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# WHEN THE GUARDIAN FAILS: INSTITUTIONAL BREAKDOWN AND THE CRISIS OF TRIBAL LAND PROTECTION IN JHARKHAND

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## ABSTRACT

Jharkhand is home to one of India's largest tribal populations, yet tribal communities continue to lose their land at an alarming rate, not because the law fails to protect them, but because the institutions meant to enforce that law have collapsed under the weight of systemic dysfunction. This article examines three key institutions that form the front line of tribal land protection in Jharkhand: The Scheduled Area Regulation (SAR) Courts, the Gram Sabhas established under the Panchayats (Extension to Scheduled Areas) Act, 1996 (PESA), and the Jharbhoomi digital land records platform. Drawing on judicial decisions, legislative frameworks and government report, this article argues that the failure of these institutions is not accidental or incidental, it is structural. Each institution suffers from a common disease: a deep and persistent gap between what the law promises on paper and what actually happens on the ground. The article further examines the dormant powers of the Fifth Schedule and Tribal Advisory Council, which remain constitutionally available but politically unused. The article concludes that tribal land protection in Jharkhand requires not merely procedural fixes, but a fundamental reimagining of institutional design, accountability, and political will.

**Keywords:** Tribal land rights, SAR Courts, PESA, Gram Sabha, Jharbhoomi, Fifth Schedule, institutional failure, Jharkhand, Scheduled Areas, Land alienation.

## I. INTRODUCTION: THE PARADOX OF PROTECTED LAND LOSS

Imagine you have a lock on your door, keys in your pocket, and a security guard posted outside, yet your house keeps getting robbed. That, in essence, is the situation facing tribal communities in Jharkhand today when it comes to their land. The legal locks are in place. The Chotanagpur Tenancy Act, the Santhal Parganas Tenancy Act, and the Fifth Schedule of the Constitution collectively create one of the most protective land regimes for any community in India.<sup>1</sup>

Yet the statistics are devastating. Studies show that only a small fraction of tribal communities in Jharkhand hold legally recognized land titles, while a large and growing majority remain enmeshed in disputes, illegal occupations, and dispossession. Land that was supposed to be inalienable has been transferred, mortgaged, and occupied through a sophisticated ecosystem of fraud, legal manipulation, and institutional complicity. The guardians have failed.<sup>2</sup>

This article focuses on why. It examines three institutions that are supposed to be the primary guardians of tribal land in Jharkhand - SAR Courts, Gram Sabhas under PESA, and the Jharbhoomi platform and asks a deceptively simple question: where did they go wrong? The analysis also turns to the Fifth Schedule and the Tribal Advisory Council, which remain largely dormant despite their sweeping constitutional mandate.<sup>3</sup>

The central argument of this article is straightforward: the failure of tribal land protection in Jharkhand is not the result of bad laws. The laws are, by and large, well-designed. The failure is institutional, rooted in flawed design, poor implementation, political indifference, and structural conditions that allow the gap between legal promise and practical reality to persist indefinitely.

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<sup>1</sup> Virginius Xaxa, *State, Society and Tribes: Issues in Post-Colonial India* (Pearson Education India, 2008), pp. 112–18. See also Walter Fernandes & Geeta Menon, *Tribal Land in Jharkhand* (Indian Social Institute, 2010), pp. 34–40.

<sup>2</sup> Chotanagpur Tenancy Act, No. 6 of 1908, Sec. 46, 71; Santhal Parganas Tenancy (Supplementary Provisions) Act, No. 14 of 1949, Sec. 20. For a comprehensive overview, see Ministry of Tribal Affairs, Report on the Status of Implementation of Land Laws in Scheduled Areas (Government of India, 2019), pp. 8–13.

<sup>3</sup> Constitution of India, Fifth Schedule, para 5(2); see also B.D. Sharma, *Unbroken History of Broken Promises: Indian State and Tribals* (Sahyog Pustak Kuteer, 2010), pp. 66–72.

## II. SAR COURTS: SPECIALIZED JUSTICE, SYSTEMIC FAILURE

### A Court Built for a Purpose:

The Scheduled Area Regulation (SAR) Courts were designed with an important and specific purpose: to provide tribal communities with a dedicated, accessible, and fast-track forum to seek restoration of land that had been illegally transferred. Unlike ordinary civil courts, SAR Courts were supposed to understand the social and economic realities of tribal communities, apply protective tenancy laws with sensitivity, and deliver timely justice.<sup>4</sup>

The vision was compelling. Tribal dispossession often involves complex layers of forged documents, coerced signatures, and fraudulent transactions that take years to untangle in regular courts. A specialized forum, staffed by officers trained in the nuances of tribal land law, was meant to cut through this complexity and deliver real relief to real people.

### The Delay Disease:

The most visible and corrosive failure of SAR Courts is delay. Cases sit in pendency for years, sometimes decades. During all this time, the person or entity in illegal possession of the land continues to occupy it, benefit from it, and often further entrench their position by making investments, sub-transferring the land, or obtaining stay orders from higher courts. The law's promise of restoration rings hollow when restoration, if it comes at all, arrives a generation too late.

The Jharkhand High Court has repeatedly intervened on this issue. In *Mangal Munda v. State of Jharkhand*, the court observed that delays in restoration proceedings fundamentally defeat the protective purpose of tribal land legislation, a sobering observation that has been made, and largely ignored, across dozens of cases. The fact that judicial observations of this kind need to be repeated across multiple decades tells us that delay is not an accident; it is a feature of a system that has not prioritized tribal justice.

### Collusive Litigation and Captured Courts:

Perhaps even more troubling than delay is the phenomenon of collusive litigation, a

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<sup>4</sup> Panchayats (Extension to Scheduled Areas) Act, No. 40 of 1996 (India), Preamble and Sec. 4(d), 4(k) [hereinafter PESA]. See also Ministry of Panchayati Raj, Report on the Status of Implementation of PESA (Government of India, 2015), pp. 4–7.

practice where fake or manufactured disputes are engineered to obtain court orders that effectively legitimize illegal land transfers. Parties who have fraudulently acquired tribal land may orchestrate proceedings in which the court, unaware of the collusion, issues orders that serve as legal cover for what was originally an illegal transaction.

The Supreme Court's decision in *Samatha v. State of Andhra Pradesh* established a clear principle: protective land laws in Scheduled Areas must be strictly and rigorously enforced, and any deviation from statutory safeguards must be treated with suspicion rather than deference. Yet SAR Courts in Jharkhand have frequently fallen short of this standard, issuing decisions based on incomplete records, inadequate factual verification, and superficial reasoning. The result is a paradox: a court designed to protect tribal land that sometimes becomes an instrument of its further alienation.<sup>5</sup>

### **Orders That Exist Only on Paper:**

Even when SAR Courts do the right thing and order the restoration of land to its tribal owner, the story does not end there — and unfortunately, it often does not end well. The enforcement of restoration orders depends on the cooperation of local administration: revenue officers who must update records, police who must facilitate physical possession, and district authorities who must oversee implementation. In practice, this chain of cooperation frequently breaks down.

The Jharkhand High Court has noted this enforcement deficit explicitly, observing that restoration orders routinely go unimplemented long after they are passed. The tribal claimant wins in court, but the illegal occupant remains in possession. This is perhaps the most demoralizing failure of the system: it tells tribal communities that even if they fight and win, the system will not deliver what it has promised. The predictable result is a collapse of trust in legal institutions and a retreat from formal mechanisms entirely.

### **III. PESA AND GRAM SABHAS: DEMOCRACY HOLLOWED OUT**

#### **A Bold Constitutional Experiment:**

When Parliament enacted the Panchayats (Extension to Scheduled Areas) Act in 1996,

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<sup>5</sup> *Samatha v. State of Andhra Pradesh*, (1997) 8 SCC 191. See also Usha Ramanathan, 'Displacement and the Law' (1996) 31(24) Economic and Political Weekly 1486, 1489.

it was making a significant political commitment: that tribal communities would not merely be governed by the state, but would govern themselves, at least at the village level, through Gram Sabhas. PESA recognized the Gram Sabha, the assembly of all adult members of a village as the fundamental unit of self-governance in Scheduled Areas. It gave Gram Sabhas real powers: the authority to consent to or withhold consent from land acquisition and transfer, to manage natural resources, and to safeguard customary practices.<sup>6</sup>

The Supreme Court, in *Orissa Mining Corporation v. Ministry of Environment & Forest*, gave this framework constitutional teeth by holding that the prior, free, and informed consent of the Gram Sabha is legally mandatory before any diversion of forest land in Scheduled Areas. PESA was not just a policy preference; it was a constitutional imperative.<sup>7</sup>

### **Twenty-Nine Years of Delay:**

Jharkhand, one of the states most directly and urgently in need of PESA's protections, took nearly three decades to enact the state-specific rules required to operationalize the Act. PESA was passed in 1996. Jharkhand, carved out as a separate state in 2000, failed to notify its PESA rules for over two decades. It was only after sustained pressure from civil society, years of litigation, and contempt proceedings in *Adivasi Buddhijeevi Manch v. State of Jharkhand*, that the state finally published the Jharkhand PESA Rules in 2025, twenty-nine years after the central legislation that mandated them.<sup>8</sup>

This delay is not a bureaucratic oversight. It represents a deliberate or at best, recklessly indifferent failure of political will. For nearly three decades, tribal communities in Jharkhand were formally entitled to the protections of PESA but practically unable to exercise them because the implementing machinery did not exist. The state's reluctance to devolve real power over land and natural resources to tribal communities was written into every year of delay.

### **The Hollow Ritual of Consultation:**

Even with the rules now in place, a deeper problem persists: the phenomenon that

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<sup>6</sup> Panchayats (Extension to Scheduled Areas) Act, No. 40 of 1996 (India), Preamble and Sec. 4(d), 4(k). See also Ministry of Panchayati Raj, Report on the Status of Implementation of PESA (Government of India, 2015), pp. 4–7.

<sup>7</sup> *Orissa Mining Corp. v. Ministry of Environment & Forest*, (2013) 6 SCC 476. The Supreme Court affirmed that prior consent of Gram Sabha is mandatory before any diversion of forest land in Scheduled Areas.

<sup>8</sup> *Adivasi Buddhijeevi Manch v. State of Jharkhand*, W.P. (PIL) No. 4448 of 2015 (Jharkhand H.C., decided Jan. 13, 2026); see also Jharkhand Gazette Notification, PESA Rules, 2025, dated Oct. 15, 2025, Notification No. 12/Rev/2025.

scholars of indigenous governance have called 'procedural tokenism.' Gram Sabha meetings may be convened with inadequate notice, held in locations inconvenient for remote villagers, or conducted in ways that ensure a predetermined outcome. In some documented instances, records of Gram Sabha proceedings have been simply fabricated, minutes created for meetings that never happened, resolutions manufactured to show community consent that was never actually sought.<sup>9</sup>

The Jharkhand High Court, in *Birsa Oraon v. State of Jharkhand*, stressed that PESA compliance cannot be reduced to the production of paperwork. Genuine, substantive participation is what the law demands, not the theatrical performance of consultation. This distinction between formal compliance and genuine participation is not merely legalistic; it goes to the heart of what self-governance means. The right to be consulted is meaningless if the consultation is rigged.<sup>10</sup>

### **The Missing Half: Women in Gram Sabhas:**

There is another dimension of PESA's implementation failure that receives less attention than it deserves: gender exclusion. While PESA does not explicitly bar women from Gram Sabha proceedings, social and cultural norms in many tribal communities in Jharkhand effectively limit their participation. Women are frequently absent from meetings, their voices are rarely heard on matters affecting land, and decisions are made by a subset of the community, typically older men who may not represent the full spectrum of community interests. This is not merely a social equity issue; it is a governance deficit with real consequences for the quality of decisions made about tribal land.<sup>11</sup>

## **IV. JHARBHOOMI: THE DIGITAL PROMISE AND ITS DISCONTENTS**

### **The Case for Digitization:**

The digitization of land records through the Jharbhoomi platform was introduced with genuine promise. The logic was intuitive: paper records are vulnerable to loss, manipulation,

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<sup>9</sup> *Birsa Oraon v. State of Jharkhand*, 2017 SCC OnLine Jhar 1789. The court stressed that compliance with PESA cannot be reduced to procedural tokenism and that substantive participation must be guaranteed.

<sup>10</sup> *Ibid*

<sup>11</sup> Nandini Sundar, *Subalterns and Sovereigns: An Anthropological History of Bastar 1854–2006* (2nd ed., Oxford University Press, 2008), pp. 203–09. See also United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, G.A. Res. 61/295, art. 18 (Sept. 13, 2007).

and selective access; digital records, maintained on a government server with proper security, should be more transparent, more accurate, and more accessible to ordinary citizens. Technology, in this vision, would displace the corrupt human intermediaries who had long profited from their privileged access to land records.<sup>12</sup>

### **Garbage In, Garbage Out:**

The problem, however, is that the quality of a digital system is only as good as the quality of the data fed into it. And in Jharkhand, the underlying land records that were digitized had been accumulated over more than a century of colonial and post-colonial administration, during which tribal landholding patterns often rooted in customary, community-based arrangements that were never formally documented were poorly captured, inconsistently recorded, and frequently inaccurate.<sup>13</sup>

The Jharkhand High Court confronted this directly in *Shivlal Munda v. State of Jharkhand*, holding that digital records cannot be treated as conclusive where the underlying data is flawed or incomplete. Digitization, in this sense, did not solve the problem of inaccurate records, it gave inaccurate records a veneer of official authority, making them harder, not easier, to challenge. The computer screen showing a wrong entry carries an implicit legitimacy that a handwritten entry in a dusty ledger does not.<sup>14</sup>

### **Exclusion in a Digital Age:**

The paradox of Jharbhoomi cuts even deeper when one considers who is most affected by the land governance system. The tribal communities whose land is at stake are, by and large, the same communities that lack reliable internet connectivity, cannot afford smartphones, and may have limited literacy in the dominant languages in which the platform operates. For them, the transition to a digital system did not simplify access, it created a new barrier, layered on

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<sup>12</sup> Jharkhand State Government, Jharbhoomi: A Digital Land Records Initiative - Progress Report 2023 (Department of Revenue, Registration and Land Reforms, Ranchi, 2023), pp. 4–7. See also Ministry of Electronics and Information Technology, Digital India Land Records Modernisation Programme - Framework Guidelines (Government of India, 2021), pp. 9–11.

<sup>13</sup> *Shivlal Munda v. State of Jharkhand*, 2021 SCC OnLine Jhar 1782. See also Ministry of Electronics and Information Technology, Digital India Land Records Modernisation Programme - Evaluation Report (Government of India, 2022), pp. 29–31.

<sup>14</sup> *Shivlal Munda v. State of Jharkhand*, 2021 SCC OnLine Jhar 1782. See also Ministry of Electronics and Information Technology, Digital India Land Records Modernisation Programme — Evaluation Report (Government of India, 2022), pp. 29–31.

top of all the existing ones.<sup>15</sup>

This has given rise to a new class of digital intermediaries: agents who offer to help community members navigate the Jharbhoomi system for a fee. In some respects, these intermediaries mirror the touts and fixers who profited from the old paper-based system and bring with them the same risks of overcharging, misinformation, and outright manipulation. Technology has changed the interface through which exploitation occurs, but it has not eliminated exploitation itself.<sup>16</sup>

### **New Vulnerabilities, Old Problems:**

Digitization also introduces security vulnerabilities that did not exist in the same form in the physical records system. Unauthorized access, data tampering, and cyber fraud are increasingly documented concerns in digital land records systems across India. In Jharkhand, the absence of robust audit trails and real-time monitoring mechanisms means that unauthorized changes to records may go undetected until the damage in the form of a fraudulently altered entry that strips a tribal community of its land title has already been done.<sup>17</sup>

A comparison with states like Karnataka and Andhra Pradesh which have invested more heavily in data validation, integration of cadastral maps, and user-friendly interfaces reveals that Jharkhand's digital reforms, while well-intentioned, have been under-resourced and under-designed. The technology exists to build a digital land records system that genuinely serves tribal communities. Jharkhand has not yet built it.

## **V. THE FIFTH SCHEDULE AND TRIBAL ADVISORY COUNCIL: SLEEPING GIANTS**

Perhaps the most underappreciated failure in Jharkhand's tribal land governance system is the failure to use the constitutional tools that are already available. The Fifth Schedule of the Constitution vests the Governor of a scheduled state with extraordinary powers: the authority to apply, modify, or repeal any central or state law in Scheduled Areas; to prohibit or restrict

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<sup>15</sup> Prashant Bhushan, 'Digitisation of Land Records and the Tribal Question' (2020) 55(14) Economic and Political Weekly 22, 24–25. See also Prabhat Ranjan & Aparajita Bharti, 'E-Governance and the Tribal Land Question: A Critical Appraisal' (2019) 54(42) Economic and Political Weekly 33, 35.

<sup>16</sup> *Ibid*

<sup>17</sup> Mihir Shah, 'Land Reforms in India: A Critical Review' in Mahendra Dev (ed.), India: Development and Participation (Oxford University Press, 2003), pp. 324–30; see also Karnataka Land Records Modernisation Mission, Annual Progress Report 2022 (Department of Revenue, Karnataka, 2022), pp. 12–17.

land transfers to non-tribals; and to direct that any law should not apply to a Scheduled Area or should apply with modifications. The Tribal Advisory Council (TAC) exists to advise the Governor on these matters.<sup>18</sup>

These are not minor administrative powers. In the hands of a Governor genuinely committed to tribal welfare, the Fifth Schedule could be used to rapidly and decisively address the failures of SAR Courts, PESA implementation, and Jharbhoomi. Regulations could be issued, laws could be modified, and institutional accountability could be mandated, all without waiting for the state legislature to act. Yet the evidence shows that gubernatorial powers under the Fifth Schedule are rarely exercised, and when they are, the scope is narrow and the impact limited.<sup>19</sup>

The TAC, similarly, has been reduced to a ceremonial body. Meetings are infrequent, agendas are thin, and recommendations are not binding, meaning that even the advice the TAC offers can be ignored with impunity. The Jharkhand High Court has, in several observations, noted the underutilization of Fifth Schedule provisions and pointed to the gap between constitutional design and administrative reality. The framework provides robust protections; the political will to operationalize them is absent.<sup>20</sup>

## VI. SYSTEMIC FAILURE: CONNECTING THE DOTS

Looking at these four institutional failures together - SAR Courts, PESA, Jharbhoomi, and the Fifth Schedule, a common pattern emerges. In each case, the legal framework is reasonably well-designed. The problem is not bad law; it is bad implementation, structural under-resourcing, and a persistent lack of political will to make these institutions work for the communities they are supposed to serve.<sup>21</sup>

Data underscores the urgency of these failures. Despite the existence of comprehensive protective legislation, studies indicate that a majority of tribal communities in Jharkhand

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<sup>18</sup> Mathew Areeparampil, *Tribes of Jharkhand: Issues in Forest, Land and Livelihood* (Chaibasa: BIRSA, 2007), pp. 89–91; NITI Aayog, Report of the High Level Committee on Socio-Economic, Health and Educational Status of Tribal Communities of India (Government of India, 2014), pp. 103–07.

<sup>19</sup> *Rameshwar Oraon v. State of Jharkhand*, 2019 SCC OnLine Jhar 1345. See also Centre for Policy Research, *Fifth Schedule Governance: An Assessment of Implementation Gaps* (New Delhi, 2018), pp. 22–26.

<sup>20</sup> *Rameshwar Oraon v. State of Jharkhand*, 2019 SCC OnLine Jhar 1345. See also Centre for Policy Research, *Fifth Schedule Governance: An Assessment of Implementation Gaps* (New Delhi, 2018), pp. 22–26.

<sup>21</sup> Ministry of Tribal Affairs, Annual Report 2022–23 (Government of India, 2023), pp. 44–48; Standing Committee on Social Justice and Empowerment, 35th Report on the Issues of Land Alienation of Tribals and Its Restoration (Lok Sabha Secretariat, New Delhi, 2013), pp. 56–60.

remain entangled in land disputes, and significant proportions have lost land they should have been entitled to keep. Reports from the Ministry of Tribal Affairs and the Standing Committee on Social Justice and Empowerment have documented that restoration mechanisms are slow, under-enforced, and inaccessible to many of those who need them.<sup>22</sup>

The consequences reach far beyond legal dispossession. For tribal communities in Jharkhand, land is not merely a productive asset, it is the foundation of cultural identity, social organization, and subsistence livelihood. Its loss triggers displacement, distress migration, erosion of community structures, and economic vulnerability. Nearly half of the tribal population in Jharkhand continues to face economic hardship, and much of this hardship traces directly to land loss.<sup>23</sup>

The NITI Aayog and Ministry of Tribal Affairs have repeatedly identified the same systemic impediments: poor coordination between government agencies, weak enforcement of land restoration orders, outdated and inaccurate land records, and a lack of legal awareness among tribal communities. These are not new findings. They have been documented in report after report over decades. The real question is why nothing substantial has been done about them.<sup>24</sup>

## VII. THE WAY FORWARD: REFORM FROM THE GROUND UP

Fixing the tribal land governance crisis in Jharkhand requires thinking beyond incremental reforms. Tinkering at the edges, adding more staff to SAR Courts, issuing circulars about PESA compliance, or improving the Jharbhoomi user interface will not solve problems that are structural in nature. What is required is a fundamental rethinking of institutional design, backed by genuine political commitment.<sup>25</sup>

For SAR Courts, this means guaranteeing institutional independence from the executive, creating dedicated monitoring mechanisms to track pendency and enforcement, and

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<sup>22</sup> Ministry of Tribal Affairs, Annual Report 2022–23 (Government of India, 2023), pp. 44–48; Standing Committee on Social Justice and Empowerment, 35th Report on the Issues of Land Alienation of Tribals and Its Restoration (Lok Sabha Secretariat, New Delhi, 2013), pp. 56–60.

<sup>23</sup> NITI Aayog, Government of India, Tribal Development Report (2021), pp. 44–49. See also Over 46% of Tribals Face Economic Hardship in Jharkhand, Times of India, Mar. 12, 2024, at A6.

<sup>24</sup> Planning Commission of India (now NITI Aayog), Report of the High-Level Committee on Socio-Economic, Health and Educational Status of Tribal Communities in India (Government of India, 2014), pp. 118–22.

<sup>25</sup> Christoph von Fürer-Haimendorf, *Tribes of India: The Struggle for Survival* (University of California Press, 1982), pp. 188–94. The sociological dimension of land loss is further examined in Virginius Xaxa, ‘Tribes as Indigenous People of India’ (1999) 34(51) Economic and Political Weekly 3589, 3592–93.

establishing clear accountability for officers who fail to implement restoration orders. Time-bound adjudication with hard statutory deadlines and consequences for non-compliance should replace the current culture of indefinite delay.

For PESA and Gram Sabhas, genuine implementation requires more than rules on paper. It requires capacity-building programs to educate tribal communities about their rights, independent verification mechanisms to detect fabricated Gram Sabha proceedings, and proactive gender inclusion measures to ensure that women's voices are part of land governance decisions.

For Jharbhoomi, the path forward involves going back to basics: a comprehensive audit and correction of existing digitized records, robust security protocols to prevent unauthorized manipulation, and investment in offline access mechanisms and local-language support to bridge the digital divide. Technology should serve the community, not exclude it.

And for the Fifth Schedule, the reform is perhaps the simplest to articulate, if the most politically difficult to achieve: use it. The Governor's powers under the Fifth Schedule are not merely symbolic, they are real, broad, and immediately available. What is needed is the political will to activate them in service of tribal communities, rather than allow them to sit dormant while dispossession continues.<sup>26</sup>

## VIII. CONCLUSION

The story of tribal land protection in Jharkhand is, at its core, a story about the distance between what a state promises its citizens and what it actually delivers. India's constitutional and statutory framework for tribal land rights is, in many respects, admirable, a serious and sustained attempt to protect historically marginalized communities from exploitation. The failure lies not in the law's vision, but in the institutions tasked with making that vision real.

SAR Courts delay, defer, and fail to enforce. PESA's Gram Sabhas are hollowed out by tokenism, fabrication, and exclusion. Jharbhoomi digitizes the problem rather than solving it. The Fifth Schedule sleeps. And tribal land continues to flow away from the communities whose

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<sup>26</sup> For a comparative analysis see Raghunath Kelkar & J.C. Pant, *Tribal Land Rights in India* (National Institute of Rural Development, 2016), pp. 77–83; Forest Rights Act, No. 2 of 2007 (India), Sec. 3, 4. See also Namita Wahi et al., *Land Rights in India: Institutions, Policies and Politics* (Oxford University Press, 2017), pp. 211–17.

very identity is bound up in it.

This article has argued that this failure is structural and systemic, not the result of any single bad actor or any single bad decision, but of an institutional ecosystem that consistently fails to prioritize tribal interests. Addressing it requires honesty about the depth of the problem, ambition in imagining solutions, and political will to implement them.

***The tribal communities of Jharkhand have been patient. The laws have been written. The institutions have been created. What remains is the hardest part: making them work.***