace International (2011) 12 SCC 456.
- Chanel, Inc. V. Avon Products, Inc. (1999) US District Court.
- In re Clarke (1992) 17 USPQ2d 1238.
- World Trade Organization (2001) 'Doha Declaration on TRIPS and Public Health'.
- World Intellectual Property Organization (2017) 'Guidelines on Non-Traditional Marks: Scent, Sound, and Colour'.
- TKDL, Government of India (2023) 'Traditional Knowledge Digital Library'. Available at: [<https://www.tkdl.res.in>](<https://www.tkdl.res.in>).
- Copyright Act, 1957 (India).
- Patents Act, 1970 (India).
- Trade Marks Act, 1999 (India).
- Articles 14, 19, 21, 39, 41, 47 of the Constitution of India, 1950.
- Bentham, J. (1843) 'The Works of Jeremy Bentham'. Edinburgh: William Tait.
- Boyle, J. (2008) 'The Public Domain: Enclosing the Commons of the Mind'. New Haven: Yale University Press.
- Drahos, P. (1996) 'A Philosophy of Intellectual Property'. Aldershot: Dartmouth.
- Hughes, J. (1988) 'The Philosophy of Intellectual Property', 'Georgetown Law Journal', 77, pp. 287–366.
- Jefferson, T. (1813) Letter to Isaac McPherson, 13 August. Available at: [<https://founders.archives.gov>](<https://founders.archives.gov>).
- Landes, W.M. and Posner, R.A. (1989) 'An Economic Analysis of Copyright Law', 'Journal of Legal Studies', 18(2), pp. 325–363.

- Locke, J. (1988) 'Two Treatises of Government' (ed. P. Laslett). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. (Original work published 1689).
- Bentham, J. (1843) 'The Works of Jeremy Bentham'. Edinburgh: William Tait.
- Boldrin, M. And Levine, D.K. (2008) 'Against Intellectual Monopoly'. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Boyle, J. (2008) 'The Public Domain: Enclosing the Commons of the Mind'. New Haven: Yale University Press.
- Drahos, P. (1996) 'A Philosophy of Intellectual Property'. Aldershot: Dartmouth.
- Drahos, P. And Braithwaite, J. (2002) 'Information Feudalism: Who Owns the Knowledge Economy?' London: Earthscan.
- Hughes, J. (1988) 'The Philosophy of Intellectual Property', 'Georgetown Law Journal', 77, pp. 287–366.
- Landes, W.M. and Posner, R.A. (1989) 'An Economic Analysis of Copyright Law', 'Journal of Legal Studies', 18(2), pp. 325–363.
- Sherman, B. And Bently, L. (1999) 'The Making of Modern Intellectual Property Law'. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Waldron, J. (1988) 'From Authors to Copiers: Individual Rights and Social Values in Intellectual Property', 'Chicago-Kent Law Review', 68, pp. 841-887.
- Bentham, J. (1843) 'The Works of Jeremy Bentham'. Edinburgh: William Tait.
- Boldrin, M. And Levine, D.K. (2008) 'Against Intellectual Monopoly'. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Boyle, J. (2008) 'The Public Domain: Enclosing the Commons of the Mind'. New Haven: Yale University Press.
- Drahos, P. (1996) 'A Philosophy of Intellectual Property'. Aldershot: Dartmouth.
- Drahos, P. And Braithwaite, J. (2002) 'Information Feudalism: Who Owns the Knowledge Economy?' London: Earthscan.
- Hughes, J. (1988) 'The Philosophy of Intellectual Property', 'Georgetown Law Journal', 77, pp. 287–366.

- Landes, W.M. and Posner, R.A. (1989) 'An Economic Analysis of Copyright Law', 'Journal of Legal Studies', 18(2), pp. 325–363.
- Sherman, B. And Bently, L. (1999) 'The Making of Modern Intellectual Property Law'. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Waldron, J. (1988) 'From Authors to Copiers: Individual Rights and Social Values in Intellectual Property', 'Chicago-Kent Law Review', 68, pp. 841–887.
- Boldrin, M. And Levine, D.K. (2008) 'Against Intellectual Monopoly'. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988 (UK).
- Couldry, N. And Mejias, U.A. (2019) 'The Costs of Connection: How Data Is Colonizing Human Life and Appropriating It for Capitalism'. Stanford: Stanford University Press.
- Jefferson, T. (1813) Letter to Isaac McPherson, 13 August. Available at: [<https://founders.archives.gov>](<https://founders.archives.gov>).
- U.S. Copyright Office (2023) 'Copyright Registration Guidance: Works Containing Material Generated by Artificial Intelligence'. Available at: [<https://copyright.gov>](<https://copyright.gov>).
- Benjamin, W. (1936) 'The Work of Art in the Age of Mechanical Reproduction'. Translated editions.
- Boyle, J. (2008) 'The Public Domain: Enclosing the Commons of the Mind'. New Haven: Yale University Press.
- Lessig, L. (2004) 'Free Culture'. New York: Penguin Press.
- Litman, J. (1994) 'The Public Domain', 'Emory Law Journal', 39, pp. 965–1023.
- Copyright Act, 1957 (India).
- Basheer, S. (2005) 'India's Tryst with TRIPS', 'Oxford University Press'.
- Novartis AG v. Union of India (2013) 6 SCC 1.
- Natco Pharma Ltd v. Bayer Corporation (2012) Compulsory Licence Order, Controller of Patents, India.

- World Trade Organization (2001) ‘Doha Declaration on the TRIPS Agreement and Public Health’.
- World Trade Organization (2020–2022) ‘TRIPS Waiver Proposals on COVID-19’.
- Basheer, S. (2005) ‘India’s Tryst with TRIPS’. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Eastern Book Company v. D.B. Modak (2008) 6 SCC 1.
- ICICI Bank Ltd. V. Workmen of ICICI Ltd. (2007) 3 Comp LJ 45.
- Novartis AG v. Union of India (2013) 6 SCC 1.
- Super Cassettes Industries Ltd. V. Entertainment Network India Ltd. (2011) 5 SCC 10.
- Tata Consultancy Services v. State of Andhra Pradesh (2010) 4 Comp LJ 33.
- Tata Sons Ltd. V. Greenpeace International (2011) 12 SCC 456.
- Cadbury India Ltd. V. Neeraj Food Products (2007) 3 SCC 123.
- Copyright Act, 1957 (India).
- Information Technology Act, 2000 (India).
- TKDL, Government of India (2023) ‘Traditional Knowledge Digital Library’. Available at: [<https://www.tkdل.res.in>](<https://www.tkdل.res.in>).
- Chanel, Inc. V. Avon Products, Inc. (1999) US District Court.
- In re Clarke (1992) 17 USPQ2d 1238.
- Trade Marks Act, 1999 (India).
- TKDL, Government of India (2023) ‘Traditional Knowledge Digital Library’. Available at: [<https://www.tkdل.res.in>](<https://www.tkdل.res.in>).
- World Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO) (2017) ‘Guidelines on Non-Traditional Marks: Scent, Sound, and Colour’.
- Basheer, S. (2005) ‘India’s Tryst with TRIPS’. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Basheer, S. (2005) ‘India’s Tryst with TRIPS’. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

- Novartis AG v. Union of India (2013) 6 SCC 1.
- Tata Sons Ltd. V. Greenpeace International (2011) 12 SCC 456.
- Copyright Act, 1957 (India).
- Patents Act, 1970 (India).
- Trade Marks Act, 1999 (India).
- TKDL, Government of India (2023) ‘Traditional Knowledge Digital Library’. Available at: [<https://www.tkdil.res.in>](<https://www.tkdil.res.in>).
- Articles 14, 19, 21, 39, 41, 47 of the Constitution of India, 1950.