
POLICING FOR PEACE: THE ROLE OF UNITED NATIONS POLICE IN CAPACITY BUILDING AND LAW ENFORCEMENT

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The aim of this research is not just study the evolution of United Nations Police but also to analyse why, how and by whom they have emerged as one of the most important and essential components of UN Peacekeeping operations.

Chapter 1

Background

Peacekeeping is the most well known instrument of the United Nations to manage with conflict situations. The UN Police have become an essential part of the UN peacekeeping mission in Post-Cold War. Their importance has evolved over the years. For instance, only 1,600 UN Police personnel acted in UN peacekeeping operations in 1995, by 2000 the number immensely to 6,662 in next operations and, at present, there are 13,334 UN Police personnel serving in twelve UN peacekeeping missions. The peacekeeping operations in the post-Cold War were different from traditional peacekeeping. The conventional UN peacekeeping operations were set up in reaction to interterritorial conflicts with the consent of host-country to manage status quo with the borders of alarming states in terms of orchestrate peace making efforts around world. These missions mainly have armed forces as they were adequately skilled and trained to handle the borders. With the completion of the Cold War, the international district has been increasingly questioned by the urge to clear up interterritorial conflicts which obstruct insides of security and administration of the concerned states. The interterritorial conflict is due to the incapacity and weakens the strength of a state to address the problems of some sections of its nations, or the war crimes of a oppressive regime nation against its own people, or the missing of national authority. All this conclude in the low appearance of civil services, and political over the nation passes elsewhere such as to the warlords. In all these conditions, the major sufferer of violence are the peoples¹. This is because their security is in risk by the existence

¹ Brogden, M. (2005), ““Horses for Courses” and “Thin Blue Lines”: Community Policing in Transitional Society”, *Police Quarterly*, 8(1): 64-98

of a poor law and directions system or its malfunction, which is incapable in curbing the free flow of illicit arms, human trafficking, existence and operation of notorious criminal gangs², 2 money laundering, corruption in public offices and increase in violence against women³. The United Nations realized that its peacekeeping operations failed to address intrastate conflicts and therefore it felt the need to establish operations with multidimensional tasks not only to maintain peace but to build stable and sustainable states so as to ensure that they did not suffer a relapse into another intra-state conflict. Thus, the United Nations has begun to engage in peace making, peacebuilding, and peace enforcement activities in order to build stable⁴ and sustainable states. The peacekeeping operations with these expanded functions have been referred to as multifunctional peacekeeping operations in this research work. The military does not have the requisite skills and training for carrying out all the multidimensional tasks. What is needed after the initial setting up of a peacekeeping operation is the deployment of a large number of international civilian personnel with specific skills and expertise, who are capable of carrying out post-conflict reconstruction. Usually these experts are “administrators, economists, police, legal experts, de-miners, electoral observers, human rights monitors, civil affairs and governance specialists, humanitarian workers”, public information and communication experts, and judicial and correction officers. Of all the international civilian personnel, the UN Police have emerged as one of the most essential elements of UN peacekeeping operations as other reconstruction activities cannot be carried out without the establishment of law and order. The local police systems become ineffective or non-existent. In such situations, the UN Police play a crucial role in restoring and stabilizing internal law and order, building local police capacity, and strengthening the “rule of law”⁵. The UN Police have become prominent in the post-Cold War years but their deployment as part of UN peacekeeping operations is not a recent trend. During the Cold War, the UN Police were posted in UN peacekeeping operations set up in Congo (1960-64), West Papua New Guinea and Cyprus (1964-present). However, their presence in traditional UN peacekeeping operations was an exception rather than a regular feature. This was so because during the Cold War, UN peacekeeping operations were primarily established in response to inter-state conflicts, with

² Bullion, A. J. (2005), “India”, in D. S. Sorenson and P. C. Wood (eds.) *The Politics of Peacekeeping in Post-Cold War Era*, New York: Frank Cass

³ Call, C. T. (2003), *Challenges in Police Reform: Promoting Effectiveness and Accountability*, IPA Policy Report, New York: International Peace Academy

⁴ Abatneh, A. S. and S. M. Lubang (2011), “Police Reform and State Formation in Southern Sudan”, *Canadian Journal of Development Studies*, 32(1): 94-108

⁵ Greener 2009: 107

due respect given to the sovereignty of states⁶. However, in the post-Cold War period, the inclusion of UN Police in UN peacekeeping operations has become mandatory in order to deal with internal law and problem issues in the conflict areas. Since the late 1990s, the UN Police have been largely responsible for carrying out three major functions: building confidence of local police, building capacity of local police, and law enforcement. Amongst these, capacity building and law enforcement functions are the most important. The capacity building functions refer to the efforts of UN Police to build the capacity of local police so that the latter could carry out policing activities and maintain law and order in post-conflict societies. The UN Police build the capacity by demobilizing non-meritorious personnel from local police, recruiting new personnel, vetting and certifying new recruits as well as existing police, and training local police in international humanitarian standards, human rights, international legal standards, international policing standards, and handling of arms and equipment. The UN Police are more often assigned the capacity building as compared to their other functions. The law enforcement functions refer to the direct and active involvement of the UN Police in maintaining and enforcing law in post-conflict societies. The UN Police are mandated to carry out these functions only when local police are non-existent or incapable of carrying out policing duties. These functions have been occasionally assigned to UN Police in varying degrees, depending upon the situation on ground. These functions usually include investigation of crimes and criminals, search and seizure of suspected criminals as they were carried out in the UN peacekeeping operation in Cambodia, and interrogation of wanted criminals as they were mandated in the UN peacekeeping operation in Haiti⁷. Sometimes, the UN Police are assigned the executive policing task, whereby they have the sole responsibility and complete authority to maintain and enforce law in post conflict society as was the case in Kosovo and East Timor⁸. To help the UN Police to carry out the law enforcement functions more effectively, the United Nations has begun to deploy Formed Police Units (FPUs). These units are deployed either prior to or along with the UN Police in post-conflict societies. They are most suited to “engaging in 4 high-risk arrests, combating organised crime, and protecting the security of elections, prisons, sensitive facilities, VIPs, and borders, all within a human rights framework”. The first all-female FPU was sent to Liberia in 2007 in recognition of the important role that women can play in stabilizing peace in post-conflict societies. It was also an attempt to engender UN

⁶ Richmond 2004: 86-87

⁷ Hansen 2002a: 26-27

⁸ Aboagye, F. B. et al. (2010), “Bottlenecks to Deployment! Police Capacity Building and Deployment in Africa”, Institute for Security Studies (ISS) Paper 221, Institute for Security Studies, Pretoria, South Africa.

Police. This study intends to analyse the expanding roles and functions of the UN Police and also their contribution to the overall performance of UN peacekeeping operations⁹.

Review of the Literature

Evolution and Role of United Nations Police in Peacekeeping Operations

Historical Development of UN Police Component:

The United Nations Police (UNPOL) has emerged as a critical component of contemporary peacekeeping operations, evolving from monitoring arrangements in early missions to assuming substantial law enforcement and capacity-building responsibilities¹⁰. The peacekeeping mandate has expanded significantly since the inception of UN operations, particularly following the end of the Cold War, as internal conflicts with mass human rights violations prompted international recognition of the essential role that law enforcement agencies—especially police—play in conflict resolution and post-conflict reconstruction¹¹. The recognition that traditional military peacekeeping forces alone were insufficient to address the complex security challenges in post-conflict environments catalysed the development of specialized police components within UN missions¹².

UN Police operations have undergone a remarkable transformation from their earliest iterations, where police personnel were minimally represented in peacekeeping missions. Today, UN Police components operate across multiple continents, with missions employing diverse police contingents from contributing nations, each bringing distinct professional experiences and training backgrounds. This expansion reflects the international community's understanding that sustainable peace requires more than military stabilization—it demands the establishment of functional, legitimate, and accountable law enforcement institutions capable of providing public security. The growth in UN Police participation demonstrates a strategic

⁹ <http://hdl.handle.net/10603/584396>

¹⁰ S. Tishkov and D. S. Tishkova, "Participation of the Ministry of Internal Affairs of the Russian Federation in Enhancing African Police Personnel Peacekeeping Capacity," *Vestnik RUDN International Relations*, Sep. 2023, doi: 10.22363/2313-0660-2023-23-3-466-479.

¹¹ K. Lavrinovich, "Community-oriented Policing in UN Peacekeeping Missions as a Model for Effective Cooperation between Police and Society," *Advances in Law Studies*, Apr. 2023, doi: 10.29039/2409-5087-2023-11-1-16-20.

¹² DPKO-DFS Guidelines on Police Operations in United Nations Peacekeeping Operations and Special Political Missions [electronic resource] // United Nations Peacekeeping - https://peacekeeping.un.org/sites/default/files/4._rule_of_law_-_8_police_operations.pdf (date: 27.03.2023)

shift in how the international community conceptualizes post-conflict peace operations.

Mandates and Operational Scope in Conflict Zones

UN Police mandates have progressively expanded to encompass comprehensive responsibilities extending far beyond traditional policing functions. Contemporary UN Police operations include crime prevention and investigation, civilian protection, monitoring and reform of local police forces, maintenance of public order, and support for transitional justice mechanisms¹³. In multidimensional peacekeeping operations, UN Police serve as critical links between military components and civilian populations, implementing mandates that address security, governance, and human rights protection simultaneously¹⁴.

The operational scope of UN Police varies significantly depending on mission contexts and specific Security Council authorizations. Some missions prioritize capacity building and advisory roles, while others maintain more direct operational involvement in law enforcement activities¹⁵. The diversity of UN Police mandates reflects the complexity of post-conflict environments and the recognition that context-specific approaches are essential for mission effectiveness. Moreover, UN Police operations increasingly incorporate protection of civilians as an explicit mandate, requiring specialized training and operational capabilities.

Transition from Traditional to Multidimensional Peacekeeping

The transition toward multidimensional peacekeeping has fundamentally altered the nature of police contributions to UN operations. Early peacekeeping missions focused primarily on observing cease-fires and maintaining separation between conflicting parties; contemporary operations engage in state-building, institution creation, and comprehensive security sector reform¹⁶. This evolution has necessitated the professionalization of UN Police personnel and the development of sophisticated training protocols to equip officers with the competencies

¹³ DPKO-DFS Guidelines on Police Operations in United Nations Peacekeeping Operations and Special Political Missions [electronic resource] // United Nations Peacekeeping
- https://peacekeeping.un.org/sites/default/files/4_rule_of_law_-_8_police_operations.pdf (date: 27.03.2023)

¹⁴ Syali, A. . (2024). Striving for Peace: Addressing Human Rights Challenges in UN Peacekeeping Operations. *DME Journal of Law*

¹⁵ Ahmed, S. et al. (2007), "Shaping the Future of UN Peace Operations: Is There a Doctrine in the House?", *Cambridge Review of International Affairs*, 20(1): 11-28.

¹⁶ Agorzdo, B. K. (2009), "Filling the „Security Gap“ in Post-Conflict Situations: Could Formed Police Units Make a Difference?", *International Peacekeeping*, 16(2): 287-294

required for these expanded responsibilities.

UN Police components now operate within broader frameworks that encompass diplomatic initiatives, humanitarian assistance, and development activities. The integration of police components into holistic peacekeeping approaches has demonstrated effectiveness in addressing complex conflicts, though it also presents significant coordination and resource challenges¹⁷. This multidimensional approach requires UN Police to balance enforcement functions with community engagement, institution-building, and support for transitional governance arrangements.

UN Police Differentiation from Military Peacekeepers

A critical distinction exists between UN police components and military peacekeeping forces, with important implications for operational effectiveness and public perception. UN Police are typically armed police units or civilian police advisors operating within civil policing frameworks, distinct from military formations despite their presence in conflict zones¹⁸. This distinction carries significant implications for mandate implementation, community relations, and the establishment of legitimate law enforcement institutions.

The presence of UN Police offers particular advantages in building relationships with local populations and establishing foundations for democratic governance. Research indicates that UN police improve law enforcement capabilities, foster community engagement, and facilitate information diffusion regarding safety and security issues¹⁹. Unlike military forces structured around command hierarchies and combat operations, UN Police operate with civilian oversight mechanisms and accountability structures that reinforce civilian control of security forces—a fundamental prerequisite for democratic consolidation in post-conflict societies²⁰.

Capacity Building and Training Frameworks for UN Police

Pre-Deployment Training Standards and Programs

¹⁷ Baarda, T. V. and F. V. Iersel (2002), “The Uneasy Relationship between Conscience and Military Law: The Brahimi Report's Unresolved Dilemma”, *International Peacekeeping*, 9(3): 25-50

¹⁸ Baer, G. W. (1973), “Sanctions and Security: The League of Nations and the Italian Ethiopian War, 1935-36”, *International Organization*, 27(2): 165-179.

¹⁹ Agorzdo, B. K. (2009), “Filling the „Security Gap” in Post-Conflict Situations: Could Formed Police Units Make a Difference?”, *International Peacekeeping*, 16(2): 287-294.

²⁰ Baker, B. (2005), “Who do People turn to for Policing in Sierra Leone”, *Journal of Contemporary African Studies*, 23(3): 371-390

Effective capacity building for UN Police begins with comprehensive pre-deployment training that addresses both technical policing competencies and the unique operational environment of peacekeeping missions. The United Nations has developed standardized training programs, including those certified through official UN protocols, to ensure baseline professional standards across diverse contributing countries. These programs typically encompass legal frameworks, human rights principles, use of force regulations, cultural awareness, and conflict-sensitive policing approaches.

Pre-deployment training has become increasingly sophisticated in response to the complexities of modern peacekeeping environments. Training curricula must address not only traditional law enforcement skills but also competencies in protecting civilians, managing intercommunal tensions, and supporting transitional justice processes²¹. The effectiveness of UN Police operations significantly depends on the quality of pre-deployment preparation, as inadequately trained personnel cannot adequately fulfill multifaceted operational mandates²². Standardized training approaches, complemented by mission-specific customization, have proven more effective than ad hoc preparation, particularly in developing comprehensive understanding of host country contexts and anticipated operational challenges.

Specialized Police Units (Formed Police Units - FPU) Development

Formed Police Units represent a specialized component of UN Police operations, consisting of self-contained, armed police units equipped and trained for more robust law enforcement operations, including riot control and protective operations. The FPU model emerged as a critical capability gap-filler in peace operations, providing tactical police capabilities that differentiate from both civilian police advisory approaches and military force employment²³. FPU units operate with specific mandates to protect civilians, maintain public order in contested environments, and support host-state police development. The effectiveness of FPU units depends substantially on human rights-based training, mandate clarity, logistical preparedness, and capacity to build community trust. Countries contributing FPU units, including Indonesia, China, and various African nations, have developed specialized training centers and pre-deployment

²¹ Baker, B. (2009), "Introduction: Policing Post-Conflict Societies: Helping Out the State", *Policing and Society: An International Journal of Research and Policy*, 19(4): 329-332.

²² Beck, P. J. (1995), "The League of Nations and the Great Powers, 1936-1940", *World Affairs*, 157(4): 175-189

²³ Bellamy, A. J. and P. Williams (2004), "Conclusion: What Future for Peace Operations? Brahimi and Beyond", *International Peacekeeping*, 11(1): 183-212

preparation protocols to ensure operational readiness²⁴. FPU deployment has demonstrated notable success in particular contexts, such as reducing sexual violence by armed groups through enhanced law enforcement presence and community engagement. However, the professionalization of FPU operations requires ongoing investment in training infrastructure, standardized procedures, and accountability mechanisms to prevent abuse of force and maintain legitimacy.

Technical Assistance and Knowledge Transfer Mechanisms

Technical assistance programs constitute essential mechanisms through which UN Police facilitate knowledge transfer and capacity development within host-country law enforcement institutions. These programs typically involve advisory relationships, on-the-job training, mentoring arrangements, and structured training courses delivered by UN Police personnel to local law enforcement agencies²⁵. The effectiveness of technical assistance depends on clear communication channels, cultural competency of advisory personnel, and alignment between external technical assistance and local institutional contexts.

International policing cooperation frameworks, including bilateral arrangements and multilateral initiatives coordinated through the UN, enable systematic sharing of best practices in criminal investigation, forensic analysis, cybercrime investigation, and other specialized policing domains²⁶. However, the transfer of technical knowledge faces significant obstacles, including institutional capacity constraints, resource scarcity, and contextual differences between donor and recipient countries. Successful technical assistance programs recognize these challenges and adapt international approaches to local circumstances rather than imposing standardized models that may prove unsuitable for specific institutional contexts.

Ongoing Professional Development and Skills Enhancement

Sustainability of improved policing capabilities requires investment in ongoing professional development and continuing education for both UN Police personnel and host-country law

²⁴ enner, T. et al. (2008), "Doctrine Development in the UN Peacebuilding Apparatus: The Case of UN Constabulary Police, 1999-2006", Paper presented on March 29, 2008 at the 49th International Studies Association Convention: San Francisco

²⁵ Bennett, A. L. (1988), "Collective Security and Its Alternatives: Theory and Practice", in A. L. Bennett, International Organizations: Principles and Issues, New Jersey: Princeton Hall

²⁶ Berdal, M. and M. Leifer (2007), "Cambodia", in M. Berdal and S. Economides (eds.) United Nations Interventionism, 1991-2004, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press

enforcement officers. This includes advanced training in specialized areas such as forensic investigation, cybercrime prevention, human rights compliance, and management of complex security threats. The effectiveness of professional development initiatives increases substantially when aligned with career advancement incentives and organizational recognition of improved skills and performance²⁷.

The evolution of crime patterns and security threats necessitates continuous updating of police training curricula and professional development programs. Emerging challenges such as cybercrime, online exploitation, and technology-enabled criminal activity require specialized training responses. Moreover, trauma-informed approaches and psychological support systems for police personnel have become essential components of professional development, particularly in conflict-affected environments where officers experience repeated exposure to violence and stress²⁸. Institutional sustainability requires establishment of training capacity within host countries, transitioning from dependence on external advisors to self-sustaining professional development systems operated by national institutions.

Law Enforcement Functions and Community-Oriented Policing

Core Policing Functions in Post-Conflict Environments

UN Police fulfill traditional law enforcement functions adapted to post-conflict circumstances, including crime prevention, criminal investigation, apprehension of suspects, and support for judicial processes. These functions prove particularly challenging in fragile post-conflict environments characterized by limited institutional capacity, inadequate forensic capabilities, and insufficient investigative infrastructure²⁹. UN Police provide both direct operational involvement in criminal investigations and capacity building support to develop investigative capabilities within host-country institutions³⁰.

The investigation of conflict-related crimes, including war crimes, crimes against humanity, and human rights violations, represents a distinctive aspect of UN Police operations in post-

²⁷ Berdal, M. R. (1996), "The Security Council, Peacekeeping and Internal Conflict after the Cold War", *Duke Journal of Comparative and International Law*, 7(1): 71-92

²⁸ Bhatia, Vipin (2015), Personal Interview, Inspector, Anti-Human Trafficking Crime Branch, Delhi Police, New Delhi, 13 January 2015

²⁹ Blaauw, E. et al. (1997), "Detention Circumstances in Police Stations: Towards Setting the Standards", *Policing and Society*, 7(1): 45-69.

³⁰ Braddick, H. B. (1962), "A New Look at American Policy during the Italo-Ethiopian Crisis, 1935-36", *The Journal of Modern History*, 34(1): 64-73

conflict environments. These investigations require specialized expertise, careful evidence preservation, and coordination with international tribunals or hybrid courts. Crime prevention through community engagement, intelligence-led policing, and problem-oriented approaches requires reorientation of police from reactive response toward proactive prevention, a significant institutional transformation in many post-conflict societies³¹. The dual mandate—simultaneously addressing conflict-related crimes and ordinary criminal activity—creates resource constraints and operational challenges that UN Police must navigate while building local capacity.

Community-Oriented Policing Models in Peacekeeping

Community-oriented policing approaches have been integrated into UN Police operations as fundamental mechanisms for establishing legitimacy, building trust, and creating sustainable security arrangements³². The model emphasizes partnership between police and community members in identifying security problems and developing collaborative solutions, fundamentally distinct from enforcement-only approaches. UN Police implementation of community policing varies significantly by mission context, with some operations achieving substantial community engagement while others face persistent legitimacy challenges³³.

Research on community policing effectiveness in UN peacekeeping contexts demonstrates that genuine community engagement requires sustained commitment, cultural sensitivity, and responsiveness to community concerns³⁴. Women's inclusion in community engagement activities has proven particularly valuable, as female police officers facilitate engagement with female community members and enhance intelligence gathering regarding security threats³⁵. Community-oriented policing models have demonstrated success in reducing postwar violence, particularly when UN police focus on broader public security gaps rather than exclusively on warring factions³⁶. However, the sustainability of community-oriented policing approaches

³¹ Broer, H. and M. Emery (1998), "Civilian Police in U.N. Peacekeeping Operations", in R. B. Oakley, M. J. Dziedzic and E. M. Goldberg (eds.) *Policing The New World Disorder – Peace Operations and Public Security*, Washington DC: National Defense University Press

³² Brogden, M. (2005), "'Horses for Courses' and 'Thin Blue Lines': Community Policing in Transitional Society", *Police Quarterly*, 8(1): 64-98.

³³ Bullion, A. J. (2005), "India", in D. S. Sorenson and P. C. Wood (eds.) *The Politics of Peacekeeping in Post-Cold War Era*, New York: Frank Cass.

³⁴ Call, C. T. (2003), *Challenges in Police Reform: Promoting Effectiveness and Accountability*, IPA Policy Report, New York: International Peace Academy

³⁵ Celador, G. C. (2005), "Police Reform: Peacebuilding Through „Democratic Policing“?", *International Peacekeeping*, 12(3): 364-376.

³⁶ Call, C. T. (2003), *Challenges in Police Reform: Promoting Effectiveness and Accountability*, IPA Policy

depends on their institutionalization within host-country police forces rather than remaining dependent on UN personnel presence.

Crime Prevention and Investigation Capabilities

Crime prevention represents a critical function distinguishing professional law enforcement from armed security forces, requiring systematic analysis of crime patterns, community engagement for crime reporting, and targeted interventions addressing root causes³⁷. UN Police contribute to crime prevention through multiple mechanisms: direct operational involvement in crime prevention initiatives, capacity building for local crime analysis functions, and establishment of specialized units addressing particular crime categories³⁸. The professionalization of crime prevention and investigation capabilities requires investment in forensic facilities, database systems, and investigative training infrastructure typically requiring international assistance in post-conflict environments³⁹.

Specialized investigation capabilities addressing particular crime categories—cybercrime, trafficking, money laundering, and organized crime—represent areas where UN Police technical expertise proves especially valuable. The development of investigation capacity requires both training and equipment provision, creating resource dependencies that constrain sustainability when international support concludes⁴⁰. Intelligence-led policing approaches, increasingly recognized as fundamental to modern law enforcement effectiveness, require institutional capacity for data collection, analysis, and information sharing—capabilities necessitating substantial technical assistance and ongoing professional development.

Coordination with Local Law Enforcement Agencies

Effective UN Police operations require sustained coordination with host-country law enforcement institutions, creating institutional relationships that ideally transition from external policing toward locally-led law enforcement as capacity develops⁴¹. This coordination

Report, New York: International Peace Academy

³⁷ Chappell, D. and J. Evans (1999), "The Role, Preparation and Performance of Civilian Police in United Nations Peacekeeping Operations", *Criminal Law Forum*, 10: 171-271

³⁸ Choedon, Y. (2013), "Indian and Chinese Engagement in UN Complex Peacekeeping Operations: A Comparative Perspective", *China Report*, 49(2): 205-226

³⁹ Claude, I. L. (1962a), "Balance of Power: An Ambiguous Concept", in I. L. Claude, *Power and International Relations*, New York: Random House, Inc

⁴⁰ Claude, I. L. (1962b), "Collective Security: An Alternative to Balance of Power?", in I. L. Claude, *Power and International Relations*, New York: Random House, Inc

⁴¹ Claude, I. L. (1971), "Collective Security as an Approach to Peace", in I. L. Claude, *Swords into*

involves advisory relationships, joint operational planning, information sharing, and collaborative training initiatives. However, coordination frequently faces significant obstacles including institutional rivalries, limited communication channels, and divergent institutional cultures between UN Police contingents and host-country forces⁴².

The coordination of multiple law enforcement agencies within host countries—including national police, paramilitary forces, intelligence agencies, and local security structures—creates complexity that UN Police must navigate while avoiding reinforcement of fragmented security arrangements⁴³. Institutional coordination mechanisms, including formal coordination committees, liaison officer arrangements, and joint taskforces, provide frameworks for UN Police to support institutional development without directly substituting for local authority⁴⁴. Coordination effectiveness increases substantially when grounded in clear institutional protocols, transparent decision-making processes, and recognition of local ownership of security challenges and solutions.

Police Reform and Security Sector Transformation

Local Police Institutional Development

Security sector reform, encompassing police development as a central component, represents a long-term institutional transformation aimed at creating effective, legitimate, and democratically accountable law enforcement⁴⁵. UN Police contribute to police institutional development through advisory support, training program design, organizational restructuring facilitation, and monitoring of police conduct⁴⁶. Successful police development requires attention to multiple dimensions: organizational structure, personnel management, professional standards, equipment and infrastructure, and integration into broader governance frameworks.

Institutional development faces significant obstacles in post-conflict environments, including

Ploughshares: The Problems and Progress of International Organization, Canada: Random House

⁴² Cockayne, J. and D. M. Malone (2005), “The Ralph Bunche Centennial: Peace Operations - Then and Now”, *Global Governance*, 11(3): 331-350.

⁴³ Cottey, A. (2008), “Beyond Humanitarian Intervention: The New Politics of Peacekeeping and Intervention”, *Contemporary Politics*, 14(4): 429-446.

⁴⁴ Danloy, Alain (2014), Personal Interview, Mission Manager, the Mission Management and Support Section, the Police Division, UN Headquarters, New York, 20 March 2014

⁴⁵ Day, G. (2000), “The Training Dimension of the UN Mission in Bosnia and Herzegovina (UNMIBH)”, *International Peacekeeping*, 7(2): 155-168

⁴⁶ Day, G. and C. Freeman (2005), “Operationalising the Responsibility to Protect - The Policekeeping Approach”, *Global Governance*, 11(2): 139-146.

limited financial resources, inadequate training infrastructure, political interference in police operations, and weak institutional capacity⁴⁷. The transition from externally-supported policing toward locally-led institutions requires conscious efforts to build institutional ownership, develop national training capacity, and establish sustainable financing mechanisms⁴⁸. Police institutional development frequently requires comprehensive reform addressing recruitment procedures, promotion systems, disciplinary mechanisms, and organizational culture—transformations requiring extended commitment and coordination across multiple international and domestic actors⁴⁹. Local ownership of reform processes proves essential for sustainability, as externally-imposed reforms lacking community support prove susceptible to reversal once external support concludes.

Rule of Law and Governance Establishment

UN Police contribute substantially to rule of law establishment through support for police reform, coordination with judicial institutions, and advocacy for human rights compliance. Rule of law requires not only effective police institutions but also functional judicial systems capable of fairly and consistently applying laws and protecting fundamental rights⁵⁰. UN Police operations intersect with broader peacebuilding frameworks addressing governance, judicial reform, and transitional justice mechanisms that collectively establish rule of law foundations⁵¹.

The integration of human rights principles into police operations proves fundamental for rule of law establishment and public trust building. UN Police training programs emphasize human rights compliance, proportional use of force, and protection of detainee rights—principles often conflicting with institutional cultures emphasizing enforcement over rights protection⁵². Accountability mechanisms ensuring police compliance with legal standards require

⁴⁷ Decker, D. C. (2006), “Enforcing Human rights: The Role of the UN Civilian Police in Kosovo”, *International Peacekeeping*, 13(4): 502-516

⁴⁸ Diehl, P. F. (2001), “Forks in the Road: Theoretical and Policy Concerns for 21st Century”, in P. F. Diehl (ed.) *The Politics of Global Governance: International Organizations in an Interdependent World*, Colorado: Lynne Rienner Publishers.

⁴⁹ Diehl, P. F. (2007), *Peace Operations*, Urbana-Champaign: Polity Press

⁵⁰ “The Right Capacities for New Challenges – Making International Policekeeping More Effective for the 21st Century”, Report of the High-Level Conference on International Police Peacekeeping in the 21st Century: The Right Capacities for New Challenges, 10-11 October 2012, Berlin, Germany

⁵¹ Dziedzic, M. J. (1998), “Introduction”, in R. B. Oakley, M. J. Dziedzic and E. M. Goldberg (eds.) *Policing the New World Disorder – Peace Operations and Public Security*, Washington DC: National Defense University Press

⁵² Findlay, T. (2002), “From Haiti to Rwanda to Sierra Leone: New Missions, Old Dilemmas”, in T. Findlay, *The Use of Force in Peace Operations*, New York: Oxford University Press

institutional independence from political interference, adequate investigative capacity, and transparent disciplinary procedures—institutional prerequisites frequently absent in post-conflict environments. The establishment of rule of law requires sustained effort to transform police institutional cultures from enforcement-oriented approaches toward rights-respecting, accountable institutions operating within legal frameworks that constrain discretionary authority.

Civilian Control and Democratic Accountability

Democratic consolidation requires establishment of civilian control over security forces, preventing militarization of policing and ensuring alignment between police operations and democratic values. UN Police support this objective through advocacy for civilian oversight mechanisms, participation in police reform dialogues, and modeling of accountable policing practices⁵³. Institutional arrangements facilitating civilian control include civilian police oversight boards, parliamentary security committees, and independent police complaint mechanisms that provide democratic accountability structures⁵⁴.

However, establishing effective civilian control in post-conflict environments frequently encounters significant obstacles, including limited institutional capacity of civilian oversight structures, political interference undermining independence of oversight mechanisms, and weak legal frameworks defining police powers and accountability procedures. UN Police involvement in supporting civilian control mechanisms requires careful attention to institutional sustainability, ensuring that oversight arrangements continue functioning once UN presence concludes. Effective accountability mechanisms require both institutional structures and cultural transformation within police organizations toward internalization of accountability principles rather than viewing accountability as external imposition⁵⁵.

Integration of International Best Practices

Adaptation of international policing best practices to local contexts represents a critical aspect

⁵³ Fortna, P. (2011), “Do Terrorists Win?: Rebels’ Use of Terrorism and Civil War Outcomes”, American Political Science Association 2011 Annual Meeting Paper, accessed 13 April 2014 from http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1900697.

⁵⁴ Frantzen, D. (2010), “Interrogation Strategies, Evidence, and the Need for Miranda: A Study of Police Ideologies”, *Police Practice and Research*, 11(3): 227-239

⁵⁵ Friedrichs, R. (2011), “Côte d’Ivoire: UN Peacekeeping, Impartiality and Protection of Civilians”, accessed 9 November 2014 from <http://www.stimson.org/spotlight/cote-divoireun-peacekeeping-impartiality-and-protection-of-civilians/>

of UN Police capacity building, requiring careful assessment of practice transferability and conscious adaptation to local institutional and cultural contexts. International best practices in community policing, crime prevention, criminal investigation, and organizational management offer valuable models; however, direct transplantation without contextual adaptation frequently produces disappointing results. Successful integration of best practices requires collaborative processes engaging both external experts and local stakeholders in identifying applicable practices and adapting them to local circumstances⁵⁶.

The evidence on effectiveness of security sector reform initiatives generally supports context-sensitive approaches over standardized models, with particular success achieved when reform processes emphasize local ownership and incorporate existing institutional strengths⁵⁷. UN Police engagement with best practices includes provision of training addressing contemporary challenges such as cybercrime investigation, trafficking prevention, and protection of vulnerable populations⁵⁸. However, best practice transfer requires attention to institutional capacity for implementation, availability of required technology and resources, and sustainability of improved practices once external support concludes⁵⁹.

Challenges, Accountability, and Effectiveness Issues

Operational Constraints and Resource Limitations

UN Police operations consistently encounter resource limitations constraining operational effectiveness and capacity-building achievements. Insufficient personnel allocations, inadequate equipment provisions, limited funding for training programs, and insufficient logistical support restrict the scope of UN Police activities and necessitate prioritization decisions limiting operational reach. Personnel shortages represent a persistent challenge affecting multiple UN missions, as troop-contributing countries frequently fail to deploy authorized strength levels, creating gaps between mandated capabilities and actual operational

⁵⁶ Fuller, G. (1991), "Moscow and the Gulf War", *Foreign Affairs*, 70(3): 55-76

⁵⁷ Gama, C. F. (2008), "Bridge over Troubled Waters: United Nations Peacekeeping Operations through the Fog of Cold War - From International Security to Human Security", Paper presented between March 26-29, 2008, at the International Studies Association Conference: San Francisco, CA

⁵⁸ Inbau, F. E. (1999), "Police Interrogation: A Practical Necessity", *The Journal of Criminal Law and Criminology*, 89(4): 1403-1412

⁵⁹ Jones, B. et al. (2009), "Building on Brahimi: Peacekeeping in an Era of Strategic Uncertainty", Report Submitted to the Department of Peacekeeping Operations and Field Support for the „New Horizon“ Project, New York: NYU Center on International Cooperation

capacity⁶⁰.

Infrastructure limitations in post-conflict environments often require UN Police to establish operational infrastructure from minimal foundations, including communications systems, transportation, office facilities, and forensic capabilities⁶¹. The complexity of multidimensional peacekeeping operations requires sophisticated coordination mechanisms, training facilities, and logistical systems consuming substantial resources while leaving limited resources for capacity-building activities. Resource constraints frequently necessitate difficult prioritization decisions, as UN Police must allocate limited personnel among competing priorities including direct operational involvement, capacity building, civilian protection, and institutional reform support⁶².

Human Rights Compliance and Accountability Mechanisms

Despite explicit commitments to human rights compliance, UN Police operations have faced serious allegations of sexual exploitation and abuse, excessive use of force, and violations of fundamental rights⁶³. These incidents undermine mission credibility, damage relationships with host communities, and contradict core peacekeeping principles. Accountability for UN Police misconduct remains inadequate, as national prerogative over disciplinary procedures frequently results in minimal consequences for personnel engaged in serious misconduct⁶⁴.

Institutional mechanisms for ensuring accountability and addressing misconduct require strengthening through clearer reporting procedures, independent investigation capacity, and transparent disciplinary processes. The immunity accorded to UN personnel under agreements with host countries frequently limits accountability options and creates perception of impunity, particularly among host-country populations. Accountability challenges extend beyond individual misconduct to institutional-level concerns regarding adherence to mandates, respect

⁶⁰ Karns, M. P. and K. A. Mingst (2001), "Peacekeeping and the Changing Role of the United Nations: Four Dilemmas", in R. Thakur and A. Schnabel (eds.) *United Nations Peacekeeping Operations: Ad Hoc Missions, Permanent Engagement*, Tokyo: United Nations University Press

⁶¹ Hultman, L. (2010), "Keeping Peace or Spurring Violence? Unintended Effects of Peace Operations on Violence against Civilians", *Civil Wars*, 12(1-2): 29-46

⁶² Karns, M. P. and K. A. Mingst (2001), "Peacekeeping and the Changing Role of the United Nations: Four Dilemmas", in R. Thakur and A. Schnabel (eds.) *United Nations Peacekeeping Operations: Ad Hoc Missions, Permanent Engagement*, Tokyo: United Nations University Press

⁶³ Lalor, M. B. (2008), "Building Host-Nation Police Forces: Principles for Strategic Military Planners", A Monograph, School of Advanced Military Studies, United States Army Command and General Staff College, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, accessed 17 August 2013 from handle.dtic.mil/100.2/ADA485636.

⁶⁴ Laws, J. (2010), "Culture, Customs and the Law in Southern Sudan", *Peacekeepers' Diaries 2010*, accessed 12 December 2014 from <http://www.rcmp-grc.gc.ca/po-mp/civpol/indexeng.htm>

for proportionality principles, and avoidance of excessive use of force in operations. Improving accountability requires multiple reforms including strengthening investigation capacity, ensuring transparent disciplinary procedures, enhancing training on rights compliance, and reforming immunity arrangements to permit greater host-country accountability without compromising UN operational independence.

Mission Legitimacy and Public Trust Building

Public trust in UN Police operations varies significantly across and within missions, influenced by mission performance, community relations, and broader perceptions of UN legitimacy⁶⁵. Host populations frequently harbor skepticism regarding external policing, particularly when UN Police are perceived as supporting particular political factions or failing to address community security concerns⁶⁶. Legitimacy erosion occurs when communities perceive UN Police as ineffective in addressing security threats, politically biased in operational decisions, or disrespectful of local customs and traditions.

Building mission legitimacy requires sustained engagement demonstrating operational effectiveness, impartiality, and respect for community values while advancing security objectives⁶⁷. Trust-building proves particularly challenging in contexts marked by historical communal tensions, recent atrocities, and political divisions wherein police operations risk being perceived as favoring particular groups. The legitimacy of UN policing operations depends substantially on demonstrated effectiveness in addressing criminal activity, protecting civilians, and supporting institutional development that community members recognize as serving legitimate objectives. However, legitimacy challenges have mounted in certain missions as host populations increasingly perceive UN operations as ineffective or as serving external interests rather than local security concerns⁶⁸.

Evaluation of Policing Effectiveness Indicators

Measuring UN Police operational effectiveness presents methodological challenges, as

⁶⁵ MacIver, R. M. (1974), "Collective Security", in R. M. MacIver, *The Nations and the United Nations*, Connecticut: Greenwood Press Publishers

⁶⁶ Mani, R. (1999), "Contextualizing Police Reform: Security, the Rule of Law and PostConflict Peacebuilding", *International Peacekeeping*, 6(4): 9-26

⁶⁷ O'Neill, J. T. and N. Rees (2005), *United Nations Peacekeeping in the Post-Cold War Era*, London/ New York: Routledge

⁶⁸ Rausch, C. (2002), "The Assumption of Authority in Kosovo and East Timor: Legal and Practical Implications", in R. Dwan (ed.) *Executive Policing: Enforcing the Law in Peace Operations*, (SIPRI Research Report No.16), Oxford: Oxford University Press

policing impacts manifest across multiple dimensions and operate over extended timeframes. Effectiveness indicators must encompass crime reduction, public security perceptions, institutional development metrics, rule of law measures, and protection of vulnerable populations—indicators reflecting distinct dimensions of complex policing objectives. Research demonstrates that effective UN Police operations require attention to multiple factors including mandate clarity, host-state cooperation, adequate resource provision, and coordination among multiple actors⁶⁹.

The evidence on UN Police effectiveness presents mixed findings, with notable successes in particular contexts but persistent challenges in others. UN police presence reduces postwar violence generally, with particularly pronounced effects when operations address broader public security gaps rather than focusing exclusively on conflict-related threats⁷⁰. However, effectiveness varies substantially based on contextual factors including conflict nature, host-state capacity, international support levels, and mandate clarity⁷¹. Effectiveness evaluation requires longitudinal assessment rather than snapshot assessment, as policing impacts develop gradually through institutional development and community trust-building processes⁷².

Gender Integration and Inclusive Peacekeeping

Women's Representation in UN Police Components

Women remain significantly underrepresented in UN Police components despite explicit commitments to gender-inclusive peacekeeping. Female police personnel comprise small percentages of most national police contributions to UN operations, reflecting broader underrepresentation of women in police institutions globally. Barriers to women's participation include organizational discrimination, cultural stereotypes, inadequate facilities accommodating women, and limited opportunities for advancement. Addressing gender representation requires comprehensive reforms including recruitment policy changes, family

⁶⁹ Padelford, N. J. (1948), "The Use of the Veto", *International Organization*, 2(2): 227-246

⁷⁰ Saint-Claire, Simon de (2004), "UNMIK: The Executive Police Mission", Saint Group, accessed 16 September 2012 from <http://www.saint-claire.org/resources/UNMIK-%20The%20Executive%20Police%20Mission.pdf>

⁷¹ Henry L. Stimson Center, accessed 18 August 2014 from mercury.ethz.ch/.../Files/ISN/.../Stimson_UNPOL_Report_Nov07.pdf

⁷² Stodiek, T. and W. Zellner (2007), "The Creation of Multi-Ethnic Police Services in the Western Balkans: A Record of Mixed Success", Research Project, Hamburg: The Centre for OSCE Research (CORE), accessed 12 October 2014 from www.ssoar.info/ssoar/handle/document/26032

support provisions, and organizational culture transformation reducing discrimination.

The strategic value of increasing women's participation in UN Police operations extends beyond gender equality objectives to operational effectiveness benefits. Research demonstrates that women police officers enhance community engagement, improve intelligence gathering, and increase effectiveness in addressing crimes affecting vulnerable populations. Female police engagement teams have proven particularly effective in building relationships with female community members and developing trust with civilian populations⁷³. Despite these documented benefits, progress in increasing women's representation in UN Police operations remains limited, reflecting deeper institutional barriers within national police forces contributing personnel to UN missions⁷⁴.

Gender-Sensitive Policing Approaches

Gender-sensitive policing approaches recognize that crime patterns, security concerns, and protection needs differ across gender lines, requiring distinct police responses addressing particular vulnerabilities experienced by women and girls⁷⁵. UN Police capacity building for gender-sensitive policing includes training on gender-based violence response, trauma-informed investigation techniques, and protection of vulnerable populations. However, effective implementation of gender-sensitive approaches requires both individual officer training and institutional policy reform establishing expectations for gendered policing responses⁷⁶.

The implementation of gender-sensitive policing approaches faces substantial obstacles in post-conflict environments where institutional capacity for specialized services remains limited and organizational cultures frequently reflect traditional, male-dominated policing models⁷⁷. Gender mainstreaming in security sector reform requires attention to organizational policies, training content, resource allocation, and performance metrics incorporating gender sensitivity

⁷³ Tanner, S. and B. Dupont (2014), "Police Work in International Peace Operation Environments: A Perspective from Canadian Police Officers in the MINUSTAH, Policing and Society, Published Online 12 March 2014: 1-18

⁷⁴ UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations (UNDPKO) (2006), UN Police Magazine, December 2006 (1 st Edition), New York: United Nations

⁷⁵ Rikhye, I. J. et al. (1974), *The Thin Blue Line: International Peacekeeping and Its Future*, London: Yale University Press

⁷⁶ Hills, A. (1997), "Policing, Enforcement and Low Intensity Conflict", *Policing and Society*, 7(4): 291-308

⁷⁷ International Crisis Group (ICG) (2011), *Keeping Haiti Safe: Police Reform, Latin America/Caribbean Briefing No. 26*, Brussels, 8 September 2011, accessed 18 September 2013 from <http://www.crisisgroup.org/en/regions/latin-america-caribbean/haiti/b026-keeping-haiti-safe-police-reform.aspx>

standards. Successful gender-sensitive policing initiatives demonstrate improved outcomes in addressing sexual violence, protecting vulnerable populations, and building community trust⁷⁸. However, sustaining gender-sensitive approaches requires institutional commitment extending beyond individual initiatives to comprehensive organizational transformation.

Protection Mandates and Vulnerable Populations

Protection of civilians, including particular attention to vulnerable populations such as women, children, and ethnic minorities, represents an explicit priority for contemporary UN Police operations. UN Police contribute to protection mandates through direct operational involvement in protecting threatened populations, supporting development of protection capacity within host-country forces, and advocating for protective measures within broader peacekeeping operations⁷⁹. Protection operations require specialized training addressing risk assessment, protective positioning, and victim support provision⁸⁰.

The UN Police role in protection addresses not only direct threats from armed actors but also structural vulnerabilities enabling criminal victimization. Protection of vulnerable populations requires attention to sexual violence prevention, trafficking prevention, forced displacement protection, and safeguarding of children affected by conflict⁸¹. Effective protection requires coordination across multiple actors including military components, humanitarian agencies, civil society organizations, and host-country security forces. UN Police facilitate this coordination while contributing specialized law enforcement expertise addressing crimes targeting vulnerable populations⁸². However, protection effectiveness depends substantially on adequate resourcing and political commitment to protection objectives, frequently competing with other peacekeeping priorities for limited resources.

⁷⁸ Kassin, S. M. et al. (2007), "Police Interviewing and Interrogation: A Self-Report Survey of Police Practices and Beliefs", *Law and Human Behaviour*, 31(4): 381-400

⁷⁹ Kim, C. and M. Metrikas (1997), "Holding a Fragile Peace: The Military and Civilian Components of UNTAC", in M. W. Doyle, I. Johnstone and R. C. Orr (eds.) *Keeping the Peace: Multidimensional UN Peace Operations in Cambodia and El Salvador*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press

⁸⁰ McCormick, D. H. (1997), "From Peacekeeping to Peacebuilding: Restructuring Military and Police Institutions in El Salvador", in M. W. Doyle, I. Johnstone and R. C. Orr (eds.) *Keeping the Peace: Multidimensional UN Peace Operations in Cambodia and El Salvador*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

⁸¹ Saksena, K. P. (1974), *The United Nations and Collective Security: A Historical Analysis*, New Delhi: D K Publishing House

⁸² Ristuccia, C. A. (2000), "The 1935 Sanctions Against Italy: Would Coal and Oil Have Made a Difference?", *European Review of Economic History*, 4(1): 85-110

6.4 Best Practices and Lessons Learned for Future Operations

Lessons emerging from UN Police experience regarding effective policing for peace include the critical importance of early police engagement in peace processes, sustained commitment to capacity building extending beyond initial mission phases, and integration of policing into comprehensive peacebuilding frameworks. Successful UN Police operations demonstrate that effective policing requires institutional development processes respecting local ownership, adequate resource allocation, and attention to long-term sustainability rather than short-term operational gains. Best practices emphasize community engagement as fundamental to police legitimacy and effectiveness, requiring culturally sensitive approaches building trust through demonstration of impartial, effective service provision⁸³. Future UN Police operations should incorporate lessons regarding the importance of pre-deployment training quality, sustained coordination between military and police components, and attention to accountability and human rights compliance as fundamental to mission credibility. Enhanced training approaches should address emerging security challenges including cybercrime, trafficking, and organized crime, requiring capacity building in specialized investigation techniques⁸⁴. Lessons regarding gender integration emphasize that women's representation requires comprehensive reform addressing recruitment, retention, advancement, and organizational culture change rather than superficial inclusion initiatives. Effective police reform requires patience regarding institutional change timelines, recognition that sustainable reform develops over years rather than months, and commitment to supporting local institutions through extended transition phases⁸⁵.

Definition, Rationale and Scope

The protection of civilians in United Nations peacekeeping is defined as all necessary means, up to and including the use of United Nations Police, aimed at preventing or responding to threats of physical violence against civilians, within capabilities and areas of operations, and without prejudice to the responsibility of the host government^{86, 87}. UN peacekeeping

⁸³ UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations (UNDPKO) (2009), UN Police Magazine, July 2009 (3rd edition), New York: United Nations

⁸⁴ UN Police Division, Department of Peacekeeping Operations (UNDP DPKO) (2013), United Nations Police - On Duty for Peace (2008-2012), New York: United Nations

⁸⁵ Wydra, Marcin (2014), Personal Interview, Former Police Unit Coordinator, Selection and Recruitment Section, UN Police Division, UN Headquarters, New York, 21 March 2014

⁸⁶ DPKO/DFS Policy on the Protection of Civilians in United Nations Peacekeeping, Ref. 2015/07 (2015), paragraph 13.

⁸⁷ The Inter-Agency Standing Committee (IASC) defines 'protection' as "all activities aimed at obtaining full

operations implement POC activities through a three tiered approach: Tier I – protection through dialogue and engagement; Tier II – provision of physical protection; and Tier III – establishment of a protective environment. UN Police have a role in all three tiers.

The mission of UN Police is to enhance international peace and security by supporting Member-States in conflict, post-conflict and other crisis situations. Its goal is to realize effective, efficient, representative, responsive and accountable police services that serve and protect the population. To that end, United Nations Police build and support or, where mandated, act as a substitute or partial substitute for host-State police capacity to prevent and detect crime, protect life and property and maintain public order and safety, in adherence to the rule of law and international human rights law⁸⁸. Today the United Nations police are working beyond traditionally written rules in rulebook. They are tutoring the local police of harmed and survived land. UN Police have sculpted a vivid identity for themselves. It changed the perspective of the world that United Nations Police is not only for peacekeeping operations but also for teaching, mentoring and preparing guidelines for the aggrieved country and for all country around the world irrespective of the status whether it is a First world country, second world country or a third world country. So this study emphasize two most important segments of UN Police which are capacity building and law enforcement⁸⁹.

Research Questions

1. How the United Nations Police has evolved and developed over time in peacekeeping mission.

Hypotheses

1. The Efficacy of United Nations Police is eroded by the lack of cooperation and coordination with other leads in the field.

Research Methodology

respect for the rights of the individual in accordance with the letter and the spirit of the relevant bodies of law (i.e. International Human Rights Law (IHRL), International Humanitarian Law (IHL), International Refugee Law (IRL).” DPKO-DFS defined POC is thus complementary to, but distinct from, IASC-defined protection.

⁸⁸<https://police.un.org/en>

⁸⁹ UN Document (2014), United Nations Police in Peacekeeping Operations and Special Political Missions, Ref. 2014.01, 1 February

The research adopts a doctrinal and analytical methodology. Primary sources include the UN Charter, resolutions, and official UN Police reports UNCOPS, UN documents such as reports of the Secretary-General, the Security Council resolutions, and the UN policy and guidance documents. Secondary sources consist of books, research articles, journals, and reports by international organizations Reports published by advocacy groups, Interviews of UN Police . Case studies of selected conflicts are used to support critical analysis.

Chapterization

This study has been dissected into following chapters. This introductory chapter also known as chapter one is followed up by chapter second titled “ Evolution and challenges faced in United Nations peacekeeping operations. The “Conclusion chapter summarizes the main findings of the preceding chapter which is chapter 2. It then examines the lessons that could be learnt from the experiences of the UN Police and the policy implications that can be drawn from the study to make the UN Police more effective and efficient in future UN peacekeeping operations.

Chapter -2

Evolution and challenges in United Nations peacekeeping operations

The main purpose of the League of Nations and the United Nations is to maintain the international peace and security established after the end of the war; world war. The founding documents of the League of Nations and the United Nations, viz. The constitution and charter each provide that these organizations are to: Achieve this objective through collective security systems. collective security system It means the principle of "one for all, all for one." This system is revolutionary as it is supposed to provide: Ensure the security of each peace-loving member state by guaranteeing the exercise of collective power In the event of an attack against a participant in a collective security system. This means that A collective security system “ensures the security of all nations through the actions of all nations; To all countries that can call into question the existing order by arbitrarily invoking policies: power”⁹⁰. Ensuring collective use of force as punishment An attacker may launch an attack or even consider launching an attack. The League of Nations and the United Nations believed that a system of collective security was necessary. Contributed more to lasting international peace and security than the system. The balance of power that prevailed

⁹⁰ Claude 1962b: 110

before World War I. However, it is not just that the functioning of the League's collective security system is tainted. Not just the gaps that exist in league agreements, but also actual incident. The appeasement of invaders and victims led to World War II. Despite all the limitations, It must be acknowledged that the league agreement was the first attempt at introduction. The concept of collective security. The failure of the League gave way to the United Nations. Its collective security system was clearly an improvement over the collective alliance. However, over time, the UN's collective security proved ineffective. It is not enough to solve post-war problems. The system of collective security established by the United Nations Charter paved the way for evolution. UN peacekeeping Operations in hotspots served as a buffer between peacekeeping operations. Hostile parties could have controlled the ceasefire line and prevented a great power attack. UN Peacekeeping Police Participated in the Cold War. After the Cold War, UN peacekeeping operations matured. Its special character makes it one of the main activities of the United Nations. It is the world's primary conflict management tool⁹¹. But that's not the case Military personnel have the necessary skills and training and are capable of performing all missions a multidimensional problem. So what is needed after the initial establishment of a peacekeeping force. The operation consists of the deployment of a large number of international civilian personnel. Specific skills and experience linked to post-conflict recovery. From All international civilians, the United Nations Police became one of the most important organizations. An essential component of UN peacekeeping operations as other reconstruction operations are not possible It was carried out without establishing public order and morals. This chapter begins by providing a general understanding of collective security. The system and the prerequisites necessary for its effective operation. Next, the main features of collective security in the League of Nations are discussed, Reason for failure. We will also analyse how the United Nations collective security system works. Improve compared to the league and identify factors that led to failure. Implementation of the United Nations collective security system. The rest of this chapter specifically deals with: How United Nations peacekeeping operations were born, developed, and evolved during the Cold War. And why did peacekeeping undergo fundamental changes after the Cold War? So this Highlighting the characteristics and different needs of multifunctional peacekeeping staff involved in restoration work. This chapter ends with a summary of Similarities and differences between traditional and multifunctional

⁹¹ Harland 2006: 183

peacekeeping operations.

Balance of Power System

Before the concept of collective security emerged, checks and balances were the main means of managing conflicts between states. The generally accepted view among states was that their interests in security, survival, territorial integrity, and political independence were best realized creating balance among states. In doing so, the state ensured that no particular state or group of states became so powerful that it threatened the very existence of other states or groups of states. Equality of power was seen as a way to resolve wars and conflicts between nations. As a result, the nineteenth century was characterized by a system of alliances and states concerned with achieving or maintaining a balance of power⁹². Balance of power refers to a system in which "power is distributed equally among multiple countries." approximately equal⁹³". This is a situation in which "power is literally balanced and neutralized by equal forces⁹⁴". In this system, war was possible at any time, and the state devoted scant resources to consistent preparation. In fact, the balance of power system has states constantly preparing for war, which led to the outbreak of war. This system did not bring lasting peace. World War I is a good example. However, the experience of World War I showed that the sophistication of weapons made wars far more destructive and devastating than before, and leaders understood that future wars could lead to extinction of humanity. Under these circumstances, a new and innovative idea of collective security emerged as the basis of international security and was consciously seen as an alternative to it. A traditional system of checks and balances, which must ensure lasting peace and security. Efforts in this direction led to the creation of the Covenant of the League of Nations. This was the first official attempt to maintain international peace and security through a system of collective security. Collective security requires that the international community adopt a collective attitude toward aggression and be prepared to act by force against aggressors on behalf of victims, if necessary. This means that war can be avoided by "building and leveraging a complex network of national commitments and international mechanisms to provide a credible threat to potential aggressors and a credible promise of effective action to victims of potential

⁹² Sheehan 1996: 129-132

⁹³ Morgenthau 1978: 179

⁹⁴ Claude 1962a: 13; 18

aggression. "collective measures ranging from diplomatic boycotts to military sanctions through economic pressure to ensure peace⁹⁵". Simply put, collective security is in relations between nations, the principle that each is the guardian of his brother. All nations act on the principle of "one for all and all for one," which ensures the security of each nation⁹⁶. A system of collective security is different from a system of checks and balances. Indeed, even if the balance of the force system suggests that it is disturbed by the balance of forces; In the event of an invasion, the collective security system is based on the fact that the invasion can be resisted thanks to the overwhelming superiority of the armed forces of all peace-loving countries. In other words, unlike the equilibrium state, Under conditions of collective security, power can only be used for defensive and non-offensive purposes⁹⁷. Moreover, collective security means a common and universal bond, not one based on competition. It unites countries in responding to any situation that threatens the peace and security of other members of the community. Indeed, collective security requires states to identify their national interests, which are best served when the security and interests of all other states are guaranteed. Collective security regimes thus include cooperation to ensure security and, as a result, Conflicts between nations are "random phenomena." Balance of power, on the other hand, divides states into opposing groups that compete for more power. This happens because each country perceives its own interests as different from the interests of all other countries. States engage in conflict or resist invasion only when their security is threatened. Therefore, competition and conflict are the main characteristics of a balance of power system, and the balance of power is therefore more favorable to war and conflict⁹⁸. Furthermore, the balance of the power system is decentralized to the extent that member states act autonomously to influence the power situation. He is only proposing "individualistic or particularistic solutions to security problems." However, on the other hand, collective security systems. This is because it aims to solve security problems by creating "institutional mechanisms capable of managing and coordinating policies" and "national resources". concerned with maintaining the general order⁹⁹" Collective security systems are therefore better and more sustainable than peace and balance of forces for maintaining peace. Security between nations. At the same time, Claude identified a number of preconditions that must be met for a collective

⁹⁵ Claude 1971: 247

⁹⁶ Saxena 1974: 4-5

⁹⁷ Claude 1971: 257

⁹⁸ Claude 1962b: 144-147

⁹⁹ Claude 1962b: 113-114

security system to function effectively. For better understanding, these assumptions are divided into two groups: subjective collective security requirements and objective collective security requirements. The first precondition of the subjective requirement is the concept of "the indivisibility of peace." This means that in order to deter aggression and ensure the safety of the victims of aggression, all states in the international community must recognize the fact that the peace and order of one country depends on the state of peace in other countries. In an era of increasing interconnectivity and globalization, states cannot ignore wars in remote areas land. It would not be wrong to say that unless the aggressive exploitation of a state is immediately countered by swift and effective sanctions, it is likely that "unchecked aggression in one direction will embolden criminals and enable them to invade in other directions", which in turn will threaten international peace and security¹⁰⁰. The second subjective requirement emphasizes that all states of the world must take a "collective responsibility" in maintaining international peace and security. When a state is part of a collective security system, its actions are directed by international organizations. "a situation involving the use of coercive means". Moreover, collective security regimes are based on the principle of "certainty", which guarantees that in case of aggression, the aggressor, whoever he may be, will have to face the collective forces of the international community. Ensuring that collective power is harnessed to prevent aggression is essential to the survival of collective security systems. Indeed, if warnings are not heeded and force is not used effectively, or if aggressors are released with impunity, the entire collective security system will surely be called a farce. Another subjective condition necessary for collective security to function is "impartiality." In other words, the collective security system can never be destroyed. You will succeed if you are motivated by your emotions and personal interests. The principle of "anonymity" therefore becomes one of the key elements of collective security. Furthermore, it is this principle that distinguishes systems of collective security from systems of balance of power. "He who commits aggression is the enemy of all; he who resists aggression is the friend of all". However, the most important subjective requirement for collective security to function is "trust" in the state¹⁰¹ members of collective security We must be confident that this system will not only succeed in maintaining international peace and security, but will also contribute to strengthening national security in the long run.

¹⁰⁰ Claude 1971: 251

¹⁰¹ Claude 1971: 255

Therefore, a state may be obliged to take all necessary measures against the aggressor. No matter what their personality is. Regarding objective requirements, one of the first preconditions of a collective security system is that there are slight differences in the relative powers of the member states of the collective security system. As Claude points out, "the existence of several great powers of approximately equal strength is essential for collective security" In other words, equality among member states means that there is no hegemony and that the opinions of several great powers have equal weight. Therefore they can In case of aggression, it is better to cooperate with each other. The second objective condition necessary for collective security is the "substantive universality of a sense of belonging"¹⁰². This means that all countries in the international community have the right to become members of the collective security system. Collective security systems are general in nature insofar as they aim to "protect each state from specific aggression"¹⁰³ really hard to predict State behaviour. There is no way to identify potential attackers. Any country can take an aggressive position at any time. But that would be unfair Refusal to join a nation solely on the basis that it may be involved in future invasions. Claude believes that there is no perfect collective security system. Without the participation of major powers. Indeed, unless a great power becomes a member of a collective security system, it is very difficult for other members to effectively punish the aggressor. It is likely that great powers will support the aggressor, contrary to the goals and objectives of the collective security system. The collective system works when each state is demilitarized to the extent that a potential aggressor cannot wage a prolonged war against the collective power of collective security members of a collective security system¹⁰⁴. The final objective requirement for a collective security system is the creation of legal mechanisms and institutional structures that are "capable of giving institutional expression." What is needed is a sophisticated organizational mechanism with the power to decide "when and against which States sanctions should be applied, the nature of any prohibitions to be instituted, the observance of obligations owed by States, and the planning and direction of collective actions deemed necessary for the implementation of collective measures." security system"¹⁰⁵. For a collective security system to function effectively, both subjective and objective preconditions must exist.

¹⁰² Claude 1971: 256

¹⁰³ Claude 1971: 257

¹⁰⁴ Claude 1971: 259

¹⁰⁵ Claude 1971: 260

Emergence of Collective Security

In response to the failure of the balance of power system, the idea of collective security emerged as a more progressive and cooperative alternative aimed at preventing conflicts through unity rather than rivalry. This concept was based on the fundamental principle that an attack on one state would be considered an attack on all states, thereby ensuring that aggression would be met with a unified and collective response. The underlying assumption was that no state would risk initiating conflict if it knew that it would face the combined strength of the entire international community. Collective security thus sought to replace the competitive nature of international politics with a system rooted in cooperation, mutual trust, and shared responsibility, where all states would work together to maintain peace and deter aggression¹⁰⁶.

Core Principles of Collective Security

The effectiveness of collective security depends on several key principles that guide its functioning, including the idea of the indivisibility of peace, which suggests that peace in one part of the world is closely linked to peace in other regions, making it essential for all states to respond to threats wherever they occur. Another important principle is collective responsibility, which requires states to prioritize the interests of the international community over their own narrow national interests, demonstrating a willingness to cooperate and contribute to the maintenance of global peace. The principle of certainty is also crucial, as it ensures that any act of aggression will be met with a definite and strong response, thereby deterring potential aggressors. Additionally, impartiality plays a significant role, as the system must operate without bias or favoritism, treating all states equally regardless of their power or status. Finally, the success of collective security relies heavily on the confidence and trust of member states in the system's ability to protect their interests and maintain peace effectively.

Collective Security in the League of Nations

The League of Nations represented the first formal attempt to implement the concept of collective security at the international level, with its Covenant outlining the responsibilities of member states to respect each other's sovereignty and resolve disputes peacefully. The League aimed to prevent war by encouraging cooperation and imposing collective sanctions against

¹⁰⁶ Agorzo, B. K. (2009), "Filling the „Security Gap“ in Post-Conflict Situations: Could Formed Police Units Make a Difference?", *International Peacekeeping*, 16(2): 287-294

aggressors; however, despite its ambitious goals, it faced several significant challenges that ultimately led to its failure. One of the major weaknesses of the League was the absence of key powers such as the United States, which limited its authority and effectiveness. Additionally, the League lacked a strong enforcement mechanism, relying on the voluntary cooperation of member states to implement its decisions. This weakness became evident in cases such as the Japanese invasion of Manchuria and the Italian attack on Ethiopia, where the League failed to take decisive action, thereby undermining its credibility and allowing aggressive behavior to continue unchecked, ultimately contributing to the outbreak of the Second World War¹⁰⁷.

Collective Security in United Nations

Despite the failure to effectively implement the League's collective security system and the disastrous consequences of World War II, members of the international community never lost faith in the idea of collective security. They were convinced of the future world War can only be avoided by building improved collective security systems¹⁰⁸. During the formulation of the UN Charter, attempts were made to overcome the shortcomings of the Association Agreement and strengthen the system of collective security in the CIS countries. Based on the experience of the league. Nations Charter defines effective collective action in Chapters 6 and 7. Chapter 6 of the United Nations Charter, "Peaceful Settlement of Disputes¹⁰⁹." It sought to find solutions to disputes (based on a proactive approach) through "negotiation, investigation, conciliation, conciliation, arbitration, judicial settlement, and appeals to local authorities." agency, arrangement, or other peaceful means. Chapter VI of the United Nations Charter is based on the League system for the peaceful settlement of disputes¹¹⁰. Chapter VII comes into effect only if all other peaceful attempts to resolve the dispute have failed and the threat or violation of the peace continues. Chapter 7 of the United Nations Charter ("Action in case of threats to the peace, breaches of the peace and law") ``aggression") recognized the existence of any threat to peace and gave the Security Council the power to suppress any act of aggression. Chapter 7 shows the progress of the United Nations Charter regarding the terms of the federation. If the parties do not respect or agree to these measures, the Security Council shall: Use of force, such as complete or

¹⁰⁷ Agorzo, B. K. (2009), "Filling the „Security Gap“ in Post-Conflict Situations: Could Formed Police Units Make a Difference?", *International Peacekeeping*, 16(2): 287-294

¹⁰⁸ Autesserre, Séverine (2014), Personal Interview, Associate Professor, Department of Political Science, Barnard College, Columbia University, New York, 6 March 2014

¹⁰⁹ <https://www.un.org/en/about-us/un-charter/full-text>

¹¹⁰ Goodrich 1947: 14-15

partial suspension of all means of communication and severance of diplomatic relations (Article 41). If these measures prove insufficient, the Security Council has the right to take measures involving the air force, navy and army (Article 42). Member States are required to provide the Armed Forces Security Council with support and means (including rights of passage) to enforce the decisions taken by the Armed Forces Security Council (Article 43). The United Nations Charter also provides for the creation of a "Committee of Arms to advise and assist the Security Council on all matters relating to hostilities." " as well as plans for the use of force (Articles 46 and 47). The commission was to sign an agreement with each member state of the United Nations. The United Nations shall determine what forces, assistance and other means may be made available to the United Nations for collective enforcement action. The collective security provisions of the United Nations Charter are much stricter than those of the League Covenant. Unlike the league constitution, many obligations were imposed. It is explicitly identified as a member state in the United Nations Charter. These obligations have been clubbed together as „Principles binding upon all Members“ which ensure that members refrain from threat or use of force in international relations. For instance, according to Articles 2.2 and 4, to become members of the United Nations, the states need to be „peace-loving“, able and willing to meet the objectives of the UN Charter. This principle states that peace-loving nations will never resort to aggression to resolve their differences; Contribute to strengthening collective security. Member States are required to resolve disputes by peaceful means in a manner that does not endanger international peace and security (Article 2.3). “Member States are also required to refrain from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any State” (Article 2.4). Furthermore, Member States are expected to support the United Nations in any actions taken pursuant to these provisions. The United Nations Charter provides that the United Nations will not provide aid to countries that have taken preventive or coercive measures (Article 2.5). Moreover, all United Nations member states are expected to implement the decisions of the Security Council in order to maintain international peace and security (Article 48)¹¹¹. Additionally, the UN Charter contains provisions imposing limits on the use of force by member states. For instance, the Preamble to the UN Charter has identified that in order to preserve international peace and security, the armed force shall not be employed except in the common interest. In accordance

¹¹¹Benner, T. et al. (2008), “Doctrine Development in the UN Peacebuilding Apparatus: The Case of UN Constabulary Police, 1999-2006”, Paper presented on March 29, 2008 at the 49th International Studies Association Convention: San Francisco

with Article 5, the members can even be suspended from the exercise of rights and privileges of UN membership if any preventive or enforcement action has been taken against them by the Security Council. Similarly, members can be expelled from the United Nations under Article 6 if they have systematically violated the principles of the Charter of the United Nations. This sends a clear signal: unlike League members, UN members cannot afford to underestimate collective security¹¹². The drafters of the United Nations Charter believed that the idea of losing their name and reputation on the international stage would deter aggressive actions by member states. Because of the "negligible diversion of the world's human and economic resources to armaments," the Security Council, together with the Armed Forces Committee, is responsible for developing and submitting to Member States a plan for the establishment of an arms control system (Article 26). Furthermore, under Article 53.1¹¹³, Member States may not take enforcement measures under regional agreements or through regional bodies without national approval. The UN's collective security system is also stronger than the League system in terms of the distribution of responsibilities between key institutions. The Covenant of the League of Nations did not specify a central body responsible for organizing and directing collective action against aggression. Furthermore, the agreement failed to define the scope of liability. League councils and parliaments have become chaotic and unable to take collective action in a timely manner. In contrast, the United Nations Charter gives the Security Council "primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security and the authority to act on behalf of all members of the United Nations" (Article 24). The Security Council has the power to resolve disputes through pacification and collective coercion. However, the necessity to establish a central coordinating body to ensure the effective implementation of the necessary measures against aggression. This was approved by the League at its 1921 general meeting during the resolution and the imposition of sanctions against Italy¹¹⁴. Unlike the League Council, the Security Council has discretionary powers; to confirm the existence of threats to peace or acts of aggression and recommend and decide on measures to be taken to ensure collective security (Article 39)¹¹⁵. In particular, permanent Security Council veto-wielding members are expected to play a leading role in ensuring collective action against an aggressor.

¹¹² UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations (UNDPKO) (2013b), UN Police Magazine, July 2013 (11th edition), New York: United Nations

¹¹³ UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations (UNDPKO) (2009), UN Police Magazine, July 2009 (3rd edition), New York: United Nations

¹¹⁴ Goodrich 1947: 17

¹¹⁵ O'Neill, W. G. (2005), "Police Reform in Post-Conflict Societies: What We Know and What We Still Need to Know", Policy Paper, The Security-Development Nexus Program, New York: International Peace Academy

Even the General Assembly is empowered to discuss, discuss and consider any matter relating to peace and security that is brought before it by any member or the Security Council (Article 11.2). The voting method provided for in the Pact constitutes a serious obstacle to the work Collective Security League. All questions related to war and aggression were decided on the basis of the principle of unanimity (article 5). Only one negative vote was needed to prevent the League Council from taking any decision. By exercising negative vote, it was possible for a member accused of threatening peace, to avoid any effective action by the Council, as it “happened in the case of Japanese aggression in Manchuria in 1931 and the Italian aggression in Ethiopia in 1935¹¹⁶”. As a result, in most cases the Security Council was unable to answer questions that threatened peace and security. In contrast, the UN Security Council's voting mechanism is based on the principle of majority rule, which requires the consent of all permanent members on substantive issues. (Article 27.3). Moreover, unlike the League of Nations, the veto is limited to the permanent members of the Security Council. The Security Council's voting mechanism thus allowed the United Nations to make decisions that were binding on member states. This means that members are obligated to take certain actions if a decision to act is made¹¹⁷. In reality, however, the United Nations collective security system suffered the same fate as the League. Instead of peace-loving nations being fair and united, after the war During this period, the international community became polarized into two blocs: the US-led bloc and the Soviet-led bloc. It soon became clear that the permanent members of the Security Council differed on almost every issue. They were guided by national rather than collective interests. The United States and the Soviet Union have been at odds in virtually every conflict around the world, including Iran's grievances against the Soviet Union in 1946, the Palestinian issue, the Arab-Israeli conflict, the India-Pakistan war, and the Congo crisis. The principle of „anonymity“ was violated as force was often used to defend allies and not every member of the United Nations. The unbridgeable differences amongst the permanent members resulted in the frequent use of veto, leading to deadlock in the Security Council¹¹⁸. The veto not only immunized the permanent members from any actions taken within the framework of collective security, but also allowed them to commit aggression without any restrictions.

¹¹⁶ Ethiopia: From prehistory to the Aksumite kingdom

¹¹⁷ Rausch, C. (2002), “The Assumption of Authority in Kosovo and East Timor: Legal and Practical Implications”, in R. Dwan (ed.) *Executive Policing: Enforcing the Law in Peace Operations*, (SIPRI Research Report No.16), Oxford: Oxford University Press

¹¹⁸ Smith, J. G. et al. (2007a), *From Timor-Leste to Darfur: New Initiatives for Enhancing UN Civilian Policing Capacity*, Issue brief (Henry Stimson Center), Washington DC: Henry Stimson Center

Fear of being punished or expelled from an international organization. For example, the United Nations did not react when Communist China annexed Tibet in 1951, when The Soviet Union attacked Hungary in 1956, as well as when the United States invaded Guatemala in 1954 and the Dominican Republic in 1965¹¹⁹. Furthermore, in some crisis situations (in which the superpowers were not directly involved), the Security Council failed to identify the aggressor because it vetoed it to prevent the Security Council from making a decision. For example, when the Greek crisis was brought before the Security Council in 1947, it could not decide who the aggressor was since the Soviet Union exercised its veto¹²⁰. A similar situation had developed during the India-Pakistan war of 1971 where it became impossible to hold either United States – backed Pakistan or Soviet Union – supported India responsible for aggression¹²¹. Further, it was because of these differences that the Military Staff Committee, which was expected to organize and lead the enforcement action of the United Nations, became defunct. There have been disagreements among the permanent members on issues such as the size and composition of the armed forces that should be carried out by the permanent members, the provision bases, the location of forces during periods of inactivity and the timing of their withdrawal. In particular, the United States preferred that the permanent forces be well armed, with no restrictions on the number of troops each permanent member could provide, and that they be readily available when needed. However, the Soviet Union believed that armies should be small and that the permanent members should provide an equal number of troops, so that no one country monopolized military planning and organization. However, these differences were never resolved, and as a result the United Nations had neither military power at its disposal nor the means to enforce its decisions¹²². Furthermore, because of these differences, UN member states were "unsure" whether collective measures could be applied when the aggressor was a permanent member of the UN Security Council. Furthermore, each time one of the superpowers tried to influence the United Nations to make a decision to blame the other for the invasion, member states stood by. As a result, no economic or military coercive measures were taken or even proposed prior to the Korean War, even though crisis situations existed in Greece, Spain, Indonesia, and Israel¹²³.

Over time, the permanent members of the Security Council realized that irreconcilable

¹¹⁹ Michalak 1971: 63

¹²⁰ Padelford 1948: 237-239

¹²¹ Mustafa 1972: 46-47

¹²² Goodrich 1974: 113-114

¹²³ MacIver 1974: 87

differences could not be resolved by the United Nations and became convinced that the United Nations collective security system was unable to provide a safe environment for refugees. promote their national interests; For example, the Soviet Union believed that the United Nations was created by the United States and Western powers to threaten its existence. And grow. Therefore, instead of relying on the United Nations, the Soviet Union became dependent on military power, communist organizations, and the Communist Party ideology to promote national interests¹²⁴. Soviet lack of confidence in the United Nations in general and the Security Council in particular led to periodic conflicts. Exercise of veto by the Soviet Union. Meanwhile, the United States and its allies agreed that the Security Council was paralyzed by the Soviet Union's frequent vetoes. Under these circumstances, they decided that it was impossible to rely on the United Nations to pursue their national interests, so Western countries, led by the United States, established the United Nations. The North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) was established to counter the Soviet threat to its security¹²⁵. The UN's collective security system is thus ineffective due to the "low confidence" of the permanent members in the UN's ability to confront threats to international peace and security and promote long-term national security. Polarization of international politics, a sense of "collectiveness" could never be fostered within a "divided" Security Council, and thus the United Nations collective security system was rendered ineffective due to the polarization of international politics and the cold war between the two blocs. Some see the UN's responses to the Korean crisis in 1950 and the Persian Gulf crisis in 1990 as examples of UN collective security in action. But you can't call them the United Nations. Because it did not meet the criteria for a collective security system, operations within that framework were prohibited. During the Korean crisis, the Security Council for the first time adopted a resolution directly condemning North Korea's aggression against a sovereign nation and calling for universal action to end that aggression. However, collective measures against North Korea are not considered UN actions based on the collective security regime. This is because there was no When the issue of the Korean crisis was presented to the permanent members of the Security Council, it was carried out jointly among the permanent members. The resolution was adopted by the Security Council¹²⁶.

¹²⁴ Tanner, S. and B. Dupont (2014), "Police Work in International Peace Operation Environments: A Perspective from Canadian Police Officers in the MINUSTAH, Policing and Society, Published Online 12 March 2014: 1-18

¹²⁵ MacIver 1974: 94-95

¹²⁶ UN Office of Internal Oversight Services (UNOIOS) (2013), Audit of UN Police Capacity Building Programmes in UNOCI, Audit Report 2013/006.

Security Council¹²⁷ at a time when Soviet delegates were boycotting Security Council meetings and were not present to debate and vote on resolutions. Furthermore, in Korean, In this crisis, UN member states have failed to take on "collective responsibility" to promote international peace and security. It's not a common interest. In particular, by attacking North Korea, the United States sought to achieve its national goal of "containing" the growing influence of the Soviet Union in North and South Korea. South Korea viewed Soviet expansion in any region of the world as a threat to its security and national interests¹²⁸. Furthermore, the United Nations has He conducted military operations during the Korean War. Instead, the military was placed under the unified command of the United States and authorized to "employ the armed forces of the United States." "National Flag During Operations Against North Korea¹²⁹" General Douglas MacArthur was appointed commander-in-chief of the Korean Unified Forces, including the Republic of Korea Army. Additionally, the United States provided the bulk of the forces to resist the invasion: 50 percent of the ground forces, 85 percent of the navy, and more than 90 percent of the air forces. Even American contributions to relief and reconstruction efforts played an important role¹³⁰. All activities during the Korean crisis were carried out by the United States. Under the cover of the United Nations. In the Korean crisis, the United Nations identified the aggressor and Member States must take the necessary measures. In other words, the UN's involvement in the Korean crisis has been symbolic and not decisive. It would be wrong to say that if Security Council resolutions and multilateral forces placed under the UN flag "were symbols of enormous moral and psychological significance, they above all conferred international legitimacy on the efforts by the United States to help South Korea repel aggression¹³¹". In order to overcome future Soviet vetoes on decisions related to conflict situations, a Peace Coalition resolution was submitted to the General Assembly at American direction, "nullifying the effect of the Soviet veto". This resolution authorized the General Assembly to consider any issues that may arise. The Security Council is deadlocked over the veto. According to the Peaceful Reunification Resolution, if the General Assembly is not in session, it may be convened under a state of emergency. Session of seven members of the Security Council. The General Assembly was also given the power to

¹²⁷ United Nations (1994), UN Criminal Justice Standards for Policing - Police Handbook, New York: United Nations

¹²⁸ Wolfers 1962: 174

¹²⁹ United Nations Document 1950

¹³⁰ Bennett 1988: 153

¹³¹ Koshy, N. (1997), "The United Nations and the Gulf Crisis", *Economic and Political Weekly*, 32(47): 3011-3020

recommend measures, including the use of force, and to appeal to the people. Member States must act accordingly to maintain peace¹³². This resolution was adopted by the General Assembly despite strong opposition from all countries. Soviet union. This amounts to transferring the authority to manage conflicts around the world from the Security Council to the General Assembly. Likewise, during the Gulf crisis in the 1990s, the measures taken against Iraq could not be qualified as collective security measures. This is because there is no “collective responsibility”. UN members took over. Instead, they were motivated by the national interests of Western countries. The free flow of oil was necessary for the survival of the American economy. And the West would not have been able to if Iraq continued to control a fifth of the world's oil reserves in Kuwait. Furthermore, it is important to note that the United States responded unilaterally on the same day as the invasion of Iraq, prior to the adoption of Security Council Resolution 661 calling for the imposition of economic and arms sanctions against Iraq. It froze Iraqi and Kuwaiti assets in banks in the United States, prohibited trade and transactions with Iraq, and prohibited air and sea travel to Iraqi ports. After Following the example of the United States, the European Community and Japan also banned oil from Iraq and Kuwait and restricted arms sales to these countries. This We see that the United States and other countries were in a hurry to protect their national interests and did not wait for the United Nations to think and act after the Iraq War invasion of Kuwait¹³³.

Emergence of Peacekeeping Operations

In response to the limitations of collective security, the United Nations developed peacekeeping operations as a more flexible and pragmatic approach to managing conflicts, focusing on maintaining stability and preventing the escalation of violence rather than directly confronting aggressors. Peacekeeping operations involve the deployment of neutral and impartial forces to conflict areas, where they monitor ceasefires, separate opposing parties, and create conditions conducive to peaceful resolution, thereby acting as a buffer that helps maintain peace without imposing solutions or engaging in combat¹³⁴.

¹³² United Nations Document 1950b: 10

¹³³ Laws, J. (2010), “Culture, Customs and the Law in Southern Sudan”, *Peacekeepers’ Diaries* 2010, accessed 12 December 2014 from <http://www.rcmp-grc.gc.ca/po-mp/civpol/indexeng.htm>

¹³⁴ Goodrich, L. M. (1974), “Maintaining Peace and Security”, in L. M. Goodrich, *United Nations in a Changing World*, London: Columbia University Press

Traditional Peacekeeping Operations

During the Cold War period, peacekeeping operations were relatively limited in scope and focused primarily on conflicts between states, with missions designed to monitor ceasefires and maintain stability under strict principles of consent, impartiality, and non-use of force except in self-defence. These operations were generally successful in preventing the escalation of conflicts, as they were accepted by the parties involved and operated in a neutral manner, allowing them to fulfil their mandates effectively without becoming entangled in political or military disputes¹³⁵.

Evolution into Modern Peacekeeping

With the end of the Cold War, the nature of conflicts changed significantly, shifting from inter-state wars to intra-state conflicts involving civil wars, ethnic tensions, and political instability, which required a more comprehensive approach to peacekeeping¹³⁶. Modern peacekeeping operations have therefore evolved to include a wide range of functions, such as supporting democratic governance, protecting human rights, assisting in the reconstruction of institutions, and providing humanitarian aid, making them more complex and multidimensional in nature, involving not only military personnel but also civilian experts and international organizations working together to address the root causes of conflict and promote sustainable peace¹³⁷.

Challenges in Contemporary Peacekeeping

Despite these advancements, modern peacekeeping operations face numerous challenges, including the complexity of internal conflicts, which often involve multiple actors with competing interests, making it difficult to achieve lasting solutions, as well as political interference by powerful states, which can influence decision-making and undermine the neutrality of operations¹³⁸. Additionally, issues such as inadequate funding, lack of resources, and the safety of peacekeepers in hostile environments further complicate the effectiveness of

¹³⁵ Hartz, H. (1999), "CIVPOL: The UN Instrument for Police Reform", *International Peacekeeping*, 6(2): 179-190

¹³⁶ Call, C. T. (2003), *Challenges in Police Reform: Promoting Effectiveness and Accountability*, IPA Policy Report, New York: International Peace Academy

¹³⁷ Bailey, M. et al. (1998), "HAITI: Military-Police Partnership for Public Security", in R. B. Oakley, M. J. Dziedzic and E. M. Goldberg (eds.) *Policing The New World Disorder – Peace Operations and Public Security*, Washington DC: National Defense University Press

¹³⁸ Call, C. T. (2003), *Challenges in Police Reform: Promoting Effectiveness and Accountability*, IPA Policy Report, New York: International Peace Academy

these missions, highlighting the need for continued reform and adaptation in response to evolving global challenges.

Conclusion

The concept of collective security represents a significant shift in the approach to maintaining international peace, moving away from competition and rivalry towards cooperation and shared responsibility. While the system has faced numerous challenges in practice, it remains a fundamental principle in international relations, providing a framework for collective action against aggression. The emergence and evolution of peacekeeping operations demonstrate the ability of the international community to adapt to changing circumstances and develop new mechanisms for managing conflicts. Ultimately, the success of these efforts depends on the willingness of states to cooperate, uphold the principles of justice and equality, and prioritize the collective good over individual interests, recognizing that in an increasingly interconnected world, lasting peace can only be achieved through unity and mutual trust¹³⁹.

¹³⁹ Chappell, D. and J. Evans (1999), "The Role, Preparation and Performance of Civilian Police in United Nations Peacekeeping Operations", *Criminal Law Forum*, 10: 171-271